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This dissertation examines the revival of interest in interplay of music and mystery in post-1945 
France, revisiting but also reconfiguring recent debates on the merits of the ineffable in music. 
The framework of my project brings into focus, amidst post-WWII French philosophies of 
music, what can be seen as two polar regions of mysteriology. At one end, there is the 
musicologist Gisèle Brelet, who employs the conventional terms of epistemology constructing 
what amounts to a metaphysics of music. At the other, there is the philosopher Vladimir 
Jankélévitch, who seeks to expose at every turn the ultimate metaphoricity of any such 
metaphysics, advocating a radical re-creation of his subject matter in the process of reflecting on 
it. 
As I show, however dissimilar, these approaches subsisted on, as well as marked the 
limits of, a broader intellectual milieu—that of an existential phenomenology committed to 
studying the intentionality of conscious experience. The Introduction discusses contemporaneous 
philosophical, and Chapter 1 traces historical, underpinnings of the new urge to register the 
aesthetic experience of music as “ontological mystery,” an experience hinging on a variety of 
modes of awareness of an Other. When approached via musical sound, the question of the Other 
becomes a problem of time—the medium through which the experience of the Other happens. 
 Both Brelet and Jankélévitch posited, albeit in differing ways, that through music we 
become conscious of a time that is other than the way in which we experience time in our 
ordinary lives. In phenomenology, the Other can take various, but related forms—most 
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 v 
commonly, it is the alterity of another consciousness, of the world in-itself, or of history. 
Chapters 2–4 explore in turn each of these forms and their corresponding temporalities as they 
appear in the work of Jankélévitch and Brelet. Chapter 2 centers on the mystery of intra-human 
and inter-human time, of time within and between subjects. Chapter 3 addresses the mystery of 
ecological time, or the temporal relationship between human beings and the natural world. 
Chapter 4 investigates the mystery of historical time and its manifestations in the dialectics of 
music. 
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1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Almost exactly halfway through his book Debussy et le mystère (1949), the philosopher Vladimir 
Jankélévitch (1903–1985) introduces a section titled “Le point méridien”—the meridian point, or 
that instant of the day at which the sun reaches its highest position in the sky, midway between 
longitudinal horizons.1 Within this, the meridian hour of his own text, Jankélévitch writes:  
Midday is comparable to the crystal whose transparency is also a resistance and 
consistency, whose limpidity signifies impenetrability. To the nothingness of 
midnight, which is nothingness in the void and obscure nonbeing, which is pure 
negative Nothing, the dying sun opposes its nothingness of midday, which is 
absolute plenitude, acute actuality, extreme positivity. Debussy knew better than 
any other this mystery of light, this insomnia in the great sunlight of diurnal omni-
presence.2 
 
The image of the noonday sun serves as one of the principal devices by which Jankélévitch seeks 
to elicit—without thereby also effacing—what is, for him, the mysterious essence of Debussy’s 
music.3 
Through his construction of this and other similarly evocative images in Debussy et le 
mystère, as well as through his performative philosophical stance, Jankélévitch attempts to 
                                                 
1“9. Le point méridien” (the final section of the second chapter) begins on page 79. It is preceded by 1,748 
lines of text. The section itself and the text that follows it consists of 1,724 lines. Vladimir Jankélévitch, Debussy et 
le mystère (Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Éditions de La Baconnière, 1949).  
2Ibid., 81: “Midi est comparable au cristal, dont la transparence est aussi une résistance et une consistance, 
dont la limpidité signifie impénétrabilité. Au néant de minuit, qui est néant dans le vide et le non-être obscur, qui est 
pur Rien négatif, le soleil de mort oppose son néant de midi, lequel est plénitude absolue, actualité aiguë, extrême 
positivité. Debussy a connu mieux que tout autre ce mystère de lumière, cette insomnie au grand soleil de 
l’omniprésence diurne.” All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
3“Le Mystère de midi” is the title of the second chapter of Debussy et le mystère. As one of several 
iterations of the “limpid mystery” (mystère limpide), “the mystery of midday,” for Jankélévitch, represents a crucial 
aspect of Debussy’s compositional aesthetic.  
2 
approximate the effects of the very objects that he is discussing. As he writes about the mystery 
of Debussy’s music, he weaves in his own literary tapestry of mystery. In a prominent sense, his 
writing about music is itself musical. At the same time that he enlightens, he bedazzles, inventing 
and reinventing something along with music’s maker, taking part in “his or her processes,” or re-
creating, as it were, “what he or she created.”4  
With the foggy light of mystery, just as he partially veils a large portion of Debussy’s 
oeuvre, Jankélévitch simultaneously uncovers in it a wealth of concrete, articulable detail. 
Mystery thus becomes, via Jankélévitch’s work, a rich source of intellectual productivity.  
In late-1940s France, this kind of thinking and writing provided sustenance for others as 
well. Gisèle Brelet (1915–1973), another French philosopher, also drew upon the mystery that, 
as she perceived it, lay at the heart of musical experience.  
Over the course of thousands of pages published during 1947–1951, Brelet sought to 
articulate the mysteriousness of, among others, musical creation, time, and performance.5 She 
did so in a way that diverged significantly from that of her now more well-known compatriot. 
Where Jankélévitch developed his thoughts on music in relatively anarchic fashion, folding them 
in with his musings on other, non-sound-related matters, Brelet expounded her musical 
philosophy systematically. Where Jankélévitch wrote books dedicated to specific French 
                                                 
4Vladimir Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, trans. Carolyn Abbate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 119. The notion of “remaking” is essential to Jankélévitch’s philosophical procedure. Ibid., 
77–8: “To remake is to make, and a re-beginning is often the true beginning; the poet who makes and the performer 
who re-makes, the composer who invents and the listener who understands, production (primary ‘poetry’) and re-
production (secondary ‘poetry’), the original beginning and the continued beginning, initiative and repetition, may 
well follow the same path, in the same sense, from the same point of view, and form nothing more than a single act. 
The second time, though without chronological priority, is often as much an inaugural and inceptive instance as the 
first. Henri Bremond has said that one must interpret the poetic experience by remaking it.” Emphasis in the 
original. 
5Her monographs alone amass 1,485 pages. Gisèle Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1947); Le Temps musical: Essai d’une esthétique nouvelle de la musique, 2 vols. (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1949); L’Interprétation créatrice: Essai sur l’exécution musicale, 2 vols. (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1951). 
3 
composers (such as Debussy, Fauré, and Ravel) and rather marginal genres (such as the nocturne 
and the rhapsody), Brelet arranged her treatises on musical aesthetics according to traditional 
conceptual categories—sound and time, material and structure, empiricism and formalism.6 
Where Jankélévitch limited his survey of music’s terrain mainly to turn-of-the-century French 
composers, Brelet expanded the scope of her research to cover as much territory as possible.7 All 
in all, she aimed for general comprehensiveness. 
And yet, Brelet’s writing, too, incorporates moments of mysteriousness. She, for 
instance, was much attached to the conception of the “eternal present,” whose puzzling aspect 
Edward A. Lippman (1920–2010), the main author of scholarship on her work, has underscored.8 
Though Lippman has regarded it as “not easily understood,” the “eternal present” remains one of 
the key terms in her philosophy of music: it refers to an experience that challenges the more 
                                                 
6In addition to Debussy et le mystère, see Vladimir Jankélévitch, Gabriel Fauré et ses mélodies (Paris: 
Plon, 1938); Maurice Ravel (Paris: Rieder, 1939); Le Nocturne (Lyon, France: Marius Audin, 1942); La Rhapsodie: 
Verve et improvisation musicale (Paris: Flammarion, 1955). Even La Musique et l’ineffable (Paris: Colin, 1961; 
Éditions du Seuil, 1983)—the closest he comes to a proper philosophy of music—upsets structural expectations and 
resists propositional transparency. Brelet organizes her works philosophically: they directly treat not specific 
musical creations, but musical creation itself.  
7When asked where music begins for him, Jankélévitch once replied in an interview: “For someone who, in 
many respects, is so old-fashioned, it is modern and contemporary art par excellence. I must say that I am absolutely 
uncultivated, nearly illiterate when it comes to everything concerning classical music. It is with difficulty that I 
distinguish one Beethoven sonata from another. Dare I say to your listeners that Bach bores me? It is my dishonor. I 
recognize that I’m missing something… One day, when I am retired, as I will have leisure, as the Sorbonne will 
restore to me the time that I dedicated to it, maybe I’ll learn from Bach. But for now—and for me, of course—music 
starts very late. It begins in France after 1870. The beginning is César Franck writing the Symphony in D minor. This 
is where it all begins. Other than that... I love the music of the twentieth century. This is what I love. This is what is 
missing, what is neglected today. It is unfortunate.” Guy Suarès, ed., Vladimir Jankélévitch (Lyon, France: La 
Manufacture, 1986), 76.  
For Brelet, music begins in mystery: “And it is the essential originality, the very mystery of musical art, 
that it can enclose within the rigor and atemporality of a form what is most concrete and living in duration—the very 
quickness of its flow.” [“Et c’est l’essentielle originalité, mystère même de l’art musical qu’il puisse enfermer en la 
rigeur et l’intemporalité d’une forme la durée en ce qu’elle a de plus concret et vivant: en la vitesse même de son 
écoulement.”] In addition to modern and contemporary music, Brelet listens to Bach and Beethoven, to medieval 
and Renaissance music, to Chinese and Japanese music—music from myriad times, places, and cultures. Brelet, Le 
Temps musical, 22. 
8In A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, Lippman refers to Brelet’s discussion of the “eternal present” 
(Le Temps musical, vol. 2, ch. 8, 684–90) as one that is “not easily understood.” Edward Lippman, A History of 
Western Musical Aesthetics (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 451–2. For more on Lippman, see 
below, pages 12–14. 
4 
familiar temporality of “psychological duration,” something Brelet views as the “commonplace 
time of everyday life.”9 In Le Temps musical (1949), she writes: 
In Stravinsky (especially in the Wedding), the elementary becoming of life 
immediately engenders the eternity of musical time, as if life became aware of 
that eternal present from which it never leaves and which is anterior and superior 
to time... The commonplace time of everyday life, essentially psychological, 
related to the subjectivity of recollection and expectation, exists only in a middle 
zone: it is neither purely in life nor purely in spirit. And this is why the musical 
time of Stravinsky, entirely turned toward itself and the eternal present, wants to 
ignore psychological duration and always situates itself before time and after 
time: in the innocence of vital and elementary duration or in spiritual duration 
(i.e., time which comes to be known and surmounted in the awareness that it gains 
of itself).10 
 
Confounding the way we ordinarily experience time, music, she intimates, operates mysteriously 
by means of two forms of mute speech, that of the body and that of the spirit. 
What’s more, it is philosophy that, for Brelet, makes it possible to cognize this 
“mysterious power of music.”11 She, like Jankélévitch, hears philosophy in and through music.12 
Like Jankélévitch, she discovers a philosophy of time embodied in the “sonically sensorial” 
                                                 
9Ibid.; Brelet, Le Temps musical, 689. 
10Ibid.: “Chez Strawinsky (tout particulièrement dans les Noces), le devenir élémentaire de la vie engendre 
immédiatement l’éternité du temps musical, comme si la vie devenait consciente de cet éternel présent qu’elle ne 
quitte pas, et qui est antérieur et supérieur au temps… Le temps banal de la vie quotidienne, essentiellement 
psychologique, lié à la subjectivité d’un souvenir et d’une attente, n’existe qu’en une zone mitoyenne: il n’est ni en 
la vie pure, ni en l’esprit pur. Et c’est pourquoi le temps musical de Strawinsky, tout entier tourné vers lui-même et 
l’éternel présent, veut ignorer la durée psychologique et toujours se situe avant le temps et après le temps: en 
l’innocence de la durée vitale et élémentaire, ou en la durée spirituelle, temps qui se sait et se vainc en la 
connaissance qu’il prend de soi.”  
11Ibid., 60.  
12Ibid.: “If musical time, realized in sonic intuition, is the essence of time and the essential acts of thinking, 
if music possesses its immanent metaphysics, it is not forbidden to metaphysics to interrogate music: it will discover 
there a knowledge of consciousness and time in their living nexus. From musical time emerges ultimately a 
philosophy of time, expressed in the language of sonic sensoriality, making use of the seductions of the latter in 
order to convince us—a philosophy which silences the others and imposes itself immediately upon us...” [“Si le 
temps musical, c’est, réalisés dans l’intuition sonore, l’essence du temps et les actes essentiels de la pensée, si la 
musique possède sa métaphysique immanente, il n’est pas interdit à métaphysique d’interroger la musique: elle y 
découvrira une connaissance de la conscience et du temps, dans leur liaison vivante. Du temps musical se dégage en 
définitive une philosophie du temps, exprimée dans le langage du sensible sonore, usant des séductions de celui-ci 
pour nous convaincre, — philosophie qui fait taire les autres et s’impose immédiatement à nous, et don’t nous 
esquisserons en conclusion les traits essentiels.”] 
5 
itself, an embodiment which adorns, with “the most dazzling evidence,” an experience of this 
philosophy.13 
Listening to the enigmatic “language of sonic sensoriality” was, for many scholars in 
post-WWII France, a vital task.14 For many, music (from both the past and the present) came to 
be seen as a privileged medium for the transmission of perplexing messages. A cultural practice 
of listening to mystery emerged in the work of a number of postwar French philosophers and 
musicologists, including not only Brelet and Jankélévitch, but also Mikel Dufrenne (1910– 
1995), Gabriel Marcel (1889–1974), Boris de Schlœzer (1881–1969), Jeanne Vial (1912–2009), 
and others.  
In their writings, notions of mystery served to signify and display the elusive musical 
object and its effects—from that of an “atemporal time,” engendering a “spontaneous coherence, 
no longer speculative but truly existential” (Brelet) to an “inexpressive Espressivo,” generating 
an “enigmatic voice” that reminds us of the “mystery that we bear within ourselves” 
(Jankélévitch) to a “pure erotic,” mysteriously bringing to presence “the world of primordial 
experience” (Marcel) to an “ineffable meaning,” revealing “a world invisible to the eye, 
undemonstrable to the intellect” (Dufrenne) to a “concrete thought,” promising an experience of 
the “unveiling of an Idea, of a perfect presence” (Vial) to a “concrete idea,” disclosing through 
the self-unfolding of its dialectical process an “immanent sense” that is “indefinable, elusive to 
reflection,” not because it is “misty, equivocal,” but because it is “concrete, individual” (de 
Schlœzer).15 
                                                 
13Ibid. 
14Ibid.  
15Brelet, L’Interprétation créatrice, 2; Brelet, Le Temps musical, 59; Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 
154; Gabriel Marcel, “Music According to Saint Augustine (1943)” and “Meditation on Music” in Music and 
Philosophy, trans. Stephen Maddux and Robert E. Wood (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Marquette University Press, 2005), 
6 
 Of these figures, English-language music scholarship has thus far evinced significant 
interest in the ideas of only one. Since the 2003 publication of Carolyn Abbate’s English 
translation of La Musique et l’ineffable (1961; rev. 1983), there has been considerable discussion 
of Jankélévitch’s philosophy of music.16 
Many have identified in Jankélévitch’s work, just as Abbate had, a promising resource.17 
A few, including Steven Rings and Michael J. Puri, have expressed reservations while continuing 
to pursue the possibility of lasting merit.18 Others have quickly turned to reproof, underlining the 
                                                                                                                                                             
120 and 130; Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, trans. Edward S. Casey, et al. 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 265–6; Jeanne Vial, De L’Être musical (Neuchâtel, 
Switzerland: Éditions de La Baconnière, 1952), 92; Boris de Schlœzer, Introduction à J.-S. Bach: Essai d’esthétique 
musicale (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 365. In all cases, emphasis in the original. In 1934, de Schlœzer had simply used 
the word mystery. As Tamara Levitz has observed, de Schlœzer argued that Stravinsky’s “Perséphone failed as a 
Hellenist or classical work because it lacked the mystery that enabled ‘true’ memories and united past and present in 
defiance of history.” Qtd. in Tamara Levitz, Modernist Mysteries: Perséphone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 614. 
16Much of the recent conversation seems to have been sparked by Abbate’s subsequent article “Music—
Drastic or Gnostic?” Jankélévitch is depicted therein as a philosopher of musical performance, one who argues that 
“real music is music that exists in time, the material acoustic phenomenon.” Carolyn Abbate, “Music—Drastic or 
Gnostic?” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 3 (2004): 505. For Abbate, Jankélévitch’s philosophy of music entails a drastic 
musicology of “actual live performances.” Ibid., 506. 
Like Abbate, I find something productive in Jankélévitch’s employment of mystery, charme, the ineffable. 
I would say, however, that the drastic musicology that Jankélévitch historically practices is one which focuses more 
on musical works and moments within those works than on performances. In La Musique et l’ineffable, Jankélévitch 
does not write about actual live performances. “Musical reality,” he asserts, “is situated neither in literature, nor in 
ideology, nor technique, nor biographical anecdotes. But, on the other hand, it is situated in all these things, at least a 
little, and more, in a thousand other things that one cannot enumerate.” Jankélévitch refuses to locate real music in 
any specific medium. Its existence would include actual live performances but cannot be constrained to them. 
Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 118. 
Earlier, Abbate’s In Search of Opera (2001) had incorporated and enacted the principles of Jankélévitch’s 
philosophy in a way that more closely resembled his own writings on music. I return to this point in Chapter Two 
(“Jankélévitch, Levinas, and Sonorous Psychism”). 
17Michael Gallope, for instance, closely considers the technical potential of Jankélévitch’s philosophy. In 
Gallope’s view, Jankélévitch “avoids privileging or essentializing any particular medium for musical technique.” 
Michael Gallope, “Jankélévitch’s Fidelity to Inconsistency,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 65, no. 
1 (2012): 239. Gallope observes that when Jankélévitch “meditates on ‘what music does’” he attends to a wide array 
of activity that includes “technical musical particulars (structures, topoi, styles, etc.).” Ibid., 236.  
18Steven Rings strives to make sense of Jankélévitch’s paradoxical statements about the relationship 
between music and language. Steven Rings, “Mystères limpides: Time and Transformation in Debussy’s Des pas sur 
la neige,” 19th-Century Music 32, no. 2 (2008): 178–208; “Talking and Listening with Jankélévitch,” Journal of the 
American Musicological Society 65 (2012): 218–23.  
Like Rings, Michael J. Puri recommends restraint: we should, he advises, adopt an “initial ambivalence” 
toward Jankélévitch’s work and “act accordingly, neither affirming it immediately for its possible redemption of our 
perceived shortcomings, nor rejecting it wholesale for its unpalatable alterity, but rather critically examining its 
elements for potential strengths and weaknesses.” Michael J. Puri, “Jankélévitch and the Dilemma of Decadence,” 
7 
inconsistency of Jankélévitch’s thought, its obsolescence, its impotence, or even its violence. For 
scholars such as James Hepokoski, Judy Lochhead, and James Currie, Jankélévitch’s ideas are, 
above all, dangerous.19 
No one among anglophone musicologists, regardless of standpoint, has placed 
Jankélévitch in historical contexts in order to specifically highlight his concrete relevance within 
those contexts: his thoughts, in other words, have not been sufficiently historicized.20 A process 
of examining the particular situations in which he lived and worked, the people with whom he 
interacted, and the multiplicity of intellectual trends with which he came into contact—only 
infrequently has this accompanied the practice of reading Jankélévitch. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Journal of the American Musicological Society 65, no. 1 (2012): 241. See also Michael J. Puri, “Memory and 
Melancholy in the ‘Epilogue’ of Ravel’s Valses nobles et sentimentales,” Music Analysis 29 (2010): 1–37.  
19For Hepokoski, the foundation of Jankélévitch’s philosophy places it in the same camp with other “anti-
intellectual positions” that “did not have an entirely savory history in the twentieth century” and that “liberal 
thinkers might well greet…with wariness.” Writings based on such positions typically follow an argumentational 
process that leads to a “perilous” maneuver—the “attempt to delegitimize the divergent voices of others.” James 
Hepokoski, “Ineffable Immersion: Contextualizing the Call for Silence,” Journal of the American Musicological 
Society 65, no. 1 (2012): 225–6.  
Lochhead claims that Jankélévitch “unwittingly” forsakes “the possibility of overt critical engagement with 
music.” Moreover, the “recent promotion of aesthetic categories of the sublime and the ineffable,” based on the 
ideas of Jankélévitch and others, “reveals a disturbing trend toward concepts that are contrary to the philosophical 
and political goals of feminism.” Judy Lochhead, “Can We Say What We Hear?—Jankélévitch and the Bergsonian 
Ineffable,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 65, no. 1 (2012): 231; Judy Lochhead, “The Sublime, the 
Ineffable, and Other Dangerous Aesthetics,” Women & Music: A Journal of Gender and Culture 12 (2008): 63. 
Currie finds in Jankélévitch’s “nonnegotiable refusal of all things German” an “unconscious” and 
“nondialectical reinscription” of the same “abusive restrictions engendered by glib identity relations” that his 
philosophy had been “deeply concerned with unmasking.” (I would argue to the contrary that Jankélévitch, up to 
1949 at least, had not unconditionally refused “all things German”; Debussy et mystère, for instance, contains 
neutral references to German music, i.e., that of Strauss, and to German philosophy, i.e., that of Nietzsche). Some of 
the music that “often falls easily within Jankélévitch’s idiosyncratic musical canon,” according to Currie, has been 
shown to be complicit with the ideals of fascism, with “the very fascist politics that Jankélévitch’s own musicalized 
value system is self-evidently meant to prohibit.” James Currie, “Where Jankélévitch Cannot Speak,” Journal of the 
American Musicological Society 65, no. 1 (2012): 248–9. 
20Outside of musicology, there have been some efforts to register the historical significance of 
Jankélévitch’s work. As early as 1964, Colin Smith had considered Jankélévitch’s thoughts in their own milieu, 
showing their relevance to many of the core concerns in French philosophy at that time. See his Contemporary 
French Philosophy: A Study in Norms and Values (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1964). More recently, 
scholars such as Andrew Kelley, Aaron T. Looney, and Alan Udoff have devoted attention to the various contexts in 
relation to which Jankélévitch formed his philosophy. Andrew Kelley, translator’s introduction to Forgiveness, by 
Vladimir Jankélévitch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Andrew Kelley, “Jankélévitch and Levinas on 
the ‘Wholly Other,’” Levinas Studies 8 (2013): 23–43; Aaron T. Looney, Vladimir Jankélévitch: The Time of 
Forgiveness (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015); Alan Udoff, ed., Vladimir Jankélévitch and the Question 
of Forgiveness (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2013).  
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It is true that setting his ideas against certain well-rehearsed conceptual backgrounds has 
often all but demanded disparagement or dismissal. Such backgrounds have tended to obscure as 
much as they clarify, however. Aligning the mystical and theological elements of Jankélévitch’s 
philosophy with a tradition of Christian anti-modernism, for example, does little to illuminate the 
role of these elements within the work of a Jewish academic who was a member of the French 
Resistance during the Occupation.21 As a broad, international phenomenon, the notion of 
preserving something ungraspable in music has been less partisan than many other intellectual 
hobbyhorses—its adherents have spanned both ends of the sociopolitical spectrum. Even the 
most strident proponents of musical modernism, namely, Adorno, held fast to the inalienability 
of nonidentity.22 
                                                 
21Hepokoski, “Ineffable Immersion: Contextualizing the Call for Silence,” 223–30. By “contextualizing” in 
this case, Hepokoski means to position alongside thinkers and ideational trends that, for him, fit within what he calls 
the recent “reemergence” of a “broader network” of similarly “anti-intellectual positions.” For Hepokoski, 
Jankélévitch has rejected “explanatory or distanced analysis,” demanding “a sidelining of critical discourse.” This 
propels him into the conceptual category of the “forthrightly antimodern,” a category which subsumes a multitude of 
viewpoints ranging from “Heidegger and those influenced by him—including the much-noted ‘theological turn’ in 
certain schools of phenomenology along with strains of postmodernism” to “numerous variants of current postliberal 
theology and the movement of ‘radical orthodoxy’—belligerently Christian, antimodernist ideas.” Certainly, 
Jankélévitch is a critic of a certain kind of modernism, and he is without a doubt “eager to cast aspersions” on the 
naïveté of a faith in scientific rationalism. But he follows neither Heidegger nor Christ, and the fact that he uses 
reason to challenge the limits of reason makes him not anti-intellectual or anti-modern, but modernist through and 
through. It is precisely by engaging the “details of his relentless testimonials” and the concrete actions that they 
perform that the deliberately analytical and critical facets of Jankélévitch’s writings become evident and compelling. 
For a demonstration of such an engagement see Chapter Three of this dissertation (“Drastic Ecomysteriology”).  
22Like Jankélévitch, Adorno acknowledges the intrinsic inadequacy of human knowledge and calls for an 
experience of that which exceeds its representational capacities—that which appears to be mysterious: “Knowledge 
of the object is brought closer by the act of the subject rending the veil it weaves about the object. It can do this only 
when, passive, without anxiety, it entrusts itself to its own experience. In the place where subjective reason senses 
subjective contingency, the primacy of the object shimmers through: that in the object which is not a subjective 
addition.” Such an experience makes it possible to “love what is alien and different.” Yet for Adorno this experience 
and the love that it engenders is equally mediate and incomplete. Theodore W. Adorno, “On Subject and Object,” in 
Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998), 254. 
A streak of utopianism in Adorno’s work has been the subject of much research. See, for instance, Yvonne 
Sherratt, Adorno’s Positive Dialectic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ute Guzzoni, “‘Were 
speculation about the state of reconciliation permissible…’: Reflections on the Relation Between Human Beings and 
Things in Adorno and Heidegger,” in Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions, ed. Iain Macdonald and 
Krzysztof Ziarek (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008), 124–37; Aubrey L. Glazer, A New 
Physiognomy of Jewish Thinking: Critical Theory After Adorno as Applied to Jewish Thought (New York: 
9 
Overemphasis has also produced distortion. A single aspect of Jankélévitch’s intellectual 
heritage has tended to eclipse the others. The philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859–1941) looms 
large in Jankélévitch’s work, and its irrefutable presence has been oft-noted, as either a source of 
progress or a begetter of regress. Nearly all of the contributors to the 2012 colloquy “Vladimir 
Jankélévitch’s Philosophy of Music” make light of the connection between Jankélévitch and 
Bergson.23 Brian Kane characterizes Jankélévitch’s perspective as one “that might be generally 
characterized as Bergsonian.”24 Steven Rings notes Jankélévitch’s assertion of a “Bergsonian 
difference in kind between music and language.”25 James Hepokoski calls attention to 
Jankélévitch’s “largely orthodox Bergsonism.”26 Judy Lochhead traces the ways in which 
“Jankélévitch’s aesthetics” develops “aspects of Henri Bergson’s dualist metaphysics.”27 
Michael Gallope defines Jankélévitch’s metaphysics expressly by defining its relationship to 
“Bergsonian durée.”28 James R. Currie observes the “import of Bergson’s work” for 
Jankélévitch’s philosophy.29  
Though recognizing his indisputable debt to Bergson is useful, it is not exhaustive. There 
is more to the work of historicizing Jankélévitch. Rather than an out-of-date, warmed-over 
Bergsonism, Jankélévitch offers a distinctive philosophical vision that, in its focus on inscrutable 
                                                                                                                                                             
Continuum, 2011); Wesley Phillips, Metaphysics and Music in Adorno and Heidegger (Basingstoke, United 
Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
23Only Michael J. Puri refrains from mentioning Bergson. Puri instead proposes an “affinity” between 
Jankélévitch’s methodology and that of his colleague Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962). Puri, “Jankélévitch and the 
Dilemma of Decadence,” 242. 
24Brian Kane, introduction to the colloquy on “Vladimir Jankélévitch’s Philosophy of Music,” Journal of 
the American Musicological Society 65, no. 1 (2012): 215. 
25Rings, “Talking and Listening with Jankélévitch,” 219.  
26Hepokoski, “Ineffable Immersion,” 224.  
27Lochhead, “Can We Say What We Hear?—Jankélévitch and the Bergsonian Ineffable,” 231.  
28Gallope, “Jankélévitch’s Fidelity to Inconsistency,” 236. According to Gallope, Jankélévitch builds a 
philosophical lexicon that “rehearses a key Bergsonian dualism between actual, ‘quidditive,’ or ‘gnostic’ forms of 
knowledge and the contingency of virtual, ‘quodditive,’ or ‘drastic’ forces of creation.” Gallope also observes that a 
“central paradox at the root of this dualism” preoccupies much of Jankélévitch’s philosophy. 
29Currie, “Where Jankélévitch Cannot Speak,” 247. 
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things, allows him to speak to the same issues that occupied many French scholars in the years 
after the Liberation of Paris.  
This dissertation situates Jankélévitch within a different milieu, one that he reflected in 
his musico-aesthetic approaches, but also one that he helped to create. Among the many 
philosophers and musicologists who studied mystery in post-WWII France, Jankélévitch appears 
as perhaps the leading proponent of performing mystery in the service of understanding it. 
Brelet manifests a countervailing tendency within the same milieu. Not proliferating but 
clarifying mystery designates the hallmark of her philosophy of music. Unlike that of 
Jankélévitch, however, her scholarly reception in English has been sparse.30 As early as 1952, 
Manfred F. Bukofzer reviewed Brelet’s first book Esthétique et création musicale (1947) in the 
Journal of the American Musicological Society. Bukofzer affirmed the work’s point of departure, 
“the valid premise” that it is the “business of the aesthetician” to uncover and clarify the 
                                                 
30In French, her reception has been richer, at least in terms of the number of citations. She is frequently 
invoked as an authority figure; her arguments, however, are less commonly engaged in a sustained, substantive 
manner. There is not for Brelet, as there is for Jankélévitch, a wealth of secondary sources dedicated to the 
interpretation of her philosophy. The degree to which her ideas have permeated the study of music in France—this is 
a topic worthy of reflection. Turning to the back cover of a recent edited collection entitled Quand le geste fait sens 
would, for instance, reveal nothing but the following quotation from Brelet’s L’Interprétation créatrice: “Il est des 
arts […] où l’activité de l’artiste refuse de se survivre en quelque objet différent d’elle-même et s’offre à nous 
immédiatement en tout l’éclat de son actuelle présence: ici la réalité de objet ne fait qu’un avec l’activité qui 
l’engendre, et l’oeuvre d’art jamais ne s’en peut isoler. Et parce que l’oeuvre n’est plus que l’activité même de 
l’artiste, il nous est donné d’assister à sa création, de pénétrer le mystère de sa naissance, de sa croissance et de son 
achèvement. […] Nous portons l’oeuvre en nous, et sa permanence n’est plus celle de l’objet, mais l’éternelle 
actualité de l’acte par lequel elle peut sans cesse être refaite.” [“There are arts…in which the artist’s activity refuses 
to survive in any object different from itself, and presents itself to us immediately in all the splendor of its presence: 
here the reality of the object is one with the activity that engenders it, and the work of art can never be isolated from 
it. And because the work is no more than the very activity of the artist, it is given to us to witness its creation, to 
penetrate the mystery of its birth, its growth, and its completion. We carry the work in us, and its permanence is no 
longer that of the object, but the eternal actuality of the act by which it can be continually remade.”] Lucia Angelino, 
ed., Quand le geste fait sens (Paris: Éditions Mimésis, 2015). 
In his “Hommage à Gisèle Brelet,” Ivo Supičić recorded that Brelet’s writings had been “translated into 
several languages, including Japanese, German, Italian, Spanish, and Croatian” and had “caught the attention of 
music aestheticians such as Walter Wiora, Andres Briner, Enrico Fubini, and many others.” Ivo Supičić, “Hommage 
à Gisèle Brelet,” International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music 4, no. 2 (1973): 317. 
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“aesthetic concepts” that underlie all compositional processes.31 This premise’s subsequent 
demonstration he found to be “so remote and abstract,” however, that “musical points of 
reference” were “all but lost.”32 For Bukofzer, Brelet’s aesthetics of music was simply “not 
concrete enough.”33  
Nearly forty years would pass before another American musicologist scrutinized Brelet’s 
work. In his Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader, Edward Lippman provided English 
translations of excerpts from Brelet’s Le Temp musical (1949), placing them within a section of 
readings on the phenomenology of music.34 Lippman’s History of Western Musical Aesthetics 
also introduced Brelet’s ideas.35 Other music scholars have mentioned her work, but almost 
always in passing.36 The discourse has been strangely silent with regard to someone who was so 
intensely productive and influential in her own time.  
                                                 
31Manfred F. Bukofzer, review of Esthétique et création musicale, by Gisèle Brelet, Journal of the 
American Musicological Society 5, no. 2 (1952): 139.  
32Ibid.  
33Ibid. 
34Edward A. Lippman, ed., Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader, vol. 3 (Stuyvesant, N.Y.: Pendragon 
Press, ), 325–49. Within the section of his reader “The Phenomenology of Music,” Lippman also includes excerpts 
from Jeanne Vial’s De l’être musical (1952), Roman Ingarden’s Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst (1962), 
and his own Progressive Temporality in Music (1984). The reader does not contain any of Jankélévitch’s thoughts 
on music. (There is, however, a section—“The Sociological Significance of Music”—that consists entirely of 
writings by Adorno.)  
35Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 443–52. Constructing a likeness of Brelet poses an 
exercise with little precedent and occupies a substantial share of the dissertation’s fourth chapter (“Mysteries of the 
Dialectic”).  
36In Confronting Stravinsky, Robert Craft’s appendix includes several items by Brelet (nos. 26–32). Craft 
writes: “Though Gisèle Brelet has been overlooked by Stravinsky scholars, her writings exercised a considerable 
influence on him in 1946–1950, particularly “Chances de la Musique Atonale.” Craft also notes that her letters to 
Stravinsky (1947–52) on “the nature of genius are fervent, his replies, matter-of-fact, but the Brelet episode merits 
examination.” Jann Pasler, ed., Confronting Stravinsky: Man, Musician, Modernist (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986), 354–5. Tamara Levitz briefly refers to Brelet in her discussions of Souvtchinsky and his 
“immanent metaphysics.” Tamara Levitz, Modernist Mysteries, 163–4. Benedict Taylor, in The Melody of Time, 
cites Brelet in a footnote, but does not mention her name in the text: “That music has often been understood as 
uniquely capable of articulating certain aspects of existence in time is evidently closely related to the fact that it has 
long been considered ‘the temporal art par excellence.’” The phrase comes from Brelet’s Le Temps musical, 25. 
Benedict Taylor, The Melody of Time: Music and Temporality in the Romantic Era (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 51. For further scholarship that contains passing references to Brelet, see the bibliography of this 
dissertation. 
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In the late 1940s, few women were writing and publishing scholarship in either 
philosophy or musicology in France (or in Germany, Great Britain, or the United States for that 
matter), let alone with Brelet’s astonishing speed, volume, and complexity. In the United States, 
Susanne K. Langer (1895–1985) was perhaps one of the few comparable figures.37 Besides 
Lippman’s translations, the article that Langer included in her 1958 Reflections on Art is the only 
other published English translation of Brelet’s writings.38 Langer considered Brelet’s article on 
the relationship between music and silence to be one of the “many significant essays on art” that 
had appeared “within the last five or six decades.”39 
Langer shared Brelet’s interest in mystery and music. Like Brelet, Langer believed that 
the “philosophy of art…should begin in the studio,” that philosophers “must know the arts, so to 
speak, ‘from the inside.’”40 At the same time, they must also know them from the outside, using 
what they have learned in order to “construct theory, not a ‘working myth.’”41 For both Brelet 
and Langer, it is in the interval between inside and outside that mystery inheres: the translation 
of music into philosophy of music passes through that obscure rift which separates a “non-
discursive image” from its representation in “discourse.”42 Yet both insisted that music is 
                                                 
37Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) would be another figure of similar stature.  
38Gisèle Brelet, “Music and Silence” in Reflections on Art: A Source Book of Writings by Artists, Critics, 
and Philosophers, ed. Susanne K. Langer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 103–21.  
39Langer had chosen Brelet’s essay because, like the other reflections in the volume, it made a “real 
contribution to art theory,” i.e., it offered a “new idea” or clarified an otherwise “moot and confused realm.” 
Susanne K. Langer, introduction to Reflections on Art: A Source Book of Writings by Artists, Critics, and 
Philosophers, ed. Susanne K. Langer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), ix.  
Langer characterized Brelet’s “philosophical ideas” not as those of a “professional” philosopher, but as 
those of someone who wrote and thought “in the half-metaphorical language of artists and lay aestheticians.” Brelet 
held a doctoral degree in philosophy from the Sorbonne; the standards and expectations of philosophical writing in 
France and the U.S. were apparently so different, however, that Langer viewed what she called Brelet’s “deceptive 
language,” her “strangely irresponsible studio-language,” as unprofessional and amateurish. Even so, her ideas 
themselves captivated Langer enough to warrant inclusion. “I have not balked at the somewhat ‘purple’ style of 
Gisèle Brelet,” Langer declared. Ibid., xvii. 
40Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953), ix.  
41Ibid., x. 
42Ibid., 118.  
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susceptible to philosophy, that music is an “epistemological datum about which we can 
philosophize” productively.43  
Langer and Lippman accepted what they saw as the idiosyncrasies of Brelet’s 
philosophical style. They refused to balk at her “poetic and repetitious” language (Lippman) or 
her excessively ornate rhetoric (Langer).44 Like Brelet and Jankélévitch, Langer and Lippman 
worked at the intersection of music and philosophy.45 While abstruseness had caused Bukofzer 
to overlook Brelet’s arguments, Langer and Lippman appreciated the complexity that those 
arguments were designed to unravel. As interdisciplinary intellectuals themselves, they looked 
past the difficulties in Brelet’s presentation to the depth of her thought and the novelty of her 
ideas.  
Working between disciplines has often carried the risk of working without discipline, or 
at least of being seen as doing so—of being seen as undisciplined and even irresponsible. Yet it 
has also benefited from strong advocacy and institutional investment in past decades. Today, 
interdisciplinarity has become a word to describe what would seem to be, according to Harvey J. 
Graff, the “dominant form of scholarly work.”46 Graff has made interdisciplinarity itself the 
object of his research, and, like others, he has called attention to the need for more “studies that 
take historical context into account.” 47 
                                                 
43Ibid. 
44Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 452; Langer, introduction to Reflections on Art, xvii.  
45Lippman earned his Ph.D. at Columbia University in 1952 for his dissertation “Music and Space: A Study 
in the Philosophy of Music.” In 1954, he joined the musicology faculty at Columbia, where he taught until his 
retirement in 1989. Throughout his career, he pioneered scholarship on the aesthetics of music. Langer, a 
professional philosopher, published widely on the relationship between art and the human mind. She lectured at 
many universities in the United States, including Columbia University (from 1945–50), during the period in which 
Lippman was enrolled there as a doctoral student.  
46Harvey J. Graff, Undisciplining Knowledge: Interdisciplinarity in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore, Md.: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 1. 
47Graff, 10. His scholarship also aims to address this need. See also Jerry A. Jacobs and Scott Frickel, 
“Interdisciplinarity: A Critical Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 35, no. 1 (2009): 58. “Researchers have 
yet to study in any detail the rise of interdisciplines comparatively or over broad historical periods.” 
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In this dissertation, I offer a historical case study of interdisciplinarity in action, a history 
of ideas formed between disciplines. Like those I write about, I step out into the amorphous, 
barely tangible space that partitions one branch of learning from another. In order to understand 
Brelet and Jankélévitch, I locate their work in some of its most immediate historical and 
intellectual contexts, attempting to see what they would have seen, read what they would have 
read. I historicize their work, but I perform it as well. I try to inhabit their texts, to think like 
them, so as to bring their (historical) ideas to life in the present moment. 
Writing from within an established discipline, I run the same geminate risk as they did— 
of being misunderstood by both musicians and philosophers. On the list of reasons for choosing 
Brelet and Jankélévitch from among the many mysteriologists in postwar France, the fact that 
they knew music intimately ranks high. They read and performed music in their professional 
lives, Jankélévitch during his lectures at the Sorbonne, Brelet in her role as pianist and soloist 
with the ORTF (Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française).48 They should not be mistaken 
for laypersons, in either music or philosophy. 
                                                 
48In a 1958 interview with Jacques Chancel, Jankélévitch spoke modestly of his relationship to music and 
to performing at the piano. “Jacques Chancel: Music has played a great role for you... Vladimir Jankélévitch: It’s 
half of my life. I am, in music, entirely whole. It is not, for me, a way to relax (délassement). I do not know what 
God is. I could tell you what it is not. This does not mean that I know what it is. But music, I know. It is neither a 
hobby nor a distraction. I only have to put myself at the piano to forget everything. Everything... It is a form of 
expression of the ineffable par excellence. What we cannot express otherwise is expressed through music. It reminds 
me of a piece by Janáček drawn from a collection he called Under a Shady Path. This piece is titled “The Missing 
Word.” Aha! The missing word! This is when music raises its voice and says what words alone cannot express. With 
it, in it, one dreams one is another, one could have a better life, one is a great artist. When I was young, I dreamed 
that I was a great virtuoso finishing, under the ovations of the audience, the concert I dreamed of giving... (Silence) I 
would have been a great pianist... JC: If you spent as much time at the piano as at philosophy, you would probably 
be a great pianist. VJ: Oh! Certainly not. No. I would have been extremely mediocre.” Suarès, Vladimir 
Jankélévitch, 65–6.  
Before training as a philosopher, Brelet had studied piano with Guntram Arcouet at the Conservatory of 
Nantes and with Lazarus Levy at the National Conservatory of Paris. She continued to perform “as soloist and 
pianist with the ORTF,” where “she dedicated herself to the interpretation of contemporary music, focusing 
particularly on works by young French composers.” Supičić, 317. 
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To trace their livelihoods is to inscribe a history of musical interdisciplinarity. The call 
for a new, implicitly interdisciplinary direction in music research sounded with forceful clarity in 
Joseph Kerman’s 1985 Contemplating Music.49 Since then it has been taken up and variously 
interpreted by numerous scholars, and disciplinarity itself has become a recurring topic in studies 
of music.50 This “critical” turn has brought music scholarship into line with cultural studies. In 
some of its best moments, this turn has led to self-reflective discursive practices, to an explicit 
and disciplined questioning of the motives of research.  
In some of the most recent examinations of disciplinary boundaries, music scholars have 
focused on mediation, reflexivity, and relationality. Georgina Born, for example, documents the 
proliferation of interdisciplinary studies over the last three decades, and she proposes, as a 
“direction for future research,” a “relational musicology,” a study of music “in process,” a study 
embedded “in the movement between” various aspects of musical reality.51 William Cheng also 
charts a kind of relational musicology, one which encourages a shift toward an ethics of care in 
the way in which we, as members of a discipline, relate to each other and to the object of our 
studies.52  
                                                 
49Anahid Kassabian makes this observation in her introduction to the collection Keeping Score: Music, 
Disciplinarity, Culture, ed. David Schwarz, et al. (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1997), 1.  
50Richard Leppert and Susan McClary, eds., Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance, 
and Reception (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Katherine Bergeron and Philip V. Bohlman, eds., 
Disciplining Music: Musicology and Its Canons (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); David Schwarz, et 
al., eds., Keeping Score: Music, Disciplinarity, Culture (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1997); 
Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist, eds., Rethinking Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Martin Clayton, 
Trevor Herbert, and Richard Middleton, eds., The Cultural Study of Music: A Critical Introduction (New York: 
Routledge, 2003); Henry Stobart, ed., The New (Ethno)musicologies (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2008); 
Georgina Born, “For a Relational Musicology: Music and Interdisciplinarity, Beyond the Practical Turn,” Journal of 
the Royal Musical Association 135, no. 2 (2010): 205–43; William Cheng, Just Vibrations: The Purpose of 
Sounding Good (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), accessed 17 January 
2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/mpub.9293551. 
51Born, “For a Relational Musicology,” 231; Georgina Born, “On Musical Mediation: Ontology, 
Technology, and Creativity,” Twentieth-Century Music 2, no. 1 (2005): 30.  
52Cheng, Just Vibrations. Cheng constructs his disciplinary critique through a combination of “affect 
theory, care ethics (refracted through disability studies and ideas of dependence), and queer theory.” 
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As they reflect on how best to do musicology, both Born and Cheng are attempting to 
come to terms with something else as well, something that also subtends with my own project—
the pervasive intangibility of relationality itself, its resistance to certain rigidly drawn schemes. 
From a distance, Brelet and Jankélévitch speak to this very concern. For them, musicology itself 
happens between music and the pen. For them, there is something mysterious at work in the act 
of thinking and writing about music, something from which it is imperative not to turn away.53  
The framework of my project brings into focus, amidst post-WWII French philosophies 
of music, what can be seen as two polar regions of mysteriology. At one end, there is Brelet, who 
employs the conventional terms of epistemology, thus engaging in what could be called a gnostic 
form of investigating musical phenomena (if we were to make use of Abbate’s terminology).54 
At the other, there is Jankélévitch, who advocates a kind of drastic re-creation.55 Brelet 
constructs a metaphysics of music; Jankélévitch seeks to expose at every turn the ultimate 
metaphoricity of any such metaphysics. For Brelet, musical mystery can be known; for 
Jankélévitch, it can only be done.  
Thus Brelet and Jankélévitch exhibit contrasting methodological tendencies in their study 
of the same phenomenon—i.e., music and mystery. I have not exaggerated the difference 
between them. The split is severe, though never absolute. To the question “Music 
                                                 
53Vladimir Jankélévitch, L’Aventure, l’ennui, le sérieux (Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1963), 62: “The 
mysterious, in every creation, is not the creator, who is disposed to psychological analysis, and it is not the creature 
(i.e., the thing created), which is disposed to physical description: it is rather the passage from the one to the other.” 
[“Le mystérieux, en toute création, ce n’est pas le créateur, qui se prête à l’analyse psychologique, et ce n’est pas 
non plus la créature qui se prête à la description physique: mais c’est le passage de l’un à l’autre.”] 
54Brelet directs her attention to that “critical reflection” which “moves from auditory intuition to the form 
that takes shape” in the “creative act” and that “mysteriously brings” this act “into being.” Brelet, Esthétique et 
création musicale, 30: “Et l’acte créateur ne peut trouver son achèvement que grâce à une réflexion critique qui 
remonte de l’intuition auditive à la forme qui en elle s’ébauche et la fonde obscurément.” 
55Jankélévitch accentuates intuition, focusing his efforts on bringing to fruition, through philosophy itself, 
creative acts. When speaking about music, Jankélévitch instructs: call upon “all the arts, all the analogies drawn 
from all possible sensations.” It would be better, he insists, to listen to music, perform it, or compose it yourself. If 
you must speak about music, then speak about it in a way that calls attention to its drastic quality, to the fact that it 
takes part in the mystery of creation. Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 119. 
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(scholarship)—(ideally) drastic or gnostic?” Brelet would answer “mostly gnostic,” Jankélévitch 
“mostly drastic.” There remain some filaments, mentioned above, that hold them together in 
tension, maintaining them in a dynamic equilibrium. Emphasizing their relative polarity, in fact, 
illuminates the stakes of mysteriology itself.  
Assertions of difference bind together otherwise disparate mysteriological methods. 
Difference itself infuses postwar French mysteriology, crystallizing principally in an insistence 
on a departure from scientistic modes of thinking. Focusing on mystery became a marker of 
difference, a way to upend the natural attitude toward the world, the attitude according to which 
the world, as an aggregate of empirical objects, exists outside of and apart from the individual 
ego that beholds it.56 Restoring mystery, reinstilling a sense of wonder at the complexity and 
ambiguity of existence, became a means of resistance to a strict severance between self and 
other, self and world, self and history. 
My use of the term mysteriology to denote the study of mystery comes directly from 
Jankélévitch’s coining of mystériologie.57 Philosophy, for Jankélévitch, begins with an 
intimation and a recognition of the mysterious. “Philosophy begins,” he writes, “with the 
conviction that the ultra-physical and the infra-physical are coarsely approximative substitutes 
for metaphysical ulteriority, just as the ultra-sensible and the infra-sensible are apocrypha of 
                                                 
56Husserl discussed the “natural attitude” or “natural theoretical attitude” in, for instance, his student Eugen 
Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method, trans. Ronald Bruzina 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 166. French thinkers knew Fink’s work despite the suppression of 
Husserl in Nazi Germany and Occupied France: “Published mention of the Sixth Meditation first occurred in 1941 
in France, in Gaston Berger’s Le cogito dans la philosophie de Husserl, to be followed only after the end of the war 
by reference to it in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception.” Ronald Bruzina, translator’s 
introduction to Sixth Cartesian Meditation, vii. 
57See http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/mystérieux, accessed 28 January 2017. The word appears twice in 
Debussy et le mystère, on pages 11 and 32. See also Vladimir Jankélévitch, Philosophie première: introduction à 
une philosophie du “presque” (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 54. 
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suprasensible authenticity.”58 Philosophy truly begins, for Jankélévitch, with the Alexandrian 
philosophers and with Plotinus, with the inception of a “serious” metaphysics, with the 
understanding that the “Beyond that solicits the spirit beyond all empirical magnitude, this 
dynamic Beyond is a mystery.”59 
Mystery is a word with undeniably theological undertones. It is a word that finds 
expression in religions of antiquity, in Judaism, and in Christianity. Yet it appears in worldly 
literature as well. Convenient for Jankélévitch’s purposes, it is both thoroughly sacred and 
thoroughly secular. Recourse to a “mysteriological narrative” occurs, for Jankélévitch, when 
Plato, in the Symposium, speaks of indicible things, abandoning dialectical discourse in order to 
allude to “something else,” something which enamors the souls of lovers, something which is 
sensed intuitively, something whose meaning can only be suggested enigmatically.60  
The use of mystériologie must have also resonated with Jankélévitch’s largely Catholic 
audience in postwar France. The French word mystère has been used to refer to religious truth 
and Christian sacrament since at least the thirteenth century.61 The sacraments of the Roman 
Catholic Church are mysteries of transformation, rites which mark the manifestation of divine 
grace in human affairs.62 Rather than purely conceptual dogma, the sacraments represent 
                                                 
58Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 3. [“La philosophie commence avec la conviction que l’ultraphysique 
et l’infraphysique sont des succédanés grossièrement approximatifs de l’ultériorité métaphysique, tout de même que 
l’ultrasensible et l’infrasensible sont des apocryphes de l’authenticité suprasensible.”] 
59Ibid.  
60Vladimir Jankélévitch, Le Je-ne-sais-quoi et le presque-rien (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
1957), 2. 
61Ca. 1240, Guillame Le Clerc, for example, used the word to mean “secret (in the domain of the Christian 
religion).” See http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/ mystère, accessed 28 January 2017.  
62See “sacrament, n.,” OED Online, January 2017, Oxford University Press, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/169523?rskey=2qyveM&result=1, accessed 28 January 2017: “In early Christian 
language sacramentum and the synonymous μυστήριον (Greek, “mystery”) were applied indiscriminately to any 
ritual observance of the Church, or to any spiritually symbolic act or object; but they were often applied in an 
eminent sense to the two most important observances, baptism and the Lord’s Supper or Eucharist.” 
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instruments of actual, existential change. In the mystery of the Christian sacrament, “something 
else” happens, arrives, comes into existence, and, by virtue of this arrival, life is transformed. 
Like philosophy and theology, art also came to embrace mystery. In late romanticism 
especially, art became sacramental. For Jankélévitch, Debussy himself was a mysteriologist, 
exploring the sacraments of nature in music. The milieu of the fin de siècle cultivated Debussy’s 
appetite for the mysterious; it also formed the backdrop against which Jankélévitch first 
developed his own philosophical leanings. A philosophy of aesthetic mystery flourished in 
France at the end of the nineteenth century, particularly in the symbolist theories of Stéphane 
Mallarmé (1842–1898). Symbolism’s attention to mystery would also receive a revival in post-
WWII French thought, in the work of mysteriologists like Jankélévitch and Brelet. 
Through an exploration of these extremes, through a study of Jankélévitch and Brelet, 
this dissertation surveys and details the collective mysteriology that materialized in post-WWII 
France. It immerses the reader in both an account of the intellectual practices through which this 
mysteriology came into being and a close reading of some of its most salient texts.  
Brelet, Jankélévitch, and their fellow mysteriologists worked across disciplinary lines and 
at the margins of the leading currents in contemporary French musicology and philosophy. Their 
scholarship, as I demonstrate, belongs to the histories of both musicology and phenomenology, 
not as proper names, but as common practices. By particularizing the work that they did, by 
specifying their methods, procedures, and techniques, I explore their radical interdisciplinarity—
their deliberate softening of disciplinary angles—as a cultural practice. Through dissolving 
disciplinary boundaries in my own text, I also seek to create, for the reader, an experience of 
mysteriology at work; the design of each chapter assimilates and then dramatizes pivotal 
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moments in Brelet and Jankélévitch’s philosophies of music (e.g., the instant, the other, the 
dialectic). 
The dissertation’s first chapter (“Musicologie and Mystery”) considers the 
mysteriological work of Brelet and Jankélévitch as a significant form of musicological activity in 
post-WWII France. Until the 1970s, French musicology was, even more than a professional 
discipline, a pluridisciplinary practice. In the period after 1945, a number of academic fields, 
including philosophy, produced musicological content outside the profession of musicology.  
Brelet, Jankélévitch, and others contributed to a marked revival of interest in music 
aesthetics. Rather than manifesting an unprecedented phenomenon, their work offered a fresh 
take on a long-standing strain within French music scholarship. As I show, a distinct regard for 
the mysterious—for the inexplicable, the inexpressible, the ineffable—had accompanied the 
progress of musicologie from its origins in le Siècle des Lumières. 
In turning to mystery, Brelet and Jankélévitch also participated in the mainstream of 
postwar French philosophy—existential phenomenology.63 Especially in the years after the 
Second World War, mystère had philosophical currency.64 Post-WWII phenomenologies of 
existence in France consistently employed the term mystery as the keystone of philosophy as 
well as its stumbling block. Thus, the remaining chapters (2–4) of the dissertation interrogate the 
role of phenomenological mysteries in Brelet and Jankélévitch’s work. 
                                                 
63See, for instance, “Part II: The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940–1960)” in Gary Gutting, 
French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 119–212.  
64Examples permeated postwar French philosophy. For example, John Ireland has described Sartre’s little-
known interest in the genre of the mystery play. John Ireland, “Freedom as Passion: Sartre’s Mystery Plays,” 
Theatre Journal 50, no. 3 (1998): 335–48. Simone de Beauvoir spoke of mystery frequently in The Second Sex, 
mainly in a critical fashion (she was primarily addressing the damaging effects of the “feminine mystery”). Simone 
de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: Vintage Books, 
2011). It was to another French phenomenologist that she was often responding—Emmanuel Levinas, who wished 
to resuscitate the mystery of the feminine Other, to posit it as the very possibility of the ethical and the future of 
humankind. Levinas, Time and the Other, esp. 85–90.  
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Put succinctly, phenomenology is the study of phenomena, not simply as “appearances,” 
but as the “objects of intentional acts.”65 Phenomenology studies intentionality—the way in 
which every performance of a conscious action is essentially an experience of the meaning of 
“something or other,” of one phenomenal object or another.66 In working out a theory of the 
intentionality of consciousness (its “object-directedness”), the German philosopher Edmund 
Husserl (1859–1938) inaugurated the idea of phenomenology as a philosophical discipline.67  
Echoes of the phenomenological movement had begun to reach French ears earlier in the 
century, but the process of translating German ideas into a new philosophical idiom—of giving 
them a distinctly French voice—reached its peak production in the 1940s and 50s.68 Those who 
made phenomenology French did so by shifting their attention to the “concrete and corporeal 
strata” of human experience, exemplified in Jean-Paul Sartre’s “trenchant analyses of ‘concrete 
                                                 
65Maurice Natanson, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973), 13. 
66Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1. 
Sokolowski reminds us that the technical sense of “intention” in phenomenology should not be confused with the 
common use of the word as the “purpose we have in mind when we act.” Rather, in phenomenological terms, 
“intending” means the “conscious relationship we have to an object.” Ibid., 2. 
67Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 14. 
68Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 3d ed. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 21. During the 1930s, the “center of gravity of the Phenomenological Movement shifted 
[from Germany] to the west. In fact, at that time it entered a peculiarly French phase…” Following a period of 
“absorbing some of the German tradition, French phenomenology developed remarkable productivity. It owes some 
of its distinctive form to its peculiar interpretations (and at times misinterpretations) of Scheler, Heidegger, and 
Husserl (in that order) by such creative thinkers as Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul 
Ricœur, Mikel Dufrenne, and Emmanuel Levinas. Their unique fusion of phenomenology and existentialism has 
harmonized and humanized phenomenology to an extent and in a manner which sets it apart from Husserl’s 
transcendental subjectivism, from Scheler’s metaphysics, and from Heidegger’s anti-subjectivistic ‘thought of 
Being.’” 
During the 1940s, Paris became the new epicenter of phenomenological philosophy. The writings of French 
intellectuals—from Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943) to Gabriel Marcel’s Mystery of Being (1951)—
took up and reshaped the work of the German phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. French 
philosophic reflections on music flourished in the 1940s and 50s as part of a period of “intensive and unusually 
productive philosophical activity in France.” Edward S. Casey, translator’s forward to The Phenomenology of 
Aesthetic Experience, by Mikel Dufrenne, trans. Edward S. Casey, et al. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University 
Press, 1973), xv. 
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relations with others’ (e.g., the look)” and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s “profoundly evocative 
descriptions of the lived body.”69  
Engaging mysteries of concrete and lived experience defined much of the work of French 
phenomenology. Perhaps nowhere did the concern with mystery become more pronounced than 
in the writings of Gabriel Marcel. Existential phenomenology, in Marcel’s formulation, consisted 
in the positing of “ontological mystery” and the development of a concrete approach to its 
investigation.70 Mystery, for Marcel, entailed a situation, a set of concrete circumstances in 
which we find ourselves embedded.71 
Marcel’s ideas resonated with others who also investigated musical phenomena in 
postwar France, including the philosopher Jeanne Vial.72 Like Marcel, Vial treated the 
“philosophical questions” that she encountered in music not as a series of “objective problems” 
                                                 
69Ibid., xvi. 
70The philosophical appendix to Marcel’s play Le Monde cassé (The Broken World, 1929) discusses the 
ontological mystery and the “proper method for restoring it.” Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, 457. 
Marcel’s 1933 essay “On the Ontological Mystery” introduces a distinction between problems and mysteries, in 
much the same way that Jankélévitch distinguishes secrets from mysteries. Marcel equates mystery with the 
“metaproblematical,” where, for Jankélévitch, mystery resides on the plane of the meta-empirical. Gabriel Marcel, 
“On the Ontological Mystery,” in The Philosophy of Existentialism (New York: Citadel Press, 1956), 9–46. 
71Marcel sought a higher form of empiricism in which experience would receive the “most intense effort of 
attention,” but in which the contents of experience would consist not of “individual sense data” but rather of specific 
types of situations—critical encounters with the world and with others. Stephen Jolin, translator’s introduction to 
Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, by Gabriel Marcel (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), xxi–xxiii. 
Thinking mystery entailed, in Marcel’s view, a “deepening of experience itself” through “becoming aware, 
recognizing, encountering, ‘seeing,’ and appreciating.” Ibid. In describing the experience of hearing sound, Marcel 
labeled feeling or sensation as the “index, the sign, the manifestation” of participation, one of the central categories 
of his philosophy. Robert E. Wood, introduction to Music and Philosophy, by Gabriel Marcel (Milwaukee, Wisc.: 
Marquette University Press, 2005), 12.  
For Marcel, true participation in a sonorous experience afforded a sense of something beyond the illusion 
of a purely interior awareness. Truly participating in the act of hearing confirmed the fundamental inextricability of 
mind, body, and external milieu; it confirmed our situatedness in the world. As Paul Ricœur observed in 1948, 
Marcel used the term “situatedness” to allocate the “adherence of the concrete subject to its flesh and its world.” 
Paul Ricœur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers: Philosophie du mystère et philosophie du paradoxe (Paris: Temps 
present, 1948), 29. 
72Marcel’s own sizeable output of writings on music itself constitutes a substantial contribution to the 
formation of French musical phenomenology. While Marcel’s purely philosophical writings contain few references 
to music, his work as a music critic amounts to more than a hundred items, with topics ranging from the musical 
idea in the work of the French composer César Franck to the relationship between Bergson and music. Marcel, 
Music and Philosophy includes English translations of a selection of his writings on music. L’Esthétique musicale de 
Gabriel Marcel, edited by Vial, contains a number of others in the original French. See note 73 below. 
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that could be “analyzed and solved” but as “mysteries” that had to be “participated in and 
understood as lived experience.”73  
The relationship of Marcel and Vial to French phenomenology proper furthermore 
paralleled that of other mysteriologists, specifically Jankélévitch and Brelet. Marcel and Vial 
have been described as phenomenologists despite the fact that neither claimed to be one.74 As it 
does even with the more easily recognizable exponents of phenomenology in postwar France like 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological approach, for Marcel and Vial (and for Brelet 
and Jankélévitch as well), tends to lead beyond itself to something else—to ontology, 
metaphysics, dialectics, or ethics. 
Though Brelet and Jankélévitch do not frame their work as phenomenological, I argue 
that their writings from this period effectively constitute phenomenologies of music. In doing so, 
I follow Lippman’s suggestion, in A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, that Brelet’s Le 
Temps musical (1949) belongs to the category “phenomenology of music,” that it consists in a 
                                                 
73Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 452. Vial published a number of works on Marcel’s 
philosophy, including Gabriel Marcel et les niveaux de l’expérience (Paris: Seghers, 1966) and Gabriel Marcel, un 
veilleur et un éveilleur (Lausanne, Switzerland: L’Age d’homme, 1989). She also edited the collection of Marcel’s 
essays on music L’esthétique musicale de Gabriel Marcel (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1980). 
74Jean Hering called Marcel an “independent phenomenologist.” Jean Hering, “Phenomenology in France” 
in Philosophical Thought in France and the United States, ed. Marvin Faber (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1968), 75. Yet Marcel’s writings contained very little overt discussion of phenomenology itself, and he once 
openly renounced the use, in his own work, of “Husserlian terminology as well as that of the German 
phenomenologists.” Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans. Katharine Farrer (Westminster, England: Dacre Press, 
1949), 158. Être et avoir further differentiated between phenomenology and hyperphenomenology: the latter, which 
Marcel called elsewhere metaphysics or dialectics, was the destination for which the phenomenological method 
paved the way. 
Nevertheless, in a 1943 essay on St. Augustine, Marcel stated that only in phenomenology would it be 
possible “today to find solid ground for a philosophy of musical experience.” Marcel, “Music According to St. 
Augustine,” 121–2. Phenomenology was, for Marcel, one of the “concrete approaches to the ontological mystery.” 
Marcel, Being and Having, 118–9. Though not a phenomenologist de rigueur, Marcel often put phenomenology into 
practice, analytically detailing the contents of conscious experience and emphasizing the active role of 
consciousness in constituting the meaning of such experience.  
Vial, likewise, practiced a form of phenomenology. Lippman has described Vial’s De l’être musical (1952) 
as a “mixture of ontology and phenomenology” rather than a “strictly phenomenological investigation.” Lippman, A 
History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 452. Vial’s phenomenology of music, Lippman observed, could easily pass 
into a “metaphysics of the ‘presence,’ or incarnation, of the musical work.” Ibid., 455. 
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“remarkably detailed and concrete investigation of the temporal nature of music, but one that 
does not represent itself as phenomenological.”75  
Brelet’s work is, Lippman implies, intuitively phenomenological.76 Without referring to 
phenomenology directly, Brelet nonetheless follows, in constructing her “immanent 
metaphysics” of music, a philosophical procedure that, Lippman argues, “bears a certain 
resemblance to Husserl’s technique of free imaginative variation”—a technique that the founder 
of modern German phenomenology had devised and employed in order to “achieve insight into 
the essence of the phenomenological object.”77 Brelet’s philosophy, like that of Jankélévitch, is 
phenomenology incognito.78 
This was not an uncommon phenomenon in post-WWII France. The composer Pierre 
Schaeffer (1910–1995) would later come to recognize a similar occurrence in his own work. 
“For years,” Schaeffer observed in his Traité des objets musicaux (written from 1951–1966), 
                                                 
75Ibid., 443. Carl Dahlhaus also indicates that Brelet’s philosophy is phenomenological in some sense. In 
his Esthetics of Music, Dahlhaus begins the chapter “Toward the Phenomenology of Music” with a series of quotes 
from Augustine (Confessions), Brelet (Le Temps musical), and Husserl (“Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des 
inneren Zeitbewussteins”). Carl Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music, trans. William Austin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 74. 
76Lippman observes that Husserl’s work was “evidently unknown to Brelet, and her study of musical time 
is in any event not really phenomenological in the strict sense of the term.” Ibid., 452. Emphasis in the original. 
77Ibid. Brelet, apparently unwittingly, performs an eidetic reduction of music in order to arrive, via a 
process of “free variation in imagination,” at an intuitive knowledge of music’s essence.  
In Husserl’s phenomenology, eidetic reduction proceeds via individual consciousness from the contingent 
aspects of material objects to their essential structures in order thereby to attain an intuition of the eidos of a thing. 
Husserl discusses the method of “free variation” in, for instance, Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer 
Semester, 1925, trans. John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 54–69; Cartesian Meditations, trans. 
Dorion Cairns (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer), 69–72. 
78How could such a thing be possible? By the time of Brelet’s writing, very little of French philosophy 
remained untouched by the ideas of German phenomenologists. During the 1940s, moreover, phenomenology 
became French. It became a mode of doing philosophy in France, and, by the end of the decade, it had become the 
dominant mode. It should not be surprising, then, that the philosophical analyses of Brelet and Jankélévitch embody 
and perform phenomenology without ever discussing explicitly the notion itself. Brelet and Jankélévitch practice 
phenomenology. 
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“we often did phenomenology without knowing it.”79 Schaeffer claimed his “phenomenological 
inheritance” outright in the Traité, and a specific reading of Husserlian phenomenology, as 
music theorist Brian Kane has argued, informed Schaeffer’s theory of l’acousmatique.80  
Unlike Schaeffer, neither Brelet nor Jankélévitch ever theorized their own relationship to 
the practice of phenomenology. In chapters 2–4, I trace the ways in which Jankélévitch and 
Brelet enacted the phenomenological turn to subjective experience.81 Their evocative depictions 
of musical experience enlist and explore phenomenology’s central query—“how can there be an 
Other for my consciousness?”82 Their investigations furthermore touch upon what was for some 
French phenomenologists the fundamental problem underlying the question of the Other—
                                                 
79This, he added, was “much better than…talking about phenomenology without practicing it.” Pierre 
Schaeffer, Traité des objets musicaux (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 91. The translation is Brian Kane’s. Qtd. in 
Brian Kane, Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 18.  
80In his Traité, Schaeffer consistently deploys, according to Kane, “techniques that are Husserlian in 
character: the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, the eidetic reduction, imaginative free variation, and the 
reactivation of originary experience.” Kane is disputing the contention, attributed to Makis Solomis, that 
“Schaeffer’s style of phenomenology is much closer to Merleau-Ponty than Husserl.” Kane, Sound Unseen, 19. 
Schaeffer’s style of phenomenology thus shares, in Kane’s view, the same shortcomings as that of Husserl. 
It employs the same ideological trick, relegating experience to a subsidiary role. It runs into the same “ontological 
problem”: Schaeffer’s phenomenology of the sound object mystifies the acousmatic experience, removing the 
historical, contingent aspects that make such an experience possible and meaningful in the first place. Kane, Unseen 
Sound, 36. “Through a sleight of hand, phenomenology covertly places its ontology prior to experience, and then 
subsequently discloses the ontological horizon as if it were always already present—as if its ontology made 
experience possible in the first place.” 
This, it is safe to say, is not a generous reading of Husserl. The reasons have to do with a later anti-
philosophical turn within philosophy itself, a turn that characterizes the thinking of some of those upon whom 
Kane’s project relies—namely, Adorno and Derrida, both of whom subjected Husserl’s phenomenology to intense 
critique. Theodore W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, trans. Willis Domingo (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1983) and Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. 
Leavey (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). 
81Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology, 22–3. The original turn in phenomenology is the one which 
moves away from the object of a conscious act to the “subjective experiencing” of that act, to the “inner, 
‘experiential,’ features” that serve to condition and structure its intentionality. David Woodruff Smith and Ronald 
McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 
1982), 92.  
82François Lyotard, Phenomenology, trans. Brian Beakley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1991), 76. 
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namely, the problem of time, or the problem of the opaque medium through which the subjective 
experience of the Other occurs.83 
It was here, on the subject of time, that postwar French phenomenology made its stand, 
so to speak, against the philosophy of Bergson. In the 1940s, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty treated 
Bergson’s ideas inhospitably, presenting what Michael R. Kelly has called “misleading 
readings.”84 Others, like Jankélévitch and Brelet, took a softer stance, acknowledging the lasting 
influence of Bergson and respectfully differentiating their own views from those of the older 
philosopher. For them, Bergsonism contained valuable insights, but insights that failed to fully 
account for the experience of time in music.  
In music, Jankélévitch and Brelet argued, it became possible to organize time differently, 
to represent the immediate data of consciousness not only in a continuous flux (i.e., Bergsonian 
durée), but also in other ways. When Jankélévitch listened to Debussy’s music, for instance, he 
often heard not an unbroken flow, but a disjointed series of musical images. Brelet located in 
Stravinsky’s music not the “succession without distinction” of Bergson’s pure duration, but the 
harnessing of time’s internal dynamism, its “power of eternal rebirth.”85  
Every musical experience, for Brelet and Jankélévitch, involved an act of creating or re-
creating musical time. In this way, they posited, we participate in the constitution of otherness: 
we become conscious of a time that is other than the way in which we experience time in our 
ordinary lives. In phenomenology, the “Other” can take various, but related forms—most 
                                                 
83As Lippman has observed, the phenomenology of music comes into existence as a “specialized field” in 
Husserl’s “Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Inner Consciousness of Time.” One of the “most fundamental 
processes of consciousness,” for phenomenology, is the “temporal constitution of a pure datum of sensation.” 
Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 437.  
84Michael R. Kelly, introduction to Bergson and Phenomenology, ed. Michael R. Kelley (Basingstoke, 
United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 4.  
85Brelet, Le Temps musical, 48, 50. 
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commonly, it is the alterity of another consciousness (i.e., another person), of the world in-itself, 
or of history. 
Chapters 2–4 explore in turn each of these forms and their corresponding temporalities as 
they appear in the work of Jankélévitch and Brelet. The dissertation’s second chapter 
(“Jankélévitch, Levinas, and Sonorous Psychism”) centers on the mystery of intra-human and 
inter-human time, of time within and between subjects. The third chapter (“Drastic 
Ecomysteriology”) addresses the mystery of ecological time, or the temporal relationship 
between human beings and the natural world. The fourth chapter (“Mysteries of the Dialectic”) 
investigates the mystery of historical time and its manifestations in the dialectics of music. 
The phenomenological styles of Brelet and Jankélévitch, unlike that of Schaeffer, had 
less to do with Husserl directly than with other philosophical sources.86 Hence, each of chapters 
2–4 summons a more immediate point of contact. Jankélévitch’s Debussy et le mystère serves as 
the primary content for the analyses in the second and third chapters. To situate Jankélévitch’s 
phenomenology of Debussy’s music within the intellectual milieu of postwar French philosophy, 
these chapters draw upon the work of two French phenomenologists who were also 
Jankélévitch’s friends and colleagues, Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908–1961).87 
                                                 
86Brelet and Jankélévitch almost certainly knew the philosophy of Husserl (and that of his most influential 
disciple Martin Heidegger)—if not always through the original German, then through translations and via the 
writings of French phenomenologists like Sartre, De Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas. When interpreting the 
work of Heidegger in Time and the Other, Levinas refers to Jankélévitch. The reference is offhand, without a 
citation. Levinas writes: “However, there is a notion—Geworfenheit—’expression of a certain Heidegger,’ 
according to Jankélévitch—that is usually translated ‘dereliction’ or ‘desertion.’ One then stresses a consequence of 
Geworfenheit. One must understand Geworfenheit as the ‘fact-of-being-thrown-in’…existence.” (The quotation 
actually comes from Vladimir Jankélévitch, L’Alternative (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1938), 152, note 
1.) Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 
1987), 45. See also Marguerite La Caze, Wonder and Generosity: Their Role in Ethics and Politics (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2013), 152–3.  
87Levinas played an instrumental role in bringing the phenomenological ideas of Husserl and Heidegger to 
the Francophone world. Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 106–7 and 354. Gutting describes 
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Chapters 2 and 3 map manifestations of mystery in Jankélévitch’s Debussy et le mystère. 
“Mystery is the thing of music,” and “no musician has gone further than Claude-Achille in the 
suggestion and transcription of mysterious things,” Jankélévitch wrote.88 Yet mystery, in 
Debussy, has been dressed, so to speak, in the lightest of garments. The language of Debussyan 
mystery is, for Jankélévitch, translucent: “Debussy is mysterious, but he is clear.”89 In 
Jankélévitch’s study, the translucent mystery serves as the catalyst for a mysteriology of 
Debussy’s music. The philosopher identifies two categories of translucent mystery governing the 
syntax of Debussy’s musical creations—the pneumatic and the grammatic.90 The former serves 
as the topic of the dissertation’s second chapter, the latter as that of its third chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Levinas’s “seminal work in introducing Husserl (and Heidegger, through whose lens he read Husserl) to France.” 
From German phenomenology, Levinas wished to salvage the promise of a “return to concrete existence and a 
shedding of the formal logic of philosophy that might obscure concrete experience.” Eric Severson, Levinas’s 
Philosophy of Time: Gift, Responsibility, Diachrony, Hope (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 2013), 32–
3. In his postwar publications, Levinas employed phenomenology in order to “reconfigure time according to the 
mystery of the solitary subject” and the mystery of the other—the first he referred to as an ontological mystery, the 
second as an ethical mystery. Ibid., 57. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the “task of phenomenology” was to “reveal the mystery of the world and the mystery 
of reason.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 
2002), xxiv. The ontological mystery, for him, was a mystery of “being in the world.” It was a mystery of 
perception, i.e., a mystery of an “organism’s entire bodily relation to its environment.” Taylor Carman, “Merleau-
Ponty and the Mystery of Perception,” Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 630. Emphasis in the original. As a mystery 
of human beings “actively and intelligently inhabiting an environment,” the ontological mystery became, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, an ecological mystery. Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 1. Emphasis in the original.  
Merleau-Ponty was not himself a mysteriologist, but a fellow traveler. To the extent that his work 
emphasized a parallel between the tasks of art and philosophy, a productive ambiguity in the phenomenon of 
expression, and an insistence on perpetually returning to the mysterious contingency of existence, he walked hand in 
hand, so to speak, with thinkers like Brelet and Jankélévitch.  
88Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 11. 
89Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
90Pelléas et Mélisande marked the arrival of pneumatic mysteries—the “mystery of souls,” the “mystery of 
Psyche,” the mystery of “fate” (“anguish,” “voluptuosity,” and “death”). For Jankélévitch, Pelléas et Mélisande 
charted the territory of the human psyche—the pneumatic topographies of the soul. In Pelléas, according to 
Jankélévitch, we find ourselves, like Baudelaire, passing through a “forest of symbols,” moving “between things that 
are each beyond themselves and that are not everything that they signify.” Ibid. See also Charles Baudelaire, Fleurs 
de mal, trans. Richard Howard (Jaffrey, N.H.: David R. Godine, 1982). 
Grammatic mysteries took shape in the “twenty-four Préludes, the Images for piano and the Images for 
orchestra, the Nocturnes for orchestra, the Estampes.” In these works, Jankélévitch recognized the mystery of 
nature—the corporeal mystery, the “mystery of Physis,” the mystery of “midday.” Ibid., 31. Where Pelléas 
presented an idiom for exploring existential mysteries, the Préludes, according to Jankélévitch, were the “language 
of the ontological mystery.” Ibid., 32. 
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Chapter 2 (“Jankélévitch, Levinas, and Sonorous Psychism”) begins by exploring the 
pertinence of Plotinian mystery to the postwar philosophies of Jankélévitch and Levinas.91 In 
Plotinus, the chapter locates as well a point of connection between the historical Jankélévitch, 
who was thinking and writing in the intellectual climate of post-WWII French existential 
phenomenology, and the Jankélévitch who appears in Carolyn Abbate’s “Debussy’s Phantom 
Sounds” as the philosopher of musical symbolism. I argue that a method of listening based on 
Jankélévitch and Levinas’s theorizations of psychic life (what Levinas called “psychism”) makes 
it possible to imagine what audiences in France, both during and right after the war, may have 
heard when they listened to the performance of a specifically symbolist passage of music from 
Debussy’s Le Martyre de saint Sébastien. 
Chapter 3 (“Drastic Ecomysteriology”) considers the congruities between Jankélévitch’s 
study of Debussyan mystery and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of vision. The chapter details the latent 
analytic procedures that coordinated Jankélévitch’s poetico-philosophical re-creation of 
                                                 
91After the Second World War, both Jankélévitch and Levinas investigated mysteries of “time and the 
other.” Levinas’s reflections on le temps et l’autre were included in the first book published by Jean Wahl’s Collège 
philosophique—Le Choix, le monde, l’existence (1947). In his preface to the volume, Wahl wrote that Levinas, 
continuing along the “path opened by Heidegger,” discovered “Being” disclosing itself to him in an “ontological, 
sometimes even magical way.” Jean Wahl, ed., Le Choix, le monde, l’existence (Grenoble, France: B. Arthaud, 
1947), 10. 
Mysteriology acquired a source of vitality in Plotinus, and, in nourishing neo-Platonic mysteries in France 
in the 40s and 50s, Jankélévitch was not alone. Some of those who studied with Émile Bréhier (1876–1952), for 
example, cut their teeth on Plotinian philosophy. Bréhier, professor of Philosophy and History of Philosophy at the 
Sorbonne from 1930–1946, had translated the Enneads into French and published commentaries on them as well. 
Bréhier’s students included Albert Camus (1913–1960), who wrote a thesis on Saint Augustine and Plotinus to earn 
his diplôme d’études supérieures (the equivalent of a master’s degree) in philosophy, and Merleau-Ponty, who wrote 
a thesis on Plotinus to attain the same degree. 
See also Samantha Novello, Albert Camus as Political Thinker: Nihilisms and the Politics of Contempt 
(Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 152, note 9; Theodore Geraets, Vers une nouvelle 
philosophie transcendantale: La Genèse de la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty jusqu’à la Phénoménologie 
de la perception (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 5. also Camus’s use of Plotinus in “L’Art dans la 
Communion,” in Œuvres complètes, vol. 1, ed. Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), 965 and ff., and 
Camus’s comments on Plotinus in “Absurd Walls,” a subsection of The Myth of Sisyphus, collected in, for instance, 
Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1972), 489–498. 
Brelet also knew Bréhier. Her first book (Esthétique et création musicale, 1947) is dedicated to him. Her 
relationship to Plotinus is not theorized in her own work, but it comes forward in her assessments of Stravinsky. See 
below, section 5.4.2. 
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Debussyan mystery by collating the technical strategies of what I call a musical ecomysteriology, 
or the ways in which Jankélévitch mapped the mysterious network of relationships in Debussy’s 
music. It finds Jankélévitch offering an ethical perspectivism based on Debussy’s music, its self-
distantiating properties, and its aural embodiment of ecocentrism.  
Chapter 4 (“Mysteries of the Dialectic”) turns to Brelet’s Esthétique et création musicale 
(1947) and Le Temps musical (1949). The chapter traces the consonances between Brelet’s 
philosophy and that of the French phenomenologist Louis Lavelle (1883–1951), but it also 
considers the thorny relationship between postwar French and German conceptions of musical 
aesthetics.92 In the late 1940s, both Brelet and Adorno published philosophies of new music. 
Examining the distance between them brings the details of each into sharper relief. Despite a 
series of apparent concordances, Brelet and Adorno practiced different forms of immanent 
critique, employed disparate dialectical methods, and constructed extremely divergent 
interpretations of Stravinsky and his music.  
                                                 
92Lavelle allegorized experience, laying emphasis on “living and re-living, on creation and contemplation.” 
Smith, Contemporary French Philosophy, 13. Experience, for Lavelle, was an adventure—it always contained an 
element of the unexpected, the unusual, the unknown. A philosophy of lived experience aimed at the mysterious 
processes that arose within that experience. A philosophy of lived experience aimed at the mysteries of participating 
in the dialectical unfolding of time and eternity, in the dynamics of the historical “movement of finite existence” and 
the “total presence” of the “Being-Act.” Paul Ricœur, preface to La participation à l’être dans la philosophie de 
Louis Lavelle, by Bechara Sargi (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1957), 9, 7–8. 
To some extent, Lavelle’s reputation has been sullied by his willingness to benefit from the Occupation, by 
his decision to gain power by working for the Vichy government. Prior to World War II, however, he had published 
extensively, producing and receiving acknowledgment for “definite claims of philosophical territory, definite 
demands for serious attention.” Robert Jones, introduction to “The Act of Presence: Key Readings from the 
Philosophy of Louis Lavelle,” http://association-lavelle.chez-alice.fr/New%20Translator%20Intro%20pdf.pdf, 
accessed 16 December 2016. After the war, his thoughts continued to demand respect from some. Brelet and 
Jankélévitch, for example, referred to his work, and Ricœur had this to say: “Around the work of Louis Lavelle, his 
perfect style, his almost Spinozist serenity, a kind of respectful and embarrassed silence has been built in France; 
young people hardly read it, and their elders prefer to discuss less perfect, but, in their view, more incisive works, 
which has often rendered them inattentive to the immense undertaking of the philosopher of being; this was natural; 
this is no doubt unsustainable; when time has laminated reputations, true grandeur will be reclassified; I am 
convinced that Louis Lavelle, at the end of this test, will be fully recognized.” Ricœur, preface to La participation à 
l’être dans la philosophie de Louis Lavelle, 7. 
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As she focused on the mysterious magnetism of Stravinsky’s music, Brelet practiced an 
historical form of interdisciplinary research. At the intersection of musicology and philosophy, 
Brelet combined a recognition of historical contingency with an attention to the articulation of 
philosophical truth. Such a methodological pluralism defined a great deal of musicological work 
in post-WWII France, and tracing the interest of such work in aesthetics and mystery, which 
extended to the very origins of music scholarship in France, not only enlarges the perspective of 
today’s musicologists on the history of their discipline, but also opens their ears to hearing some 
very familiar music in new ways. 
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2.0  MUSICOLOGIE AND MYSTERY 
2.1 BETWEEN HISTORY AND AESTHETICS 
When, in 1958, the French musicologist and librarian François Lesure (1923–2001) published a 
survey of French musicology since 1945, the documentation of its activity filled more than a 
dozen pages in the journal Acta musicologica.93 Of this activity, academic musicology accounted 
for less than half; responsibility for the bulk of music-related intellectual pursuits rested with the 
great periphery (libraries, conservatories, learned societies, religious organizations, international 
conferences, other academic disciplines).94  
                                                 
93Françoise Lesure, “La musicologie française depuis 1945,” Acta Musicologica 30, no. 1 (1958): 3–17. 
Academic musicology in France presented a bleak outlook after the war: By 1948, the number of university 
professorships had dwindled from a mere three to a solitary one. When André Pirro died in 1943, the Sorbonne 
suppressed his chair in music history, and, at the death of Pirro’s student Yvonne Rokseth in 1948, the chair of 
musicology at the University of Strasbourg remained for a decade without a holder. Thus, at the Congress of Utrecht 
in 1952, Paul-Marie Masson could say to his international colleagues: “I know a country that is considered very 
civilized and where one university professor is considered sufficient to teach the history of music to the entire 
Nation.” Paul-Marie Masson, “Les Tâches internationales de la musicologie,” in Société internationale de 
musicologie: cinquième congrès, Utrecht, 3–7 juillet 1952 (Amsterdam: Alsbach, 1953), 13. 
From 1945–1958, the French university system had only two scholars employed as professional 
musicologists—Masson himself and his successor Jacques Chailley (1910–1999). 
94I have chosen to define the activity of academic musicology as the work carried out by those who held a 
doctoral degree in musicology. In his article, Lesure does not distinguish between those who had achieved the 
Doctorat és lettres or d’État and those who had not. Of all the people whose contributions Lesure cites, six were 
academic musicologists during the entire period 1945–58, three were academic musicologists for at least part of that 
same period, and thirty-eight produced music scholarship without a doctorate in musicology. It is no easy task to 
quantify the actual work that they did, because this work assumes such different forms (i.e., teaching, 
administration, service, scholarship). Taking only one type of product within a single category of musicological 
labor (i.e., scholarly monographs) and suppressing questions of comparative value, it becomes possible to gauge, 
very roughly, the disparity between French musicology in its current sense and in the sense that it had for Lesure in 
1958. Lesure’s study cites thirty-seven monographs—fourteen by academic musicologists (~38%), twenty-three by 
others (~62%).  
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Lesure discerned a proliferation of musicological work across several different 
disciplinary areas. There was nonetheless a methodological bias that oriented Lesure’s story of 
postwar French musicology, a bias which Lesure expressed clearly when, in the midst of telling 
that story, he chided French musicologists for failing to adequately reflect upon the nature of 
their discipline. “What is regrettable,” he wrote, “is that musicologists do not more fully 
interrogate the foundations of their discipline, the scope of their method, the precise orientation 
of their aim.”95  
For Lesure, an indistinctness of scholarly trends coupled with the nonexistence of a 
vigorous mainstream had afflicted musicological research in France after 1945. Particularly 
disconcerting, in his eyes, was the scarcity of a specific type of musicological resource, a type 
which consisted primarily of historical investigation and which, for him, should have 
characterized French musicology’s core concern as well as its dominant practice. Before 1945, 
Lesure implied, the study of music history had functioned as the central focus and approach of 
musicologie. 
The relative disintegration of historical music research, according to Lesure, clarified the 
endemic obscurity of postwar French musicology in general. The drying up of the historical 
stream explained, en bloc, French musicology’s “lack of a mainstream” (which amounted, for 
Lesure, to an “ideological deficiency”), the “displacement of the center of interest” of music 
research, and the almost complete absence, “since the war,” of “any indisputable monuments, 
                                                 
95Lesure, “La musicologie française depuis 1945,” 8. For examples of such interrogations, see André 
Schaeffner, “Ethnologie musicale ou musicologie comparée?” in Les Colloques de Wégimont: Cercle International 
d’Études Ethno-Musicologues, ed. Paul Collaer, 18–32 (Bruxelles: Elsevier, 1957) and Françoise Lesure 
“Musicologie et sociologie,” Revue musicale, no. 221 (1953): 4–11. 
34 
any awe-inspiring studies in the vein of classic works, like those of Prunières, Pirro, La 
Laurencie, etc.”96  
Musicology, in the truest sense of the word, was, for Lesure, precisely historical 
musicology. He attributed its dissolution to the recent passing of many prominent French 
scholars of music history, to the collective loss of those “gentlemen of musicology” who, “in 
total independence, could devote a lifetime to gather the materials for a French violin school, for 
a Mozart biography, dividing their time between archives, libraries, and office work.”97  
Though he favored the historical method and defended its sovereignty, Lesure also 
conceded its de facto postwar usurpation as well as the existence of other (albeit, in his view, 
illegitimate) claims to French musicology’s throne. Lesure alluded to aesthetics, acoustics, and 
psychology—the once peripheral tributaries that gained in prominence after the purported drying 
up of the historical stream.  
After the war, a renewed attention to aesthetics became, Lesure wrote, “one of the most 
visible phenomena of the new musicology in this country.”98 The aesthetic mode of 
musicological inquiry benefited from the institutional support that now eluded that of the 
                                                 
96Lesure, “La musicologie française depuis 1945,” 8–9. The only exception, in Lesure’s view, was Marc 
Pincherle’s Antonio Vivaldi et la musique instrumentale (2 vols., 1948). Henri Prunières (1861–1942), a scholar of 
seventeenth-century French and Italian music, remains best known for his studies of Lully (1910) and Monteverdi 
(1924) as well as his examination of Cavalli et l’opéra vénitien (1931). Pirro’s many celebrated writings include 
L’Orgue de Jean-Sébastien Bach (1895), L’Esthétique de Jean-Sébastien Bach (1907), Dietrich Buxtehude (1913), 
Schütz (1913), Les Clavecinistes: Étude critique (1924), and Histoire de la musique de la fin du XVIe siècle à la fin 
du XIVe (1940). For further discussion of Pirro, see below, section 2.3.2. Lionel de La Laurencie (1861–1933), who, 
like Prunières, focused primarily on music of the French Baroque, wrote several notable works, including Rameau 
(1908), Lully (1911), “Contribution à l’histoire de la symphonie française vers 1750” (with G. Saint-Fox), L’École 
française de violon de Lully à Viotti: Études d’histoire et d’esthétique (1922–4), and Orphée de Gluck: Étude et 
analyse (1934). 
97Lesure’s musicological “gentlemen” included Yvonne Rokseth (d. 1948), P.M. Masson and G. Saint-Fox 
(d. 1954), and J.G. Prod’homme and Leon Vallas (d. 1956). Lesure, “La musicologie française depuis 1945,” 8. 
98Ibid., 9.  
35 
historical: in addition to a professorship in aesthetics at the Sorbonne, the Paris Conservatory 
established two chairs for the teaching of aesthetics.99  
In terms of research, however, the “most important works” in the field of music aesthetics 
since the end of the war, according to Lesure, issued not from professors of aesthetics, but rather 
from Gisèle Brelet, a French musician and philosopher who, after first having trained in piano at 
the conservatories of Nantes and Paris, turned to the study of biology and philosophy at the 
Sorbonne, where she earned a Doctorat ès lettres in philosophy in 1949.100  
Within a four-year period, Brelet published three works on the aesthetics of music. In her 
first monograph Esthétique et création musicale (1947), she attempted to derive a “pluralistic 
aesthetics” of music, an aesthetics which would “no longer seize upon some abstract ideal and 
posit it once and for all” but instead found itself upon conditions of musical art that were 
simultaneously universal and concrete.101 Her doctoral thesis on musical temporality (Le Temps 
musical, 2 vols., 1949) and her treatment of musical performance (L'Interprétation créatrice, 2 
vols., 1951) followed shortly thereafter.  
As Lesure noted, the latter work belonged to the Bibliothèque Internationale de 
Musicologie, a series for which Brelet herself served as directrix for the Presses Universitaires 
de France (PUF). Brelet began her editorship of the PUF’s International Library of Musicology 
in 1950, and, by 1958, the collection already included a dozen volumes, most of which pertained 
to music aesthetics. What Lesure could have noted as well was the fact that the PUF’s 
appointment of a philosopher-musician (rather than a musicologist per se) to oversee a series of 
                                                 
99The philosopher Etienne Souriau (1892–1979) held the chair in aesthetics at the Sorbonne beginning in 
1941. The Paris Conservatory entrusted its two posts to the aesthetician Marcel Beaufils (1899–1985) and the 
composer Roland-Manual (1891–1966). 
100It wasn’t until the 1950s that the French university system renamed the Doctorat ès lettres as Doctorat 
d’État. Alan D. Schrift, Twentieth-Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers (Hoboken, N.J.: 
Blackwell, 2006), 208.  
101Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, viii. 
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titles in musicology further corroborated the rapport of aesthetic analysis with musicological 
research in the postwar era. 
Besides Brelet’s writings, Lesure marked a number of other aesthetic studies as 
noteworthy, including those of two Russian émigrés—Boris de Schlœzer’s phenomenological 
investigation of J.S. Bach’s musical aesthetics (Introduction à J.-S. Bach: Essai d’esthétique 
musicale, 1947) and Vladimir Jankélévitch’s philosophical examinations of music (e.g., La 
Rhapsodie, verve et improvisation musicale, 1955; Le nocturne, 1957).  
Jankélévitch’s scholarship nevertheless lacked, for Lesure, the “scientific trend” that he 
perceived in many postwar aesthetic explorations, a trend which, he noted, even “classically 
trained musicologists would be wrong to despise.”102 A methodological inclination toward the 
scientific—toward the realm of empirical observations, testable hypotheses, and falsifiable 
conclusions—would, Lesure hoped, eventually “prevail on a tendency toward phraseology,”103 a 
crime of rhetorical sophistication, Lesure alleged, from which the aforementioned Jankélévitch, 
“despite some ingenious discoveries, does not always escape, even in his more recent work.”104 
Notwithstanding his reservations about the grounds of their research methods, Lesure 
identified Brelet and Jankélévitch as significant representatives of an institutionally validated and 
highly visible form of French musicology. In 1958, Lesure’s deliberation suggested that 
                                                 
102Lesure, “La musicologie française depuis 1945,” 9. 
103La phraséologie has, in French, a different connotation than does the word phraseology in English. 
Whereas in English phraseology is a neutral, descriptive term, simply referring to an author’s choice and 
employment of words and phrases, in French la phraséologie may be either descriptive (in the same sense as the 
English word) or pejorative, in which case it refers to the use of high-flown language to express relatively mundane 
thoughts. 
104Ibid. Lesure also listed some of the studies that dealt more specifically with the “evolution and aesthetics 
of contemporary music,” including, e.g., “Maurice le Roux, Introduction to Contemporary Music (1957), Claude 
Rostand, French Contemporary Music (1952, 2nd ed. 1957), Antoine Goléa, Aesthetics of Contemporary Music 
(1954), Robert Siohan, Sound Horizons (1956), various works of Rene Leibowitz on the twelve-tone school, and our 
special issue on Polyphony (1950) and that of the Musical Revue (1957) on recent essays of experimental music.” 
He briefly commented on the acoustics and psychology of music as well. 
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aesthetics was becoming, perhaps at the expense of historical studies, the most prominent, the 
most prolific, and the most publicly patronized of trends in postwar French musicology.  
At the most visible level, at the institutional level of music scholarship (i.e., at the level of 
educational degrees, academic disciplines, and occupational titles), this may have been true. At 
the individual level, however, professional distinctions did not always entail straightforward 
results. More specifically, within musicological work itself—at the level of method—
conventional disciplinary markers sometimes become difficult to discern. In music aesthetics and 
music history, techniques for the production of knowledge often overlap. 
Lesure attempts to separate the historical and aesthetic modes, but rarely has the history 
of musicological work in France shown any solid line of demarcation between them. More 
typical of French musicology has been a flexible commingling of history and aesthetics, coupled 
with an emphasis on the one or the other. Those whom Lesure designated as proponents of 
historical musicology frequently grappled with aesthetic issues as well; conversely, those he 
identified as aestheticians regularly demonstrated genuine engagement with the history of music. 
Moreover, French musicology’s integration of historical and aesthetic questions did not 
surface for the first time only after 1945. Rather than privileging historical research, French 
music scholarship has, from its Enlightenment beginnings, exhibited a multilateral strategy, a 
synthetic deployment of historical and philosophical methods in the service of appreciating and 
articulating music’s concrete reality as well as the abstract conditions of its possibility.  
In this chapter, I take seriously Lesure’s claim that l’esthétique constituted one of the 
most visible phenomena of postwar French musicology; however, I question Lesure’s conflation 
of the institutional viability of aesthetics as a discipline with the degree of music scholarship’s 
investment in aesthetics as a topic. Though universitarian endorsement in the period after 1945 
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may have enhanced the visibility of aesthetics as a sanctioned form of music-academic discourse, 
a predilection for music aesthetics was not in itself an entirely novel trait of post-WWII French 
musicology. The study of l’esthétique musicale has continuously constituted a strong dimension 
of musicological practice in France. 
In what follows, I take some of the seminal figures that have populated histories of 
musicology in France and demonstrate the critical role of the aesthetic in their investigations of 
music.105 I demonstrate, in other words, that the post-WWII emphasis on aesthetics can be traced 
to more than a few historical precedents in the practice and profession of French musicology. 
From Jean-Jacques Rousseau to François-Joseph Fétis to Romain Rolland, André Pirro, and 
Paul-Marie Masson, those French intellectuals who have practiced musicology have harbored, 
alongside their dedication to music’s empirical history, an abiding interest in speculative issues 
that fall outside the scope of such a history. In subsequent chapters, I will also argue that a 
concern for the historical materials of music persists just as resolutely in aesthetic musicology, 
intertwined ineluctably with the philosophical core of Brelet and Jankélévitch’s 
phenomenologies of music.  
                                                 
105Recent historical sketches include Philippe Bachman, La musicologie en France entre impasse et 
mutation: état des lieux et enjeux politiques (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1992) and Bruno 
Moysan, “Musicologie française: analyse vs sociologie?” Espaces Temps 84–6 (2004). Both Bachman and Moysan 
aimed to fill a “bibliographic vacuum.” Moysan’s survey began with the observation that “the history of musicology 
in France still remains to be written”; Bachman, in his earlier reflection, had noted that “a history of musicology in 
France, of its pedagogy and of its methodological issues has yet to be written.” Moysan, 132; Bachman, 9. “Music 
historiography,” Bachman continued, is “one of the branches that so far has been neglected in France, unlike in 
Germany or Britain where there have been reflections on the manner in which previous and present generations have 
written and are writing the history of music.” Bachman included a bibliography, which compiled a number of works 
divided into two categories—theoretical (ouvrages théoriques) and factual (ouvrages et articles de documentation). 
Yet he prefaced his list of references with the caveat that “the literature on musicology in France is hardly important, 
especially in terms of teaching and research institutions.” Ibid., 172.  
In addition to the items in Bachman’s bibliography, other reviews of the history of French musicology have 
taken the form of articles or sections of articles within larger, more encyclopedic sources, such as the exposition of 
national traditions of musicology in Grove Music Online and RILM’s study of music’s intellectual history. Vincent 
Duckles et al., “Musicology,” in Grove Music Online and Rémy Campos, “‘Musicology’ as Evidence,” in Music’s 
Intellectual History, eds. Zdravko Blažeković and Barbara Dobbs Mackenzie (New York: Répertoire International 
de la Littérature Musicale, 2009).  
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Throughout its history, the emphasis on aesthetics in musicologie has carried with it, 
moreover, an emphasis on the mysterious. Attending to music as an aesthetic object has meant 
attending to that which, in the experience of this object, offered resistance to thought—to that 
expression which presented its meaning “directly,” without reference to the “universe of 
reason.”106 It meant, in the words of Mikel Dufrenne, a prominent 20th-century French scholar of 
aesthetics, attending to “something mysterious and irreducible to discourse.”107 The object of 
aesthetics—that which is aesthetic in the object—was that mysterious something which the 
object harbored, according to Dufrenne, “simply because it addressed itself to perception and 
thus to feeling, rather than to understanding.”108  
The term mystère itself did not always possess, in the history of French musicology, the 
same vogue that it would have in postwar France. Yet the idea of “something mysterious” and its 
value for musical knowledge, as something in need of articulating, resonated in the writings of 
many of those who participated in the historical enterprise of musicologie. 
2.2 MUSIC AESTHETICS AND MYSTERY: THE ANCIENTS 
French music scholarship, regardless of its disciplinary origination, has treated the aesthetics of 
music as one of its foremost concerns. In addition to the historical, psychological, and cultural 
aspects of music, musicology in France has afforded eminence to that of the aesthetic—to that of 
                                                 
106Dufrenne, Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, 133.  
107Ibid., 145. 
108Ibid.  
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the phenomenal, the affective, the transformative.109 From the beginning, its practitioners have 
sought to theorize the aesthetic experience of music.110 
Just as intellectual historians have traced the origins of many modern disciplinary 
formations to the Enlightenment, so narrators often locate musicologie’s genesis in the Age of 
Reason. A similar sequence of scholars—from Rousseau in the eighteenth century to Fétis in the 
nineteenth and to Rolland, Pirro, and Masson in the twentieth—recounts the professionalization 
of French musicology. The strength of this prototypical chain is twofold: interlinked with the 
more commonly emphasized dedication to collecting and organizing historical information is a 
consistent attention to extrapolating the meaning and value of music for human experience. 
2.2.1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) has often been regarded as one of the “founders of modern 
musicology.”111 Rousseau’s writings on music have been viewed as musicological in some sense 
despite the fact that Rousseau himself was not a musicologist but a philosophe. Some of the 
earliest practical instantiations of French musicology issued therefore not from the pen of a 
trained specialist but from that of a public intellectual who applied his perspicacity to an array of 
topics, including education, philosophy, and politics in addition to music. 
                                                 
109The meaning of the word aesthetic, as I am using it here, reflects that of post-WWII French 
phenomenologists, especially Mikel Dufrenne, whose Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique (1953) expanded 
the movement’s borders to include the region of aesthetic experience—the terrain on which the human subject feels 
and lives the work of art. Dufrenne grounded aesthetic experience in the “open availability of feeling and 
perception,” thereby seeking to reclaim the original Greek meaning of aisthēsis (as “sensorial experience”). Edward 
S. Casey, translator’s forward to The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, xvi. 
110As Julia Simon has recently remarked, Jean-Jacques Rousseau suggested a theory of aesthetic experience 
in which musical performance in particular held the “potential to bridge the fragmentation of modern existence.” 
Julia Simon, Rousseau Among the Moderns: Music, Aesthetics, Politics (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2013), 148.  
111Moysan, 133. 
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For modern historiographers, Rousseau’s foundational status rests on his Dictionnaire de 
la musique and his entries on musical topics in Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie. The 
musicological in Rousseau has been located in the fact-collecting of his more encyclopedic and 
taxonomic undertakings.112 The Dictionnaire and the articles on music in the Encyclopédie far 
from expend the extent of Rousseau’s thoughts on music, however.113 Aesthetic speculation 
permeates his writings on music, even the relatively unprepossessed contributions to reference 
sources.  
Rousseau, in his Dictionnaire of 1768, for instance, compiled more than 600 pages of 
facts, but he deprived very few of them of analytical commentary. Rousseau’s dictionary brims 
with critique. In his preface, Rousseau wrote of musicians that they “read little,” but of music 
that few arts more necessitated “reading and reflection.”114 One of the purposes of his dictionary, 
he pronounced, would be “to make it as profitable to them as possible,” i.e., to tell musicians not 
what they already know, but to teach them about “what they still need to learn.”115  
Consequently, Rousseau’s tome is as much normative as it is informative. Rousseau 
includes, for example, an entry on the “unity of melody” in which he defines his own conception 
of the proper relationship between harmony and melody, an entry in which, rather than 
straightforwardly explaining the meaning of a musical term, Rousseau expresses his own 
aesthetic theory of the primacy of the melodic aspect of music.116  
                                                 
112Ibid.; Bachman, 10.  
113Rousseau’s reflections on music in his 1781 Essai sur l’origine des langues have, for example, continued 
to provoke interest from scholars well into the twentieth century, perhaps most notably in the work of Jacques 
Derrida. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 
1997). See also Michael Nass, “Pneumatology, Pneuma, Souffle, Breath,” in Reading Derrida’s Of Grammatology, 
ed. Sean Gaston and Ian Maclachlan (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 28–30.  
114Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Dictionnaire de la musique (Paris: Duchesne, 1768), vi. Rousseau’s Dictionary 
was first published a year earlier in Geneva (1767). 
115Ibid.  
116Ibid., 536–9.  
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The aesthetic knowledge of music, for Rousseau, primes the subject for “experiences of 
the eternal present.”117 In Rousseau’s formulation, aesthetic knowledge is felt, lived, performed, 
experienced. Casting off the “importunate intellect and its analysis,” it transcends the “linear 
quality of time, with its fragmentation of the self” and enters into a “pure duration, a kind of 
eternity or eternal present that leaves no sense of emptiness.”118 It transports the solitary self 
beyond itself toward something greater, toward the “Self as such, the soul of humanity.”119 
In music, the creation of this mysterious time outside of time depends upon the unity of 
melody. Through melodic unity, Rousseau argues, the perception of musical forms and the 
communication of moral sentiments become possible.120 Through the performance of melody, its 
formal principle, music elicits aesthetic experience—an encounter with otherness, yet one which 
leads to solidarity.121 In such an encounter, the individual subject secures a glimpse of the ethical 
dimension of existence, indirectly experiencing itself in the present moment as human 
community. 
The search for a kind of transcendence through aesthetic experience remained important 
to music scholarship in post-WWII France. Echoes of Rousseau’s speculations about knowledge, 
performance, and temporality continued to sound, for instance, in the music philosophies of 
                                                 
117Simon, 146–7. For Esposito, Rousseau’s originality resides in the conviction that “history isn’t man’s 
only dimension.” Esposito, 44. The origin of historical time is somehow ahistorical, atemporal. Hence Rousseau’s 
concentration on the present, on the “ephemeral quality of the here and now.” Simon, 149. 
118Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), 281; Lester G. 
Crocker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Prophetic Voice, 1758–1778 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 346.  
119Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 1. The pathway to this universal Self, which persisted as the true inner self within each 
individual, lay not primarily in logical thinking, but rather in feeling, in “empathy and human fellowship.” ibid., 17. 
Solomon reminds us that though Rousseau certainly “stressed the sentiments as central to self,” he also insisted that 
“reason and the sentiments work together in the moral life.” ibid., 18. 
120Simon, 71–6.  
121Tracy B. Strong, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Politics of the Ordinary (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2002), 59–66. Strong discusses a lengthy quotation in which Rousseau recounts a personal experience of 
aesthetic unity, an experience of a festival in which “words, music, and action came together,” allowing each 
individual simultaneously to perform the whole and to experience the other “as he or she experienced him- or 
herself.” The festival, that is, made it possible for Rousseau to “live with others in the present.”  
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Brelet and Jankélévitch, reverberating in their inclination toward creative engagement—toward 
an active participation in the processes of musical creation and performance.  
Brelet, Jankélévitch, and other mysteriologists recommended musical practice as a 
remedy for the maladies of modern society. Like Rousseau before them, Brelet and Jankélévitch 
portrayed the aesthetic experience of music as an essentially ethical experience.122 In their 
postwar writings, music provided an ideal experiential model through which to begin rebuilding 
social relations, to reimagine a new form of enlightened human community, and to redeem the 
potential of humankind after the horrors of modern war. 
2.2.2 François-Joseph Fétis (1784–1871)  
Histories of modern musicology have also typically presented the work of François-Joseph Fétis 
(1784–1871) as originary.123 Fétis is often considered the first French musicologist, both for his 
professional activity and for his comprehensive approach to the study of music.124 In addition to 
                                                 
122For an insightful discussion of Rousseau’s musical aesthetics, see Simon, Rousseau Among the Moderns, 
esp. Chapter Five.  
123Fétis has figured in many accounts of the birth of musicology, where his five-volume Histoire générale 
de la musique (1869–76) functions as one of the precursors to the foundation of modern musicology (which occurs 
for many with the publication of Guido Adler’s 1885 article on the scope, method, and aim of musicology). Guido 
Adler, “Umfang, Methode, und Ziel der Musikwissenschaft,” Vierteljahrsschrift für Musikwissenschaft 1 (1885): 5–
20. See also David Beard and Kenneth Gloag, Musicology: The Key Concepts (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1; E. 
Eugene Helm, The Canon and the Curricula: A Study of Musicology and Ethnomusicology Programs in America 
(Hillsdale, N.Y.: Pendragon Press, 1994), 9. 
Some have also pointed to Fétis’s Histoire générale de la musique as an antecedent of ethnomusicology. 
Fétis’s general history of music, that is, enacted an epistemological paradigm in which Western art music failed to 
exhaust the empirical reality of music. Bruno Nettl, Nettl’s Elephant: On the History of Ethnomusicology (Urbana-
Champagne: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 24; Alexander L. Ringer, “One World or None? Untimely 
Reflections on a Timely Musicological Question,” in Comparative Musicology and Anthropology of Music: Essays 
on the History of Ethnomusicology, eds. Bruno Nettl and Philip Bohlman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 187. 
124The nineteenth century beheld the arrival of what Bachman calls the “paleographer-archivists” (les 
archivistes paléographes), a musicological type that he argues has persisted to the present day (he could have used 
Lesure as an example). Moreover, the paleographer-archivists, for Bachman, constituted French history’s first 
professional musicologists—mainly employed as librarians by institutions like the Conservatoire, they included such 
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his work as a composer, conductor, performer, teacher, and librarian, Fétis made significant 
contributions to musicology, music criticism, music theory, and the philosophy of music. Fétis 
practiced music research and analysis, but he practiced it outside of his socially recognized and 
institutionally ordained musical professions.125 He directed his literary efforts equally to music 
criticism, theory, pedagogy, performance, philosophy, aesthetics, and even anthropology. 
As they have with Rousseau’s work, histories of musicology focus on the factual, 
empirically descriptive aspects of Fétis’s output. Before the 1830s, most of Fétis’s published 
writings, in the form of reviews and music criticism, appeared in periodicals such as Le temps, 
Le national, and La revue musicale.126 His contributions to the development of musicological 
scholarship, however, have been associated with the work that he did later, beginning with the 
first edition of his Biographie universelle des musiciens (1835–44). 
Despite its “subjective and error-strewn nature,” Fétis’s Biographie, according to 
Katherine Ellis, formed a “landmark in the discipline of musicology, and indicated the 
comprehensivity of knowledge for which Fétis craved, yet which he was prepared to compromise 
                                                                                                                                                             
figures as François-Louis Perne (1772–1832), François-Joseph Fétis (1784–1875), and Bottée de Toulmon (1797–
1850). Bachman, 14. 
Of course, the word musicologie itself did not appear in print until the very end of the nineteenth century, in 
the work of Pierre Aubry (1874–1910). See http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/musicologie, accessed 29 January 2017. 
125Katherine Ellis, “Fétis, François-Joseph,” Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online, Oxford University 
Press, accessed May 29, 2013, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/09564pg1. When 
the sixteen-year-old Fétis entered the Paris Conservatoire (on 31 October 1800), there was no institutional support 
for his intellectual interest in the study of music. Nonetheless, he made the time—outside of his formal studies—to 
examine “the writings of Zerlino and Martini, the music of Palestrina, and the notational problems of medieval 
music.” The nature of this early experience would mark Fétis’s musicological research throughout his long and 
varied musical career—whatever his official post (professor of counterpoint and fugue at the Paris Conservatoire in 
1821, librarian at the Conservatoire from 1826–1831, or Director of the Brussels Conservatory from 1833), if Fétis 
wished to undertake any studying of or writing about music history, it had to be on his own time, above and beyond 
his official duties. Apparently, he also sometimes conducted research in lieu of his obligations. For instance, when 
he too often neglected his responsibilities as librarian of the Conservatoire in favor of his extracurricular research, he 
was relieved of his post. 
126Fétis founded La revue musicale in 1827. A weekly music journal, it consisted almost entirely of his own 
writing. 
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in the interests of evangelism.”127 Fétis compromised his dictionary’s comprehensivity, that is, 
with the inclusion of aesthetic principles.128 
In Fétis’s view, however, aesthetic principles did not compromise the production of a 
biography; rather, they decided its success. One of the “principal duties of the biographer,” Fétis 
wrote in the preface to the Biographie, was to attain sincerity and impartiality in the 
“appreciation of merit.”129 An authoritative evaluation required a “knowledge of all that is in the 
field of music,” a knowledge which resulted not only from “technical studies,” but also from the 
“philosophy of art.”130 A successful biography required aesthetic judgment, which its author 
acquired through a “well-made study” of the history of art in combination with a “fine, delicate, 
energetic feeling, a great experience, and an eclectic disposition of the mind.”131 For Fétis, a 
discussion of music’s facts was inseparable from a discussion of its values. 
Like Rousseau’s Dictionary, Fétis’s Biography contained—in addition to names, places, 
and dates—subjective reflections on speculative concerns, such as the nature of truth, beauty, 
and the good.132 In his entry on Rousseau, Fétis praised the “aesthetic part” of the Dictionnaire 
de la musique for displaying its author’s “rare instinct for art and especially elevated views.”133 
Fétis also remarked that Rousseau’s writings on aesthetics had not been “without fruit for the 
reform of French taste” in the art of music.134 
                                                 
127Ibid. 
128Ellis notes that aesthetic compromises are “less blatant in the second edition [1860–5], a collaborative 
volume in which Aristide Farrenc wrote, checked, and revised many of the entries.”  
129François-Joseph Fétis, Biographie universelle des musiciens, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Paris: Didot, 1868), iv.  
130Ibid.  
131Ibid.  
132Fétis esteemed the aesthetic theories of Victor Cousin (1792–1867), whose most celebrated work was Du 
vrai, du beau, et du bien (1853). 
133François-Joseph Fétis, Biographie universelle des musiciens, 2d ed., vol. 7 (Paris: Didot, 1867), 335–6. 
134Ibid., 337.  
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In other writings, Fétis construed his own aesthetic understanding of music. “Music 
expresses the affections of the soul,” Fétis wrote.135 Yet it “expresses” only insofar as it 
“touches,” exercising over the subject a “sort of magnetic power, by means of which it places 
him in relation with external sensorial things.”136 Akin to “love,” music has a “moral as well as a 
physical effect”: like love, music has its “voluptuous sweetnesses, its passionate explosions, its 
joy, its grief, its exaltation, and its vagueness—that delicious vagueness which presents no 
determinate idea, but which excludes none.”137 Through performance, the “reciprocal action” of 
artists and audience produces the “charm” of music, the invocation of a beauty that moves the 
soul.138  
Notions of music’s affectivity, transformativity, and performativity continued to hold 
sway over mysteriologists in postwar France. Charme, in particular, played a pivotal role in 
Jankélévitch’s philosophy of music.139 Charm—the “musical act” itself—came to the fore in 
Music and the Ineffable, where it served as an “inexhaustible” source of mysterious energy.140 
Brelet spoke of musical charm as well. For her, it did not fully encompass musical experience, 
but consisted in the act of thinking “sonority as such.”141 To “taste charm” was, for Brelet, to 
                                                 
135François-Joseph Fétis, La musique mise à la portée de tout le monde (Paris: A. Mesnier, 1830), 348. 
136Ibid., 348–9. 
137Ibid., 358.  
138Ibid., 323.  
139See, for instance, Arnold I. Davidson’s “The Charme of Jankélévitch” and Carolyn Abbate’s 
“Jankélévitch’s Singularity,” both in Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, vii–xii and xiii–xx, respectively. 
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140Ibid., 83, 96. “Born of love,” Jankélévitch wrote, charme does not “provide us with the solution to a 
problem but is much more a state of infinite aporia that produces a fruitful perplexity.” In this, he said, it is “more 
ineffable than untellable.” Ibid., 96. Abbate has observed that charme is for Jankélévitch an “aesthetic phenomenon” 
with ethical consequences: the experience of charme, “the ways that one is transformed in response to it, is 
equivalent to the power of love, caritas and eros—the love of another or for an Other—in Jankélévitch’s moral 
philosophy.” Abbate, “Jankélévitch’s Singularity,” xviii. 
141Brelet, Le Temps musical, 697.  
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come to know one aspect of musical reality—that aspect which corresponded to “sound in 
itself.’142 
2.3 MUSIC AESTHETICS AND MYSTERY: THE MODERNS 
2.3.1 Romain Rolland (1866–1944) 
If Fétis has served as the most visible predecessor of musicology in nineteenth-century France, 
Romain Rolland (1866–1944) has typically played the role of arch-musicologist in the early 
twentieth century. Rolland worked throughout his career to lay the foundations for a distinctly 
French musicology.143 After completing a wide-ranging education in the humanities, Rolland 
arranged the “first music history congress to be held in Paris, in 1900,” and, in 1901, he co-
founded the Revue d’histoire et de critique musicales, the “first French journal intended for 
music historians.”144 
From 1902–1911, Rolland served as director of the newly established school of music at 
the École des Hautes Etudes Sociales. 145 He also received, in 1903, an appointment to the 
                                                 
142Ibid., 698. Charm corresponded directly, in Brelet’s view, to sound, but not to time.  
143As a branch of the more general study of the historical “evolution of the human soul,” French 
musicology, in Rolland’s estimation, depicted music as “one of the strongest expressions of that soul,” as one of the 
most characteristic features of the “inner life” of human beings. Romain Rolland, Musiciens d’autrefois, 2d ed. 
(Paris: Hachette, 1908), 1. 
144Rolland earned his doctoral degree from the University of Paris in 1895, writing an academic thesis on 
the origins of modern lyric theater (Les Origines du théâtre lyrique moderne) and a dissertation on the history of 
opera in Europe before Lully and Scarlatti (Histoire de l’opéra avant Lully et Scarlatti). Rolland had also written a 
Latin-language thesis on sixteenth-century Italian oil painting, and, upon finishing his doctorate at the Sorbonne, he 
spent a few years teaching courses on the history of art at several lycées in Paris. Robert Henderson, “Rolland, 
Romain,” Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online, Oxford University Press, accessed May 29 2013, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/23710. 
145Jane F. Fulcher, French Cultural Politics and Music: From the Dreyfus Affair to the First World War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 61–2. Fulcher shows the ways in which Rolland surmounted ideological 
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inaugural chair of music history at the Sorbonne.146 Rolland initiated the French university’s 
integration of musicological research and training, a development which heralded a significant 
change in the typical educational background and intellectual development of future historians of 
music in France.147  
An abiding attention to aesthetics characterizes Rolland’s studies of music history. In his 
“Notes on Lully,” Rolland lauds the seventeenth-century French composer for having attained in 
his operas a “truthfulness and purity of feeling which equaled that of the greatest poets in 
music.”148 Lully, Rolland rhapsodizes, “has hardly written an opera that does not breathe the 
poetry of nature, of night, and of silence.”149 Rolland compares Lully’s “Le sommeil de Renaud” 
                                                                                                                                                             
antagonisms, reaching across the clerical/anticlerical divide, inviting both Republican and anti-Republican music 
historians to lecture at the École, and aiming to mitigate the influence of the Schola Cantorum through the École’s 
success. The School of Advanced Social Studies was “a sort of semiofficial educational institution,” as “almost half 
of its lecturers were associated with the university system.” The institution’s purpose, according to Fulcher, was “to 
bring university figures together with socialists and proletarians” and “to provide a forum for the presentation of 
new ideas not yet ‘authorized’ for university instruction.” In 1902, Rolland presented a series of lectures on music 
during the revolutionary period and shortly thereafter assumed the directorship of musical studies at the school, 
using his administrative position to create “a forum for exchange between the radically different approaches and 
opinions associated with competing institutions or schools.” Fulcher, French Cultural Politics and Music, 60. 
146At this time, similar positions were also being created at other major international universities (e.g., 
Columbia, Harvard). Thanks go to Deane L. Root for directing my attention to this fact. 
147Moysan, 134; Bachman, 15. Before the twentieth century, music education and research had been 
primarily the domain of the Conservatoire. With Rolland’s appointment, French universities began to endorse the 
academic study of music. Though it would be a great deal of time before they would train musicologists qua 
musicologists (i.e., before they would recognize musicology as a distinct discipline with a specific curriculum), 
French universities nonetheless provided a commitment to scholarship and tools for historical research that purely 
musical institutions of the time did not possess. The École Normale Supérieure (ENS) played an important role in 
educating future musicologists, including Paul-Marie Masson and Rolland himself, the latter of whom, having 
attended the ENS as a student, subsequently taught music history there. 
Rolland pointed to the 1900 International Congress on Music History as an event that dramatically 
quickened the pace of development of music-historical research in France. Romain Rolland, “Musique,” in L’École 
des Hautes Etudes Sociales 1900–1910 (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1911), 69–70. Jane F. Fulcher notes that, in the years 
following the congress, “courses on music history began to spread, including the ‘cours libres’ at the Sorbonne and 
the lectures at the Schola, the École Normale Supérieure, and the Institut Catholique.” Fulcher, French Cultural 
Politics and Music, 61. 
148Romain Rolland, Some Musicians of Former Days, trans. Mary Blaiklock (New York: Henry Holt, 
1915), 219. Rolland’s “notes” first appeared in January 1907 in Mercure musical et Bulletin français de la S.I.M. 
(Société internationale de musique, Section de Paris). 
149Ibid. Rolland provides a list of examples: “We find it in the prologue of Cadmus, in the rural scene in 
Thesée, in the sleep of Atys, in Pan’s elegy in Isis, in the ‘nymphs’ choruses and dances in Proserpine, in the 
symphony and song of Night in the Triomphe de l’Amour, in the village wedding in Roland, in Reynold’s sleep in 
Armide, and in his last work, Acis, which is a pastoral in itself.” In a footnote, he draws particular attention to the 
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with the setting by Gluck, concluding that the “beauty of Lully’s music” resides in “certain 
aspects” on a “higher level than Gluck’s.”150 He praises especially Lully’s writing for the voice: 
In Lully’s airs the natural beauty of the voice floats confidently on the quiet 
stream of the accompaniment. The declamation follows in the current of its own 
proper rhythm. The beauty of Gluck’s declamation is less certain; it depends on 
the orchestra, and does not soar above it; man’s being is here absorbed in nature. 
With Lully the voice keeps its personality; and this was in accordance with the 
aesthetic principles of the time, which demanded that the voice should always be 
the chief instrument in the expression of feeling.151 
 
For Rolland, Lully’s operas breathe mystery—the “poetry of nature, of night, and of silence.”152  
 
In examining the qualities of Lully’s music, Rolland carefully considered the opinions of 
Rousseau.153 Although, with regard to Lully, he disputed the “acid criticisms” of “that great 
enemy of French music, Jean-Jacques Rousseau,” Rolland expressed gratitude for Rousseau’s 
Dictionary of Music, which, “in spite of its many errors,” he wrote, “abounded in original and 
sound ideas.”154 He also credited Rousseau with having accurately predicted the “reform in 
recitative” of French opera that had finally, he argued, come to fruition in Debussy’s Pelléas et 
Mélisande.155 
                                                                                                                                                             
Triomphe de l’Amour (1681) and “the sweet harmony which mingles and blends with the voice of Night. Night, the 
hidden Diana, Mystery, Silence, Dreams…” [“la douce harmonie, qui se mêle et s’accorde avec la voix de la Nuit. 
La Nuit, Diane cachée, le Mystère, le Silence, les Songes...”]. Philippe Quinault, Le théâtre de Monsieur Quinault: 
Contenant ses tragedies, comedies, et operas, vol. 5 (Paris: Compagnie des Libraires, 1739), 86–9. 
150Ibid.  
151Ibid., 220.  
152Ibid., 219.  
153He also considers the views of the abbé Du Bos (1670–1742) and Le Cerf de la Viéville (1674–1707).  
154Ibid., 207, 292, 257. In his introductory essay to the volume on Rousseau for the Living Thoughts 
Library, ed. Alfred O. Mendel, Rolland spoke at greater length of his “ personal gratitude to the great musician-
poet.” Not only his “thought” was “revolutionary,” Rolland declared, “his very writing brought about a revolution in 
the manner of feeling and of expressing feeling.” In order to express the “new world” that Rousseau found within 
himself, “he had to create a new language, which was free and more supple.” With Rousseau, “ideas came after 
rhythm”: he first sang within himself his periods and his sentences, without giving them words.” Romain Rolland, 
“Jean-Jacques Rousseau,” in Rousseau (London: Cassell, 1939), 24–6. 
155Romain Rolland, Musicians of To-day, trans. Mary Blaiklock (New York: Henry Holt, 1914), 240. 
According to Rolland, Rousseau had shown “in his Lettre sur la musique française that there was no connection 
between the inflections of French speech, ‘whose accents are so harmonious and simple,’ and ‘the shrill and noisy 
intonations’ of the recitative of French opera. And he concluded by saying that the kind of recitative that would best 
suit us should ‘wander between little intervals, and neither raise nor lower the voice very much; and should have 
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For Rolland, Pelléas et Mélisande’s veiled passion epitomized “one end of the pole of 
our art,” i.e., French art, at whose other extremity Bizet’s Carmen resided.156 Where Carmen 
subsisted entirely “on the surface, all life, with no shadows, and no underneath,” Pelléas dwelt 
“below the surface, bathed in twilight, and enveloped in silence.”157 It was this “double ideal” 
that, for Rolland, defined the aesthetic reality of French music—the “alternation between the 
gentle sunlight and the faint mist that veils the soft, luminous sky of the Isle of France.”158 The 
use of poetic imagery foreshadowed the stylistic tendencies of Brelet and Jankélévitch.159  
In combining literary play with historical description, Rolland equally prefigured the 
habits of postwar mysteriology. Rolland’s respect for the role of cultural history in aesthetic 
judgment tempered the artistic spirit of his writing, in which ideas often emerged in “images or 
formal patterns rather than abstract thought.”160 He had been trained as a historian, and his 
“university work,” as R.A. Frances has observed, “enriched historiography by accommodating 
music to it.”161 His writings on Beethoven (7 vols., 1928–1945) displayed his attempt to wed 
intellection and intuition: in them, Rolland set out to capture the emotional expressivity of 
Beethoven’s music “by all means available,” through “musical analysis, documentary study, and 
creative intuition.”162 
                                                                                                                                                             
little sustained sound, no noise, and no cries of any description—nothing, indeed, that resembled singing, and little 
inequality in the duration or value of the notes, or in their intervals.’ This is the very definition of Debussy’s 
recitative.”  
156Ibid., 244. 
157Ibid., 244–5.  
158Ibid., 245.  
159The dialectical interplay of two French musical poles achieves new life in Jankélévitch’s Debussy et le 
mystère, for instance. In Jankélévitch, it is Fauré and Debussy who represent contrasting shades of French music: 
“Debussy and Fauré, they represent the two aspects of the eternal mystery of man—one is mystery sharpened, 
mystery of midday, mystery of nothingness and the immobile, the other is mystery flattened, mystery of midnight, of 
hope and living water.” Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 149. 
160R.A. Francis, Romain Rolland (New York: Berg, 1999), 253. 
161Ibid., 254.  
162Ibid., 221. Romain Rolland, Beethoven: Les Grandes époques créatrices, 7 vols. (Paris: Éditions du 
Sablier, 1928–1945).  
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2.3.2 André Pirro (1869–1943)  
Rolland’s successors at the Sorbonne included André Pirro (1869–1943) and Paul-Marie Masson 
(1882–1954). Pirro taught at both the Schola Cantorum and the École des Hautes Etudes 
Sociales. Upon Rolland’s retirement, Pirro became professor of music history at the Sorbonne, a 
post he held until his own retirement in 1937. Over the course of his career, he mentored many 
students.163  
Pirro produced numerous precisely documented explorations of early music’s previously 
unmapped territories.164 Pirro’s scholarship also displayed an avidity for philosophy and 
aesthetics. In addition to his dissertation on l’esthétique of J. S. Bach, Pirro published in the same 
year, as a supplementary dissertation at the University of Paris, a study of Descartes and music 
(Descartes et la musique, 1907).165 Pirro gathered and compared the isolated fragments in which 
Descartes discussed music in order to ascertain what the philosopher had to say on the subject of 
sound (“the material means of music”) and on the subject of the “effects of musical art.”166 
While Descartes affirmed the “expressive force of music,” he prudently refrained from 
                                                 
163Some of his students included Marc Pincherle (1888–1974), Yvonne Rokseth (1890–1948), and 
Geneviève Thibault de Chambure (1902–1975). 
164For instance, Pirro’s Histoire de la musique de la fin du XVIe siècle á fin du XIVe—“his last and greatest 
work,” according to Sharp and Gribenski—represented “an object lesson in scholarship, being packed with material 
gained at first hand or checked from reliable sources, and informed by keen critical insight.” G.B. Sharp and Jean 
Gribenski, “Pirro, André,” Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online, Oxford University Press, accessed May 11, 
2013, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/21827. See also André Pirro, Histoire de la 
musique de la fin du XIVe siècle à la fin du XVIe (Paris: Henry Laurens, 1940). 
165Pirro’s L’Esthétique de Jean Sébastien Bach, as a founding work of French musicology, presented an 
analysis of the organization of motivic trajectories within the form and expression of Bach’s musical language, 
especially with respect to text setting. André Pirro, L’esthétique de Jean Sébastien Bach (Paris: Fischbacher, 1907). 
The analysis of Bach’s aesthetics also served as Pirro’s dissertation at the Sorbonne, where he obtained the Doctorat 
ès lettres in 1907. Sharp and Gribenski describe Pirro’s study of Bach’s aesthetic as an “outstanding” effort to 
explain “the symbolism of the music.” Sharp and Gribenski, “Pirro, André.” 
166André Pirro, Descartes et la musique (Paris: Fischbacher, 1907), 3. 
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elucidating its causes or its mechanics, for, Pirro had concluded, he lacked the technical acumen 
with which to do so.167  
To “discover and unravel” in musical works the “feelings that have informed them,” Pirro 
urged a strategy of patient and searching analysis.168 The quest for aesthetic meaning, though 
often mesmerizing, was not a “pursuit of the ineffable,” but a “very practical study.”169 Amidst 
the “magnificent intertwining” of J. S. Bach’s music, from deep within the “resplendent palaces” 
that it constructed, for example, the “symbols of an unknown language” beckoned, calling us to 
“decipher” them and reveal the meaning of their “message.”170 Sometimes, Pirro asserted, this 
“soul-language,” this “intercourse of the soul with the beautiful,” lifted the subject “for an instant 
out of the infinite depths of longing,” momentarily elevating it to that condition, free from all 
sadness, which “Epicurus pronounced the chief of all good, the happiness of the gods.”171 
For both Brelet and Jankélévitch, it will be Debussy who will speak fluently this 
language of the soul. In his “quest for the divine instant,” Debussy espoused an “Epicurean” 
philosophy, Jankélévitch argued.172 Debussy’s “auditory imagination,” Brelet contended, led 
time in the direction of “that Epicurean duration which is fragmented at the discretion of 
pleasure—of sonic jouissance.”173 In Debussy, Jankélévitch sensed the presence of the “most 
fleeting, most futile, and most humble miscellanea”; Debussy captured life in “its instantaneous 
                                                 
167Ibid., 124. 
168André Pirro, The Aesthetic of Johann Sebastian Bach, trans. Joe Armstrong (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014), 6.  
169Ibid. 
170Ibid., 7. 
171André Pirro, Johann Sebastian Bach, The Organist and His Works for the Organ, trans. Wallace 
Goodrich (New York: G. Schirmer, 1902), 56–7. Here Pirro was quoting from both Hegel’s Aesthetik and 
Schopenhauer’s Lichtstrahlen aus seinen Werken (Leipzig: J. Frauenstädt, 1874). 
172Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 32.  
173Brelet, Le Temps musical, 695.  
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flagrancy, in the singularity of its concrete and familiar minutes.”174 For Brelet, Debussy’s 
“impressionism” bore witness to the “rebirth—beneath the psychological instant, which passes 
and flees—of the eternal instant, which endures because it is retained, because it is the 
Epicurean instant of a sensorial pleasure that is seized upon and that seems to arrest time.”175 
2.3.3 Paul-Marie Masson (1882–1954)  
From 1931, Pirro worked alongside his younger colleague Paul-Marie Masson at the Sorbonne. 
In the previous year, Masson had attained the doctorate ès lettres with his dissertation on the 
operas of the French Baroque composer Jean-Philippe Rameau.176 He succeeded Pirro in 1943, 
and, in 1951, a year before his own retirement, he founded the Institut de Musicologie at the 
University of Paris.177 
In looking back on the history of his profession, the French musicologist Bruno Moysan 
reflected that the work of both Rolland and Pirro embodied a form of romantic humanism in 
which music ideally served as an expression of spiritual transcendence. Yet it was Masson’s 
scholarship, Moysan argued, that showed deeper concern for the critical analysis of sources. An 
exact contemporary of “l’école méthodique,” Masson separated himself from Rolland and Pirro, 
                                                 
174Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 32.  
175Brelet, Le Temps musical, 695. Emphasis in the original. 
176Paul-Marie Masson’s dissertation at the University of Paris was also published as L’Opéra de Rameau 
(Paris: Henry Laurens, 1930). 
177Born in Nîmes in 1882, Masson prepared at Henry IV for the entrance examination to the ENS, where he 
was accepted in 1903, when Lavisse was director, and received his agrégation de lettres in 1907. See Moysan, 134. 
During his Republican training, Masson nonetheless never shied away from the anti-Republican Schola Cantorum, 
where he studied counterpoint, fugue, and composition with Vincent d’Indy, a French composer and a “devoted 
Catholic who believed that music existed in order to elevate the spirit of humanity.” Robert Francis Waters, Déodat 
de Séverac: Musical Identity in Fin de Siécle France (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008), 82. Masson had, beginning in 
1910, served as chargé de conférences at the University of Grenoble and lectured on the history of French music and 
literature at the Institut Français in Florence, Italy. After the First World War, in 1919, he initiated and presided over 
a new Institut Français at Naples. 
54 
according to Moysan, in his efforts to erect a monument to the nation’s musical history on the 
methodological foundation of documentation and reasoning.178  
His thesis on Rameau’s operas, for example, relied on a “highly developed critical 
apparatus,” the principal originality of which consisted in its application of the approach of 
l’école méthodique to musical categories (such as forms, genres, and compositional processes). 
For Moysan, all of Masson’s work aimed at a history of music that illuminated the “intellectual 
debates of the past,” that articulated the mental attitudes of the historical agents who created 
musical objects, rather than one which simply described the concrete events of previous time 
periods.179  
Despite Moysan’s claims, elements of “romantic humanism” and “spiritual 
transcendence” persevered in Masson’s views, coexisting with a penchant for critical analysis 
and scientific rigor. As they did for Rolland and Pirro, and for Rousseau and Fétis before them, 
the physical and the metaphysical competed for Masson’s attention, especially in his exploration 
of music’s relationship to philosophy (which included articles on musical aesthetics, musical 
humanism, Nietzsche’s conception of music, and Rousseau and music).180  
Like his predecessors, Masson incorporated both historic and aesthetic methods, and, in 
his contribution to Lavignac’s Encyclopédie, he made this expressly clear. The heart of Masson’s 
entry on le mouvement humaniste subdivided into two sections on musique mesurée: the first was 
                                                 
178L’École Méthodique refers to the Annales School of historical research, a dominant mode of 
historiography in France in the twentieth century. The school received its name from the journal Annales d’histoire 
économique et sociale, the primary site of publication for the scholars of l’école méthodique, whose approach 
emphasized the institutional structures and conceptual frameworks of historical human societies. Its founders 
included Lucian Febvre (1878–1956) and Marc Bloch (1886–1944). André Burguière, L’École des Annales: Une 
histoire intellectuelle (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2006) and Peter Burke, The French Historical Revolution: The Annales 
School 1929–89 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
179Moysan, 135.  
180Paul-Marie Masson, “L’Humanisme musical du XVIe siècle,“ Bulletin français de la S.I.M. 3 (1907): 
333–7 and 677–718; “Les Idées de Nietzsche sur la musique,” Bulletin français de la S.I.M. 3 (1907): 841–6; “Les 
Idées de Rousseau sur la musique,” Bulletin français de la S.I.M. 8 (1912): 23–32. 
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called “Étude historique,” the second “Étude esthétique.”181 In the transition between them, 
Masson articulated their relationship. While the first indicated the “historical importance of the 
movement provoked by the humanist musicians,” the second sought to “appreciate the artistic 
value of the works to which it gave birth.”182 
Masson admired Rousseau for his originality, his creativity, and his productivity.183 In 
considering Rousseau’s ideas on music, Masson first related them to Rousseau’s philosophy: 
The main principle of this system is, as we know, belief in the original goodness 
of nature, gradually corrupted by the negative influence of civilization. Under this 
principle, the best music is the most natural music. And what is the most natural 
music, the most spontaneous, the most primitive, the one that appeared from the 
beginning of humankind? It is the melody of the human voice.184 
 
He discussed Rousseau’s conception of l’unité de mélodie, his criticism of harmony, his 
participation in the la querelle des Bouffons, his notion of musique pathétique, and his 
consideration of the “mysterious creation of genius.”185 As the “most eminent form of sensibility, 
                                                 
181Paul-Marie Masson, “Le Mouvement humaniste,” in Encyclopédie de la musique et dictionnaire du 
conservatoire, ed. Albert Lavignac (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1913). His entry treated “vers mesurés” and the 
manner in which sixteenth-century French musicians approximated music “mesurée à l’antique.” Earlier sections 
also followed this bipartite organization (i.e., history and aesthetics).  
182Ibid., 1306. 
183In his 1912 essay on Rousseau, Masson wrote: “There is everything in the hundreds of pages that 
Rousseau wrote on the art of music. There are errors, inadequacies, biases, outrageous jokes. But there are also 
many insightful thoughts, fruitful views, prophetic insights. It is by his ideas, far more than by his rare compositions, 
that Rousseau marked his place in the history of our art, and a very important place. This man who, in musical 
terms, was above all a critic, had, in the music of the eighteenth century, almost as prominent a role as that of 
Rameau and Gluck. All of Europe discussed his theories. When Gluck arrived in Paris, he went to ask his advice. 
Never yet had reflection applied to the things of music acted so strongly on artists and on opinion. An entire 
aesthetic doctrine is contained in his writings, a doctrine which meets its passionate detractors and its fervent 
followers. It is truly a kind of direction of conscience that Rousseau aspires to practice in the field of music as in that 
of morality, politics, or education. Bringing to the examination of various social institutions a spirit formed, as it 
were, on the margins of society, he emits quite naturally the most unexpected judgments, the strangest paradoxes; he 
dreams only changes and reforms. But precisely because he is free from all social prejudice, he boldly looks in all 
directions, to what has not been done and what could be; he shows the unmarked routes to the artists, and he pushes 
toward the goal that he sees but that he cannot reach himself.” Paul-Marie Masson, Les idées de Rousseau sur la 
musique (Paris: Publications de la revue, 1912), 1–2. 
184Masson, Les idées de Rousseau sur la musique, 3. 
185Ibid., 22. Emphasis in the original. 
56 
the musical quality par excellence,” genius exalted and intoxicated, resurrecting the effects of the 
“singers of antique dithyrambs,” of “song dedicated to Dionysus.”186 
Even as he pushed musicologie further in the direction of empirical research, Masson 
could not help but keep alive that frisson of Dionysian melody which he found reflected in the 
materials of his research.187 Masson’s successor at the Sorbonne was Jacques Chailley (1910–
1999), a musical polymath whose career included many vocations—composer, conductor, 
educational reformer, musicologist, music theorist. He published prolifically on a wide range of 
topics, refusing to limit his activities to a single field, method, or topic. 
In 1958, the very same year in which Lesure surveyed the state of French musicology, 
Chailley coordinated the publication of the Précis de musicologie, a “panorama of musicological 
science” resulting from the collective effort of twenty-five French specialists.188 In addition to a 
preface by Chailley, the volume, intended as a guide for students, contained nineteen chapters 
and nine appendices, each written by one or more scholars (four of whom were academic 
musicologists—Armand Machabey, Solange Corbin, Geneviève Thibault, and Chailley himself).  
1958 thus marked a reflexive turn for musicologie, a moment in which French music 
scholars took stock, examining the “foundations of their discipline, the scope of their method, the 
precise orientation of their aim.”189 The content of the Précis made it clear that the business of 
French musicology was, first and foremost, “doing music history,” but that this required, at the 
                                                 
186Ibid., 23. Masson also quoted Rousseau’s definition of genius: it is that “disposition of the soul which 
inspires in the composer the living ideas of which he has need, in the performer the living expression of these very 
same ideas, and in the listener the living impression of the beauties and defects of music that he is made to hear.” 
Ibid.; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Sensibilité,” in Dictionnaire de la musique (Paris: Duchesne, 1768), 436. 
187Upon his retirement from the Sorbonne, Masson’s colleagues, students, and friends honored him with a 
two-volume collection of essays entitled Mélanges d’histoire et d’esthétique musicales (Paris: Masse, 1955). 
188Daniel Devoto, review of Précis de musicologie, ed. Jacques Chailley, Cahiers de civilisation médiévale 
3, no. 10 (1960), 224.  
189Lesure, “La musicologie française depuis 1945,” 8. 
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same time, more than just “knowing music history.”190 A chronological sequence of chapters on 
the history of music comprised the core of the handbook; auxiliary disciplines and subjects were 
relegated to appendices. 
The appendix on “philosophie et esthétique musicales” was written by Gisèle Brelet. She 
provided a brief history of philosophy and musical aesthetics, divided into three major periods—
the “Dogmatic Age” (from antiquity to Kant), the “Critical Age” (from Kant to the post-
Kantians), and the “Modern or Positive Age” (from Hanslick to the present).191 La période 
moderne, to which she devoted the most detail, led, in her view, to an “extraordinary blossoming 
of musical aesthetics,” an “aesthetics which, through the diversity of its tendencies and methods, 
aimed at a concrete and complete description of the musical phenomenon.”192  
Brelet summarized the various methods of modern musical aesthetics—the experimental, 
the psychological, the sociological, the autonomous, the integral, and the philosophical. It was 
within this last group that she placed her own work. Moreover, within this group, she placed 
herself alongside two other philosophers whose work she found to evince a commitment to 
l’existentialisme, in the sense that they had also “accentuated the concrete” and dedicated 
themselves to the “singular problems that the musically concrete poses.”193 Their names were 
Theodore W. Adorno and Vladimir Jankélévitch. 
                                                 
190Jacques Chailley, ed., Précis de musicologie (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1958), x. Chailley 
was citing André Pirro: “Pour faire de l’histoire de la musique, il faut connaître non seulement l’histoire et la 
musique, mais encore la philologie, la philosophie, l’archéologie, l’astronomie, la physique, l’anatomie, les 
mathématiques...sans oublier cinq our six langues vivantes et autant de langues mortes...” 
191Gisèle Brelet, “Philosophie et esthétique musicales,” in Précis de musicologie, ed. Jacques Chailley 
(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1958), 389.  
192Ibid., 390.  
193Ibid., 411.  
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3.0  JANKÉLÉVITCH, LEVINAS, AND SONOROUS PSYCHISM 
3.1 FELLOW PLOTINIANS 
Vladimir Jankélévitch often identified himself as a follower of Plotinus. In La Musique et 
l’ineffable, he claimed: 
I am not here to find handholds in music, to have something to say about it, not to 
confer a pseudoconsistency on ultimate inconsistency by means of analogies 
taken at face value. On the contrary, I am following Plotinus: in multiplying and 
destroying the metaphors one by one, the mind will be subtly deflected toward the 
Platonists’ ‘great matheme.’194 
 
Jankélévitch’s philosophical writings, too, revealed an affinity for the author of the Enneads, that 
powerful elaboration of a specific kind of third-century Platonism.195 For Plotinus, Plato’s 
“greatest lesson,” or the Idea of the Good, was the One, the ineffable source of all things, the 
inexhaustible wellspring of purely spontaneous creativity.  
In his Philosophie première (1954), Jankélévitch observed that, for Plotinus, there was, 
behind the multiplicity of the empirical world, “another, an entirely different Miracle [Thauma]” 
that was “no longer marvel, but mystery: τὸ δὴ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα τὸ ἕν,” or that which was 
                                                 
194Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 118. See Enneads, I 4, 13, 3–12, where Plotinus makes reference 
to Plato’s Republic 505a: “You have often heard me say that the most important branch of study (megiston 
mathêma) is the form or character of the good—that which just things and anything else must make use of if they are 
to be useful and beneficial.” Plato, Republic, ed. G.R.F. Ferrari, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 210. 
195The Enneads, John Llewelyn has noted, count “among the works most frequently cited by Jankélévitch.” 
John Llewelyn, Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2002), 74.  
59 
“truly prior—the thauma of the One.”196 The Plotinian One, the ultimate Mystery (to which 
adjectives like “singular” and “multiple” did not apply), resembled the infinitesimal target of 
Jankélévitch’s philosophy.197 
They were not exactly the same, however. More than simply a follower, Jankélévitch was 
an interpreter of Plotinus. The same was true of Jankélévitch’s friend and colleague Emmanuel 
Levinas.198 These two philosophers were, in a sense, neo-Plotinians. They revived the Plotinian 
thauma and then redefined its significance. Rather than something that came to be known 
through a kind of mystical union, the One, for Levinas and Jankélévitch, entered into human 
experience only as an insurmountable distance. The movement toward mystery, for them, was 
not, as in Plotinus, one of liberation from corporeal and social captivity, but one of actualization 
and commitment. 
                                                 
196Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 251–2. “As for Plotinus, one senses him oscillating between the 
vertigo of the vacuum and the aesthetic admiration of the plenitude, between the austerity of the Great Darkness and 
the hedonism of the light, which is cosmophilia and iconophilia, between the enthymeme collected and the 
expansion marveled: having contemplated the brilliance of celestial bodies he meditates on their author (τὸ τῶν 
ἄστρων φέγγος ἰδὼν τὸν ποιήσαντα ἐνθυμεῖται)... On one side he shows us the glorious light, τò ἀγλαόν (aglaia): 
the midnight sky where the stars are blinking, the plain of afternoon when the larks are singing, where the bright day 
recounts the glory of God, where the one that Gracian called the star of ostentation spreads its tail like a peacock and 
deploys the full range of reflections and multicolored flowerets. But behind this sumptuous pavan of beauty, behind 
the ‘manifestation of light unmanifested,’ there is another, an entirely different Miracle [Thauma] that is no longer 
marvel, but mystery: τὸ δὴ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα τὸ ἕν.” Emphases in the original.  
The quotations in Ancient Greek are from the Enneads of Plotinus. The first is from Book 3, tractate 8, 
verse 11: τὸ τῶν ἄστρων φέγγος ἰδὼν τὸν ποιήσαντα ἐνθυμεῖται (“one who sees the light of the stars ponders their 
maker”). The term ἀγλαόν, which Jankélévitch associates with “la lumière glorieuse,” appears in the third Ennead as 
well, where Plotinus claims that Nature has no further aim than the achievement of a “resplendent and graceful 
spectacle” ( Enneads 3.8.4). The second quotation comes from the sixth Ennead, tractate 9, verse 5: τὸ δὴ πρὸ 
τούτου θαῦμα τὸ ἕν (“that which is truly prior—the thauma of the One”). Unless otherwise specified, translations 
are my own. 
197Plotinus’s philosophical practice consisted in teaching students how to contemplate mysteries. In Roman 
Greece, Plotinus formed a “mystery school,” a combination of the “later metaphysics of Plato” and the “ecstatic 
mystery cults” of earlier periods. According to Harry T. Hunt, “students came to the school, located in Rome, to 
learn its understandings and attendant contemplative practices, and thence realize them in their own lives.” As much 
a “contemplative practice” as a “system of thought or philosophy,” Plotinus’s school trained its students in the 
contemplation of mysteries. Harry T. Hunt, Lives in Spirit: Precursors and Dilemmas of a Secular Western 
Mysticism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 81.  
198According to Brian Schroeder, Levinas’s philosophy signaled a “marked retrieval of specific Plotinian 
themes, reinterpreting and appropriating them in the development of his ethical metaphysics.” Brian Schroeder, “A 
Trace of the Eternal Return? Levinas and Neoplatonism,” in Levinas and the Ancients, ed. Brian Schroeder and 
Silvia Benso (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 210.  
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The intersections of their ideas and their lives invite comparison.199 As professional 
philosophers, they were exact contemporaries.200 They knew each other well. Each respected the 
other’s work. They acknowledged mutual influence.201 Their kinship resonated beyond the letter 
as well. Both were Frenchmen with Russian Imperial origins.202 Both were Jewish.203 Both 
suffered during the Occupation.204  
                                                 
199In the one I sketch during the course of this chapter, I rely upon several others, including Llewelyn (see 
note 195 above), Kelley, “Jankélévitch and Levinas on the ‘Wholly Other,’” and Christina Howells, Mortal 
Subjects: Passions of the Soul in Late Twentieth-Century French Thought (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2011).  
Another monograph that informs my reading of Jankélévitch in this chapter is Daniel Moreau, La Question 
du rapport à autrui dans la philosophie de Vladimir Jankélévitch (Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2009), 
esp. 87–112. Moreau explores the pertinence of the relationship with the mysterious other across many of 
Jankélévitch’s philosophical writings. 
200Both men devoted much of their professional lives to teaching philosophy at French universities, 
although for Levinas, who completed his doctorat d’État in 1961, professional philosophy came only after many 
years of service at specifically Jewish institutions. Levinas received appointments as professor of philosophy at the 
University of Poitiers in 1963, at the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris in 1967, and at the Sorbonne from 
1973 until his retirement in 1979. 
In 1927, Jankélévitch obtained his first teaching appointment at the French Institute of Prague. He then 
taught at lycées in Caen and Lyon before taking a lectureship at the University of Toulouse in 1936. He accepted a 
position at The University of Lille, a position he would occupy from 1938 until the outbreak of war in 1940. After 
the war, Jankélévitch worked for Radio Toulouse as the head of music programming until he was reinstated to his 
position at University of Lille in 1947. From 1951 until his retirement in 1979, he held the Chair of Moral 
Philosophy at the Sorbonne.  
201Levinas stated, for example, that his idea of the “absolutely other” came from Jankélévitch. Emmanuel 
Levinas, “Phenomenon and Enigma,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa.: 
Duquesne University Press, 1998), 47. For both philosophers, this “absolutely other” coincided with their neo-
Plotinian conception of the One. 
For his part, Jankélévitch made use of Levinas’s concept of the il y a. See Jankélévitch, Philosophie 
première, 145, where he cited Levinas: “There is something that is nothing,” Jankélévitch wrote. “This quasi-
dialectical oscillation from being to non-being is immobilized in the intuition of a ‘There is’ (‘Il y a’), not of a ‘there 
is something’ wherein the something awaits its baptismal name inscribed on the dotted line or encrypted in 
hieroglyphics or hidden behind a veil, but of a ‘There is’ which is a declaration of presence in general, and of actual 
presence, without attributive relation of predicate to subject; absent presence, without a doubt, for the one who 
persists in reifying it, a pneumatic presence in spite of everything, of which the mute reproach means, as well as the 
elusive evidence of a glance: And yet I am there!” Emphasis in the original. 
202Though Jankélévitch was born in Brouges, France, in 1903, his parents had emigrated from Russia. 
Before moving to France, Levinas spent the first two decades of his life in Kovno, at that time part of the Russian 
Empire (in what is now Kaunas, Lithuania). Levinas left Russia to study philosophy at the University of Strasbourg 
in 1923. Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (West 
Lafeyette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1993), 2.  
203Levinas was born, in 1906, into a “Russian-Jewish haskalah (enlightenment) milieu,” received a 
traditional Jewish education, and would remain a “committed Jew for the duration of his adult life.” Michael 
Fagenblat, A Covenant of Creatures: Levinas’s Philosophy of Judaism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2010), xii. Levinas cultivated a highly visible public association with Judaism throughout his life. Fagenblat, xiii–
xiv. By contrast, the precise nature of Jankélévitch’s relationship to Judaism is more ambiguous. Jankélévitch only 
began to publicly reflect on his relationship with Judaism, to “write essays on Israel and what it means to be 
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In tandem with these convergences, a stylistic divergence further recommends putting 
Jankélévitch and Levinas face-to-face with one another. Jankélévitch was among the members of 
the jury during Levinas’s doctoral defense at the Sorbonne. After acknowledging the candidate’s 
already substantial record of philosophical scholarship, Jankélévitch told Levinas, “It’s you who 
should be sitting where I am.”205 Nonetheless, expressing concern that Levinas had failed to 
sufficiently consider Bergson’s work, Jankélévitch proceeded to correct this perceived 
insufficiency with his own discussion of Bergson, and it was in the midst of this exposition that 
Levinas interjected the following comment: “Listen, Monsieur Jankélévitch, what you do is 
poetry, what I do is prose.”206 
Levinas’s prose often clarifies and even enriches Jankélévitch’s poetry. In particular, 
drawing upon Levinas tends to sharpen the poetic images of mystery in Jankélévitch’s Debussy 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jewish,” after his experiences during World War II. His engagement with his Jewish heritage, however, never 
reached the level of philosophical commentary. Jankélévitch, unlike Levinas, never drew “philosophical insight” 
directly from the Torah or the Talmud. Kelley, translator’s introduction to Forgiveness, xi. 
204In 1940, Jankélévitch had joined the French army to defend the Republic against the German offensive. 
Wounded in combat, he spent several months recuperating in a French hospital. When his physical injuries had 
healed, a much deeper and longer-lasting wound awaited him. Jacques Madaule, “Vladimir Jankélévitch,” in Écrit 
pour Vladimir Jankélévitch, ed. Monique Basset (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), 10. Jankélévitch returned to Toulouse, 
where he had previously lectured (from 1936 to 1938), but found that he could no longer secure any official 
academic position there: he was forbidden to teach in French universities because of his Jewish background. For the 
rest of the war, he held “philosophy lectures secretly at various cafés in Toulouse,” aided the “efforts of the 
Resistance,” and tried to “elude deportation.” Kelley, translator’s introduction to Forgiveness, xi. After Liberation, 
he had to wait until October 1947 to regain his prewar teaching position at the University of Lille. 
Deployed in 1939, Levinas and his regiment surrendered to the German army in 1940. Until the end of the 
war, Levinas labored in a Nazi prison camp. Samuel Moyn, Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas Between 
Revelation and Ethics (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 198. During the war, Levinas underwent forced 
labor in a military camp for enlisted soldiers called Fallingbostel (near Hannover, Germany). In captivity, Levinas 
conceived and wrote much of Existence and Existents, a book which was published in 1947 (the same year as Time 
and the Other) and one which plays a significant role in this chapter. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, 
trans. Alphonse Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 2001). 
205Qtd. in Marie-Anne Lescourret, Emmanuel Levinas (Paris: Flammarion, 1984), 218. Levinas published 
his dissertation in 1961 as Totalité et Infini. The members of Levinas’s jury included Jankélévitch, Jean Wahl 
(1888–1974), Gabriel Marcel, Paul Ricœur (1913–2005), and Georges Blin (1917–2015). Merleau-Ponty, who 
would have been a member as well, had died a month prior to the defense. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, 
eds., The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xxiv.  
206Qtd. in Marie-Anne Lescourret, 218.  
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et le mystère. Levinas’s phenomenology of psychism (or psychic life) serves to ground a series 
of mysteries that occupied both Levinas and Jankélévitch in their postwar writings.  
Before turning to Levinas, I first consider the reading of Jankélévitch in Carolyn 
Abbate’s seminal article “Debussy’s Phantom Sounds.” I subsequently make use of Levinas’s 
propinquity to Jankélévitch in order to offer a freshly historicized perspective on Jankélévitch’s 
philosophy of music. Finally, I rely on Abbate, Levinas, and Jankélévitch in order to explore the 
question of what it may have meant to listen to Debussy in post-WWII France. Through their 
ears, so to speak, I listen to a passage from Debussy’s Le Martyre de saint Sébastien, a passage 
in which symbolist and existentialist mysteries collide. 
3.2 BETWEEN AUDIBLE AND INAUDIBLE: ABBATE’S JANKÉLÉVITCH 
In “Debussy’s Phantom Sounds,” Jankélévitch appeared as a philosopher of ineffability whose 
“writings on music and language” contained implicit symbolist motifs.207 Jankélévitch’s 
philosophical remarks, according to Abbate, bottled up “essences of French symbolist 
doctrines.”208 Such doctrines focused not on real music, music that existed in time, but on music 
that was literally imaginary, music that was expressly fictional, that was never actually present in 
any living body—the purest sort of musical fantasy.209 
                                                 
207Originally an essay published in Opera Quarterly, “Debussy’s Phantom Sounds” later appeared, in 
slightly different form, as a chapter in Abbate’s In Search of Opera. Carolyn Abbate, “Debussy’s Phantom Sounds,” 
Opera Quarterly 10, no. 1 (1998): 67–96; Abbate, In Search of Opera, 145–84. All future references, unless 
otherwise noted, will be to the later version (Chapter Four of Abbate’s In Search of Opera). 
208Abbate, In Search of Opera, 145. 
209In Abbate’s scholarship, there appear to be two very different Jankélévitches. For Abbate, it would seem 
that Jankélévitch’s philosophy served to authorize a kind of hermeneutic interpretation of music before it came to 
discredit the twin figures of formalism and hermeneutics in music scholarship. Before he was the philosopher of 
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It is true that, for Jankélévitch, the location of musical reality was, like the “infinitely 
receding object” of the symbol, “always elsewhere.”210 Music occupied the spaces of a 
“pneumatic geography” wherein the “univocal identification of places” was ceaselessly 
attenuated and disrupted.211 Music’s pneumatic landscapes rendered “all localization fugitive and 
fleeting.”212 To pinpoint the location of musical reality was always an act of the imagination—a 
figurative repositioning that effectively fictionalized that reality.213 
For Abbate, Jankélévitch’s ideas, composed a good half-century after the peak of the 
symbolist movement in France, continued to evoke generally the spirit of symbolist attitudes 
toward music. Jankélévitch’s thoughts in La Musique et l’ineffable, according to Abbate, 
ascribed to musical reality a “perfect apparitional quality that others regarded as characteristic of 
symbols per se.”214 Jankélévitch, in other words, described music in the same way that others 
had described “symbols per se.” Ineffability was, for Jankélévitch, music’s essential quality; 
ineffability, as Abbate has noticed, was likewise the essence of the symbol.215 
                                                                                                                                                             
“drastic actions or experiences,” Jankélévitch was, for Abbate, the philosopher of musical symbols, ideas, and 
images—of gnostic secrets and knowledge. Abbate, “Music—Drastic or Gnostic?” 510. 
210Abbate, In Search of Opera, 267– 8n3; 167. 
211Vladimir Jankélévitch, La Musique et l’ineffable, 2d ed. (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1983), 129. The 
translation is my own. Abbate cites the original French in “Debussy’s Phantom Sounds,” 84–5n36.  
212Ibid. 
213For Jankélévitch, a grammatical inscription of musical reality only works when it is formulated as a 
paradox. See, e.g., Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 103: “The country of dreams, no one’s country, the 
homeland of nonexistent things, the mystic Jerusalem of Fauré’s Requiem, the invisible city, the otherworldly city of 
Kitezh, all these designate the doubtful homeland of a Charm that is not here, and not there, but everywhere and 
nowhere.” Also ibid., 83: “With this Charm (the musical act), there is nothing to ‘think’ about, or—and this amounts 
to the same—there is food for thought, in some form, for all infinity; the Charm engenders speculation 
inexhaustibly, is inexhaustible as the fertile ground for perplexity, and the same Charm is born of love. Infinite 
speculation, as soon as it becomes exhilaration pure and simple, is analogous to the poetic state.” 
214Musical reality “materializes in the distance and cannot be caught when we journey toward its meaning: 
it will always recede, leaving a glowing trail of assumed connotations.” In music, Jankélévitch came across, in 
Abbate’s view, a “hall of sonorous mirrors, saturated with implications and suggestions that draw the mind on to a 
vanishing point that can never be reached.” Abbate, In Search of Opera, 145. 
215As Abbate notes, “Twin notions of inexhaustible resonance and distance (entailing an interpretative quest 
toward an infinitely receding object) recur in most nineteenth- and twentieth-century definitions” of the symbol. 
Abbate, In Search of Opera, 267–8, note 3. 
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The semblance is undeniable, and, in Abbate’s hands, it becomes richly productive for 
interpreting Debussy’s music. Working within the symbolist movement itself, composers like 
Debussy discovered opportunities to create a specifically symbolist kind of music. Through an 
“interplay of poetic implication and musical gesture,” Abbate argues, Debussy created music that 
is not simply like a symbol—it is a symbol, in the sense that it stages specific symbolist 
actions.216 In response to poetic implication, Debussy’s musical gestures aimed to realize 
symbolist poetry’s inaudible music.  
Hence, it is not only poetry that can evoke an inaudible music. Musical rhetoric can also 
draw the mind toward an intimation of impossible sounds. It can, Abbate says, “represent music 
that, by the very terms of the fictions proposing it, remains beyond expression.”217 The reality of 
symbolist music casts a wide net, incorporating real sounds that exist in time as well as fictional 
sounds that, by definition, have no physical duration.218 
The reality of music includes the phantom sounds that Abbate locates as she inspects 
Debussy’s score; it includes the unactualizable sounds suggested by Debussy’s musical settings 
                                                 
216Abbate, “Debussy’s Phantom Sounds,” 96. 
217Abbate, In Search of Opera, vii. 
218In the context of Debussy’s phantom sounds, real music therefore includes more than the acoustic 
material phenomenon per se, more than actual live performances. Abbate interprets individual moments from 
musical works apart from their performance in a specific time and place. Here, the objects of her scholarship are 
those moments in which musical works reflect a phantasmatic quality, moments in which works “give voice to an 
uncanny phenomenon,” displaying themselves as “ephemeral reflections” of performance itself. Ibid., xiii. Abbate 
looks to the structural details of the work for concrete signs of a music that cannot be presented concretely—an 
“impossible music.” Ibid., 167. 
Abbate’s “perpetually absent objects” are not yet “vanished live performances”; they are the spectral 
imprints left on works by the fact of music’s acoustic materiality. Rather than drastic performances, Abbate focuses 
on “music that literally is not present in the work,” on “musical objects” to which the “listener is directed, without 
that object ever being revealed.” Ibid., vii. This object is revealed neither in the work nor in performance. It is only 
the gesture of its “concealment or flight” that comes to our attention. Ibid., viii. Abbate seeks to understand the 
insistence of this gesture in opera, an act of legerdemain which is real despite the fact that its object is entirely 
illusory. She describes such gestures as the specific moments in which opera indicates the “general elusiveness” of 
music, expressing the “ineffability of music (or apparent ineffability).” Ibid. 
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of symbolist texts.219 This music can only be accessed indirectly, as it were, in phantom form. 
Thus Debussy creates, through an interpretation of poetic images of inaudible music, musical 
images of inaudible music. Through his phantom sounds, he makes the inaudible almost audible.  
In symbolist operas like Debussy’s Pelléas et Mélisande, these phantom sounds conjure 
up, via “collisions” between symbolist texts and acoustic sounds, an “imaginary music that 
cannot be realized,” but of which it is still possible to have an idea, however faintly.220 To 
augment Abbate’s argument: such impossible, truly mysterious music would be the sound, if it 
could be heard, of the “thauma of the One.” Symbolist music would, for Jankélévitch, evoke the 
thought of a radical alterity—the “great matheme,” the Idea of the Good, the One, the ineffable 
par excellence. 
Nonetheless, when Jankélévitch himself contemplated the ineffability of music, he did 
not always seek out places where musical works posited “inaccessible music beyond what we 
can hear.”221 Rather, he often sought out precisely those places where works posited music that 
was not beyond what we can hear, music that we can hear clearly, but that nonetheless remains 
in some way inaccessible to us—music that, despite its transparency, remains in some way 
unknown to us.222 
In both cases, Jankélévitch scouted the limits of understanding.223 Jankélévitch, as I 
understand him, walked a tightrope between what we can hear and what we can know, 
                                                 
219For Abbate, the music that is not real—the unreal music—is no longer (or, more accurately, is not yet) 
the unactualized (but actualizable) sounds contained in the prescriptive signs of musical notation. 
220Ibid., 181. 
221Abbate, In Search of Opera, viii.  
222Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 102. “Alas, music in itself is an unknowable something, as unable 
to be grasped as the mystery of artistic creation—a mystery that can only ever be grasped ‘before or after.’” 
223For him, the philosopher should stand “at the borders of the vacuum,” skirting “the abyss of 
nothingness,” living precariously on the “verge of the abyssal Ungrund.” Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 250–
1. Andrew Weeks has indicated that the term Ungrund, “once considered to be the equivalent of the Gnostic 
‘abyss,’” had been redefined by Koyré as “l’Absolu absolument indétérminé, l’Absolu libre de toute détérmination” 
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navigating the barely discernible edge that separates and connects the material acoustic 
phenomenon and the intricate web of ideas framing its composition, performance, and reception. 
He placed himself in between concrete and abstract, audible and inaudible, the sounds of 
multiplicity and the silence of the One.  
Jankélévitch’s philosophy of music certainly resonates with French symbolist doctrines. 
It also resonates with certain categories of postwar French phenomenology, such as time, 
otherness, and intersubjectivity. Paying attention to the historical contemporaneity of 
Jankélévitch’s thought, moreover, not only modifies how we read Jankélévitch, fine-tuning how 
we understand his interpretations of Debussy, but also illuminates how listeners may have 
received or responded to Debussy’s music in post-WII France. 
3.3 PNEUMATIC MYSTERIES 
Jankélévitch constructed, in Debussy et le mystère (1949), a mysteriology of Debussy’s music, 
an elaboration of the correspondences between metaphysical mysteries, poetic images, and 
musical details. The translucent language of Debussyan mystery spoke to Jankélévitch of two 
fundamental aspects of human experience—the pneumatic and the grammatic. The first is the 
subject of this chapter, the second that of the next. 
What might Jankélévitch have meant by the term pneumatic? Literally, pneuma signifies 
“breath” or “wind.” Symbolically, it refers to “spirit,” to an invisible, apparitional, immaterial 
                                                                                                                                                             
(“the Absolute absolutely undetermined, the Absolute free of all determination”). Andrew Weeks, Boehme: An 
Intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-Century Philosopher and Mystic (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1991), 148; Alexandre Koyré, La Philosophie de Jacob Boehme (Paris: Vrin, 1929), 281. 
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quality that nevertheless generates material effects.224 Pneuma, for Jankélévitch, describes the 
vital principle of living beings, the creative force that animates the life of the “psychic” as well 
as the “carnal” aspects of organisms.225 
The notion of pneuma also figures prominently in Levinas’s philosophy. Pneuma is, for 
Levinas, the engine of our interior lives, of what Levinas calls psychisme. Both “an event in 
being” and “a way of being,” psychism embraces a double movement. It enacts a “feat of radical 
separation” between an individual being and being-in-general, and it seeks to escape from the 
finitude it thereby acquires.226 
For Levinas, as Silvia Benso has observed, psychism is “neither spiritual nor material”; it 
is “an accord, a chord, which is possible only as an arpeggio.”227 The psyche exists only in its 
relationship to exteriority, to what is outside of it, other than it. Within the life of the psyche, 
there is an ongoing process of individuation and de-individuation. On the one hand, the “I” 
separates itself from the anonymity of sheer existence (the il y a), and, on the other, it seeks 
separation from itself, groping toward the infinite, toward an idea whose content “overflows the 
thought that thinks it.”228 
                                                 
224Certainly not an entirely secular philosophical concept, pneuma, as a word for the soul, would have 
carried strong theological associations within French postwar culture as well. I am indebted to Deane L. Root for 
pointing out that the Greek πνεῦμα (pneûma) itself served as a translation of  ַחוּר (rúach, “wind, breath, or spirit”) in 
the Hebrew bible and inspired much Christian theological doctrine as well. 
225In Philosophie première, Jankélévitch employed the term pneumatic at various times in order to 
designate a plane of the “abstract,” the “analogical,” the “ethical,” the “invisible,” the “inexpressible.” Jankélévitch, 
Philosophie première, 20–21, 85. 
226Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, 
Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 54. Emphases in the original. For an illuminating discussion of Levinas’s use 
of psychisme and pneuma in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, see Silvia Benso, “The Breathing of the 
Air: Presocratic Echoes in Levinas,” in Levinas and the Ancients, ed. Brian Schroeder and Silvia Benso 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 9–23. 
227Benso, 20; Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1981), 70.  
228Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 25.  
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An especially important notion for both Levinas and Jankélévitch in the postwar years, 
the il y a, or the “there is,” referred to an impersonal and anonymous alterity. In Levinas’s 
writings, the il y a possessed, as Bettina Bergo has remarked, a “certain existential Stimmung,” 
one which was, in the words of Alphonso Lingis, “essentially nocturnal.”229 Its “absent 
presence” gained, as we shall see, a characteristic diurnality in Jankélévitch’s Debussy et le 
mystère.230 
For Jankélévitch and Levinas, the desires of the subject exceed the pleasures of solitude; 
egoism reaches beyond itself toward someone or something else. The dynamic of this movement 
is Desire—the desire for the other. Levinas calls this Desire “the very pneuma of the psyche.”231 
Psychism thus turns toward the mystery of other subjects, which, in turn, gives birth to the 
ethical, to the recognition of being-for-the-other. 
Psychism shrinks from the il y a and extends toward the Other. Both encounters involve 
peculiar experiences of time. Levinas and Jankélévitch each liken the experience of the il y a to 
something like insomnia, in which a sense of time’s passage disappears, locking the individual 
within an eternal present. In eros or voluptuosity, they argue that, by contrast, the future becomes 
possible once again, especially in the caress and withdrawal of the Other.  
Whether insomnia or voluptuosity, in Debussy et le mystère everything happens in the 
mystery of an instant.232 For Jankélévitch, philosophy’s primary task is to elucidate the 
                                                 
229Bettina Bergo, Levinas Between Ethics and Politics: For the Beauty that Adorns the Earth (Norwell, 
Mass.: Kluwer, 1999), 193; Alphonso Lingis, translator’s introduction to Otherwise than Being, by Emmanuel 
Levinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), xxxvi.  
230The il y a manifested itself, furthermore, as another trace of the workings of the absolutely other, or the 
One, for both Levinas and Jankélévitch. See Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 145. 
231Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 69, 141. Emphasis in the original. 
232The notion of the instant not only served as an “idée fixe in Jankélévitch’s writings on Debussy”; it also 
permeated Jankélévitch’s writings as a whole. See Rings, “Mystères limpides,” 202n64. The importance of the 
instant is reflected in the title of Jankélévitch’s revised and expanded edition of Debussy et le mystère—Debussy et 
le mystère de l’instant (Paris: Plon, 1976). 
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conditions of possibility for experiencing the instant. In Philosophie Première, Jankélévitch 
writes that he upholds “what a dogmatism would certainly be tempted to call the three principles 
of metaphysics: the Instant between Nothingness and Being.”233 Neither extant nor extinct, 
neither present nor absent, neither “in here” nor “out there,” the instant Jankélévitch calls 
Presque-rien or Presque-être, “Almost-nothing” or “Almost-being.”234 The instant neither is nor 
is not—rather, it arrives or happens. But what arrives or happens? 
Precisely that which eludes an answer to the question of what it is. For Jankélévitch, the 
instant falls into the category of the “je-ne-sais-quoi,” or the “I-know-not-what.”235 The instant 
is, in a word, mysterious. Jankélévitch describes the instant in Philosophie Première as an 
instantaneous switching on and off, as a spark that is extinguished as soon as it comes into 
existence, as a vertiginous coinciding of light and dark, day and night, birth and death. 236 To use 
Andrew Kelley’s concise formula: “What the instant is or presents is a qualitative difference, not 
a quantitative one, or an abrupt change from one quality to another.”237 
Even in Philosophie première, Jankélévitch turns to Debussy’s music to exemplify the 
“doubly pending” character of the instant: almost nothing, almost something, the instant is not 
the “lesser-being of a gradual decrescendo” but a “mystery of sudden emergence in the invisible 
darkness, or, like the Debussyan pianissimo, in the inaudible silence.”238 To reach the threshold 
of the instant “without falling into Nothingness or remaining in Being,” Jankélévitch avows, one 
must have not a “heavy hand” (main lourde) but a “supernatural” one as well as “an 
                                                 
233Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 210.  
234Ibid.  
235Le je-ne-sais-quoi et le presque-rien is the title of a 1957 work of philosophy by Jankélévitch. 
236Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 210. Philosophy’s fundamental obligation, for Jankélévitch, is to 
pursue the means for recognizing an encounter with that “ungraspable threshold where being ceases to be something 
and where nothing ceases to be nothing, where each contradictory is at the point of and even in the middle of 
becoming its contradictory.” 
237Kelley, translator’s introduction to Forgiveness, xvii. 
238Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 211.  
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imponderable legerity in the ‘manner’ [manière],” i.e., the manner of playing.239 Thus the barely 
audible, almost inaudible vibration of the Debussyan pianissimo emerging suddenly from silence 
becomes a privileged marker of the mysterious instant in Jankélévitch’s phenomenology.240 
3.4 EXPERIENCING PNEUMATIC MYSTERIES 
Debussy et le mystère is a catalog of mysterious, yet concrete instants in Debussy’s works. Many 
such instants arose, for Jankélévitch, in Le Martyre de saint Sébastien, Debussy’s 1911 theatrical 
collaboration with Gabriele D’Annunzio (1863–1938), billed as a mystère in 5 acts.241 In 
documenting in particular his perceptions of pneumatic mystery in Debussy’s music, 
Jankélévitch returned again and again to this “mystery play.”  
Why this particular work? The last time that it had been given in its original form at 
L’Opéra de Paris, in the summer of 1922, the play had led Boris de Schlœzer to complain not 
only about how its performance went on too long, but also about how quickly it had become 
                                                 
239Ibid. 
240In Debussy et le mystère, Jankélévitch also correlates the instant with the Debussyan pianissimo. In the 
performance indication doucement sonore (“gently sonorous”), Jankélévitch locates a “specifically Debussyan 
atmosphere,” a “clear and harmonious pianissimo that, through the striking of correct notes of the chord, through the 
use of harmonics and spacing of parts, obtained maximum power from the keyboard with the most economic 
means.” Heavy-handedness will, once again, prevent the realization of the “hushed intensity” of the Debussyan 
pianissimo: to play “dolce ma sonoro” requires a “left hand that sings, but not ponderously, an intangible touch, and 
phalanges as miraculously nimble as the flight of the ‘Exquisite dancers.’” Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 129–
30. (Here, Jankélévitch is referring to “Les fées sont d’exquises danseuses” (Préludes, Book II, no. 4). Elsewhere, 
this same Prélude had been described as a “poem of lightness, where everything is vapor, pianissimo, and ravishing 
muslin” and an incarnation of “imponderable Leggierezza [Lightness].” Ibid., 37.) Softly dying away, the pianissimo 
of Debussy moves between the barely liminal and the nearly subliminal, pursuing the “elusive threshold” that flees 
before it, hunting the “instant when the mutation from All to Nothing and from Something to Inexistence takes 
place.” Ibid., 133. The infinitesimality between pianissimo and silence thus constitutes one variety of the instant in 
Debussy’s music. 
241The work also featured Léon Bakst’s sets, Michel Fokine’s choreography, and Ida Rubinstein’s 
performance in the title role. The acts were called mansions, after the “medieval term connoting both an episode in 
the narrative and a visual scene.” According to Mary Fleischer, “D’Annunzio compared the mansions to stained 
glass windows; each mansion had a distinctive décor” intended to “underline the static and visual nature of the text.” 
Mary Fleischer, Embodied Texts: Symbolist Playwright-Dancer Collaborations (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), 56.  
71 
démodé: “If the Martyre lasted only one hour, it would be acceptable, but it is painful to breathe 
for five hours during this atmosphere of artificial paradise set to the Parisian taste of 1911.”242 
In France in the 1940s, Le Martyre de saint Sébastien found new life, not in complete 
stagings of the original mystère en cinq actes, but in fragments symphoniques.243 In concert halls 
during and after World War II, French audiences enjoyed performances of Debussy’s music as a 
four-movement orchestral suite.244 Through Jankélévitch’s writing, saint Sébastien’s revival 
extended to the analysis of its music as well. 
In Debussy et le mystère, Jankélévitch traced Debussy’s compositional trajectory from 
the “secret to the mystery” as one from inexpression to expression.245 Despite the illimitable 
depths of her eyes, the “smooth forehead” of La Damoiselle élue (1888–9, Debussy’s lush 
orchestral song, after a poem by the Pre-Raphaelite Dante Gabriel Rosetti) was, Jankélévitch 
said, “still somewhat expressionless.”246 The “God for whom Arkel wishes” in Pelléas et 
                                                 
242Boris de Schlœzer, “Le Martyre de saint Sébastien à l’Opéra,” Nouvelle Revue française 18 (Sept. 1922): 
245. [“Si le Martyre ne durait qu’une heure, ce serait acceptable, mais est pénible de respirer cinq heures durant 
cette atmosphère de paradis artificiel au goût parisien de 1911.”]  
The work would finally return, in a shorter version, to the stage of l’Opéra in 1957. See also Revue 
musicale 234 (1957), entitled Le Martyre de saint-Sébastien, de la création 1911 à la reprise à l’Opéra de Paris 
1957; Annamaria Andreoli and Carlo Santoli, eds., L’Arte del tragico: L’Avventura del Martyre de Saint Sébastien 
di Gabriele D’Annunzio dal 1911 ad oggi (Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2000), 71–119 and 129–34; Ralph 
Locke, “Unacknowledged Exoticism in Debussy: The Incidental Music for Le Martyre de saint Sébastien (1911),” 
Musical Quarterly 90, no. 3/4 (2007), 408–9, note 16. 
243Giovanni Gullace, Gabriele D’Annunzio in France: A Study in Cultural Relations (Syracuse, N.Y.: 
Syracuse University Press, 1966), 91. 
244P. Le Flem, “Le Martyre de saint Sébastien,” Paris-Midi, June 17, 1941. Listening to the symphonic 
fragments may have stirred, for some in postwar France, memories of the staged (or at least narrated) version of the 
mystère–the fragments may have acted, in other words, as a sort of program music, but with a once-realized (or 
potentially realizable), not merely imaginable, programmatic content. Even for those listeners who were unfamiliar 
with the original work, the hagiography of St. Sebastian, an important Catholic saint, was likely familiar. Audiences 
in wartime and early postwar France would have recognized the programmatic nature of the music with its 
unmistakably religious undercurrent (i.e. spiritual, “psychic” content). 
245 Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 13. “The interval from La Damoiselle to Pelléas and from Rossetti 
to Maeterlinck measures all the distance between the occult mystery and the limpid mystery, between the arcane 
Punchinello and the destinal mystery of existence.” 
246Debussy’s mysteriology, according to Jankélévitch, “first finds an aliment in the occultist and 
Rosicrucian Paris of the 1880s, in this Paris of the Chat-Noir and le Sâr Péladan where mysticism sometimes takes 
the face of mystification.” Jankélévitch claims that “the Mallarmean, Pre-Raphaelite, and cabalistic pretexts” of 
Debussy’s youth “have found a decor of irises with which to express themselves, and, in this decor, the blessed 
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Mélisande (1892–1902, Debussy’s tranquil, if not ascetic, five-act opera after the symbolist 
dramatist Maurice Maeterlinck), however, was “not expressionless.”247 This music expressed. 
But what did it express? That which was inexpressible—mysteries of human existence (anguish, 
love, death). It conveyed, for Jankélévitch, experiences that we share, but that we do not 
completely grasp. 
As did saint Sébastien, whose music Jankélévitch chose as particularly expressive of the 
innermost mysteries of the human psyche. “Saint Sébastien,” the philosopher wrote, “where 
there is an all white paradise and legions of archangels, saint Sébastien is driven by the trembling 
of human suffering.”248 There were, for Jankélévitch, “two inverse movements” that 
corresponded to the “two spaces, Upper and Lower,” of Debussy’s music, “two spaces, not-at-all 
topographical but pneumatic (for they do not denote a here-and-there on the world map).”249 
There was, in Debussy, a descent (from light into darkness) and an ascent (from darkness to 
light). Both movements, both spaces were present in saint Sébastien, which, for Jankélévitch, 
opposed “the death of God to the exultant jubilation of the resurrection.”250 
Suffering and redemption, death and resurrection—in Debussy et le mystère, these were 
the “inexpressible” things that saint Sébastien nevertheless expressed.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Damozel.” La Damoiselle élue is “more enigmatic than truly mysterious; but the secret she carries is a message still 
empty and formal, a message without content.” Here “invisible wings quiver like a flight of angels on the bows of 
the orchestra, while the voices chant the hermetic threnody, but in all this seraphism, we catch less the instinct of 
mystery than the taste of the strange.” Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 11–12.  
247Ibid., 12. “‘Take pity on hearts, you Virgin gold on silver,’ Debussy will later inscribe under the last bars 
of the Proses lyriques. Gold on silver...it is very much that: as in the hieratic skies of Angelico. But the God for 
whom Arkel wishes—remember: ‘If I were God, I would pity the hearts of men’—this God is certainly not gold on 
silver, and its sky is not expressionless. Even saint Sébastien where there is an all white paradise and legions of 
archangels, saint Sébastien is driven by the trembling of human suffering.” 
248Ibid.  
249Ibid., 87–8. 
250Ibid., 88. 
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Audiences in wartime and post-WWII France had attuned themselves to such themes, and 
perhaps this is one of the reasons why the sounds of Debussy’s saint Sébastien resonated so 
strongly with them. If so, Levinas and Jankélévitch’s constellation of ideas (pneuma, psychism, 
the il y a, insomnia, voluptuosity, alterity, and the instant) grants a relevant form of access into 
the way an audience member could have heard saint Sébastien in postwar France. 
Nearly 4,000 lines of D’Annunzio’s symbolist verse, deftly maneuvering between the 
sacred and the profane, furnished Debussy with ample opportunities for creating musical 
symbolism. His musical setting invited listeners to empathize with the martyred hero, to be both 
stirred by his sensuality and awed by his spiritual might.  
At the outset of the play, the narrator invites the audience to witness the drama of 
Sébastien’s life, as it were, through a series of five stained-glass windows (corresponding to the 
five acts or mansions). In the first, “The Court of Lilies,” twin brothers Marc and Marcellien 
have been bound with rope. They are awaiting torture for having refused to disavow their 
Christian beliefs. Sébastien, commander of the archers of Emèse, leans on his bow, silently 
watching the young martyrs. 
Moved by their faith, Sébastien calls for a sign from God. He fires an arrow into the sky. 
Miraculously, the arrow does not fall back to earth. Sébastien removes his armor. He steps, 
barefoot, onto the burning embers and dances ecstatically—“in an ineffable ambiguity, delirium 
alternates with ecstasy, ardor with elation, warlike saltation with nuptial jubilation.”251  
                                                 
251Gabriele D’Annunzio, Le Martyre de saint-Sébastien: Mystère composé en rythme français (Paris: 
Calmann-Lévy, 1911), 100. Sébastien speaks during his ecstatic dance. I have included his words in figure 1. Here is 
an English translation: “I dance in the heat of the burning lilies. / Glory, O Christ the King! / I tread in the whiteness 
of the lilies. / Glory, O Christ the King! / I press the soft lilies. / Glory, O Christ the King! / My feet are naked in the 
dew! / I love you, King.” 
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In m. 237, a mystery of voluptuosity begins to unfold in Debussy’s music (figure 1 
below). Sébastien’s religious passion is, by turns, psychic and carnal, deeply spiritual and highly 
sensual. As Sébastien dances, his fervor spreads to the crowd: a woman regains her sight, the 
family of the twins converts. Seven sheaves of lilies shine with the “dazzling brilliance of 
seraphic lights.”252  
Voluptuosity becomes mysterious, for Levinas and Jankélévitch, in the ambiguity of its 
fundamental gesture—the caress. As a “mode of the subject’s being,” where the subject who is 
“in contact with another” goes “beyond this contact,” the caress is both fleshly and 
transcendent.253 Going beyond the physical contact of touch, the caress seeks without knowing 
exactly “what it seeks.”254 It reaches for “something other, always other, always inaccessible, 
and always still to come [à venir].”255 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
252Ibid., 100–1  
253Levinas, Time and the Other, 89.  
254Ibid. 
255Ibid. It is like a pure seeking, like a “game with something slipping away, a game absolutely without 
project or plan, not with what can become ours or us, but with something other, always other, always inaccessible, 
and always still to come [à venir].” 
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Figure 1. Debussy, Le Martyre de saint Sébastien, mm. 237–49 (vocal score) 
 
 
In mm. 237–49 of saint Sébastien, both words and music reflect such a voluptuous 
movement (figure 1 above). Throughout the passage, Sébastien alternates physical descriptions 
(e.g., “I dance in the heat of the burning lilies”) with hymns of praise (“Glory, O Christ the 
King!”). The movement within the realm of contingent, here-and-now desire (eros) toward an 
unconditional, yet-to-come love (agape) for the Other finds expression in the extreme 
chromaticism of the music. 
The mysterious, from Jankélévitch’s perspective, came neither from the body nor the soul 
in isolation, but from the relationship between them—in the passage from the one to the other. 
The instant in which this passage takes place can be heard as occurring in mm. 251–6 (figure 2 
below). Sébastien’s words here express the pure seeking of voluptuous mystery, and, at the same 
time, they call attention to the impending arrival of a symbolist musical gesture: “It is as if my 
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soul / were made with willow leaves, / as if my veins / were made of music and the dawn! / It is 
as if I were shaking off / a frost of sonorous stars! / I love you, King.”256  
“It is as if…” These are the words that, for Abbate, would have authorized Debussy to 
compose phantom sounds.257 At last, beginning in m. 259, there is more than “delirium and 
ecstasy,” more than the redness of the coals and the whiteness of the lilies: “now the seraphic 
salutation surmounts the terrestrial hymn.”258 Now there is more than suffering and the desire to 
be liberated from it. A heavenly choir enters, and the meter changes from triple to quadruple. 
The key signature changes from F# major to C major—from, in Jankélévitch’s vocabulary, the 
key of “sumptuousness” to the key of “blank austerity.”259 Diatonic harmonies also supplant the 
chromaticism of the previous section (mm. 237–58). 
 
                                                 
256D’Annunzio, 101.  
257Abbate, In Search of Opera, 175–6: “But Debussy could displace the poetic notion of impossible music 
‘as if’ from an alien voice metonymically onto an orchestra whose impossible singing becomes the phantom form of 
the concealed song.” 
258D’Annunzio, 101. The text that Debussy set to music does not include the verses “Très-haute Bannière, 
Hampe tutélaire et Verge fleurie” from D’Annunzio’s original. Thus, translated into English, the chorus sings: “Hail, 
O Light, Light of the World, Cross broad and deep, Sign of victory, and Palm of glory and Tree of life!” 
259Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 107.  
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Figure 2. Debussy, Le Martyre de saint Sébastien, mm. 249–56 (vocal score) 
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For both Jankélévitch and Levinas, an acute duality characterized human experiences of 
mystery. This duality resided along the fault line of the psyche, along the edge that split it into 
two pneumata—pneuma as breath and pneuma as spirit. The very stuff of psychic life—its 
elemental substance—is the air that we breathe. We subsist on and become substantive through 
respiration, through the expansion and contraction of the lungs. This literal pneuma drives our 
self-constitution. Another pneuma, one which animates the imagination, impels us to move 
outside of ourselves, to embrace and be embraced by another form of otherness, that of another 
human being, and, sometimes, beyond this, that of an “entirely different Miracle [Thauma],” one 
which is “no longer marvel, but mystery.”260 
Within this framework, the seraphic chorus, though otherworldly, is still of this world. It 
is not the voice of the Other. Rather, the angelic voices are singing to this Other, to a divine and 
mysterious presence. This moment, for Jankélévitch, would be that of the instant before midday, 
the instant of the “nurturing light” from Plato’s Republic, “King of Heaven, beneficent Apollo 
and scion of the Good, making sensible objects visible as the Idea of the Good makes intelligible 
objects comprehensible, demiurgic cause of vegetation and life…”261  
At midday itself, however, the sun “veers into murderous light.”262 No longer only the 
“principle of all lucidity,” it becomes also the “killer of dreams, killer of illusions.”263 As a 
                                                 
260Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 251–2.  
261Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 80.  
262Jankélévitch declares several precedents for the Debussyan mystery of “murderous light”: “The cruel 
Mallarmean azure, the nirvana of Leconte de Lisle, the deadly whiteness according to Zarathustra, the dominical 
and meridional acedia of Laforgue—four versions of the same souciant insouciance, of the same unmotivated 
despair that holds everything completely in the metempirical paradox of anguish.” Ibid., 79.  
Alenka Zupančič observes that the “image of noon or midday as the figure of the two” is a “recurrent 
(linguistic) image” in Nietzsche’s work. Midday is a “moment” for Nietzsche as it is for Jankélévitch. In Nietzsche, 
midday is the moment of “eternity, gaze, one turning to two, the shortest shadow, nuance, middle, and almost.” 
Alenka Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 
87. 
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result, the subject who basks in “this mystery of light, this insomnia in the great sunlight of 
diurnal omni-presence,” may be “put into question,” to use Levinas’s language.264 
Psychism is, for Levinas, “persistence in one’s own being.”265 Through breathing, the 
human persists, continues to be. A music that comports the psychic life of the human also 
persists in and through its breath. Some passages from Debussy’s mature music can easily be 
heard as simulating states of insomnia, wherein music that expresses the mystery of the psyche 
stops breathing. Musical psychism ceases to be when it no longer breathes. But it can persist 
temporarily without breathing, precisely when it holds its breath. This does not mean that it 
literally holds its breath, any more than Levinas means that the face of the other involves the 
literal, physiognomic features of a human face.266 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
263Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 79. Here Jankélévitch is quoting the poem that Debussy wrote to 
accompany the third of his Prose lyriques for piano (De fleurs, 1893): “friend of the bad flowers, killer of dreams, 
killer of illusions.”  
264Ibid., 81.  
265Benso, 19. 
266Emmanuel Levinas, Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 208. See also Daniel K. L. Chua, “Beethoven’s Other Humanism,” Journal 
of the American Musicological Society 62, no. 3 (2009): 602–8 
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Figure 3. Debussy, Le Martyre de saint Sébastien, mm. 255–70 (vocal score) 
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Rather, there are moments in which, even as the sound continues to resonate, the breath 
ceases. In such moments, music exposes what Jankélévitch refers to as the “trembling of human 
suffering.”267 In such moments, the musical subject (i.e., the music’s implied agency) falls silent 
and what we hear is the sound of that which inspires dread, of that which defines the experience 
of insomnia—the il y a. When time comes to a momentary standstill, the breath catches, air 
becomes trapped in the lungs. In thus holding its breath, the musical subject gives voice to the 
voiceless presence of anonymous being-there. 
“There is in Debussy,” Jankélévitch wrote, “a permanent midday that at any instant of the 
day can create the enchantment of motionless hours.”268 Jankélévitch listed a number of 
instances in Debussy’s music in which “time stands still and man holds his breath.”269 One such 
moment occurs at m. 270, precisely when the first seraphic salutation ends (figure 3 above).  
After the unaccompanied chorus seraphicus in mm. 255–70, the voices fall silent.270 On 
the downbeat of m. 270, the chorus of angels ends on the word “life” (singing a G in unison). A 
change of expression immediately ensues (figure 4 below). The meter changes (from quadruple 
to triple), and an insistent pulse commences in the bass. The seraphic choir’s forte gives way to 
pianissimo in the piano. The gentle gliding of parallel chords replaces the linear, homophonic 
setting of the chorus.  
                                                 
267Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 12.  
268Ibid., 77.   
269Jankélévitch, Philosophie première, 159. In Debussy et le mystère, Jankélévitch also recorded several 
examples in a footnote, but did not otherwise elaborate upon them. One of these was from Le Martyre de saint 
Sébastien (1911), pp. 26–7 (“la cour des lys”). (Jankélévitch’s references were to the vocal score.) Jankélévitch, 
Debussy et le mystère, 77. 
The majority of the footnotes in Debussy et le mystère consist of lists of references to specific moments in 
the scores of Debussy’s pieces. They function as collections of supplementary evidence for specific manifestations 
of the phenomenon of the musical instant.  
270In the vocal score, the passage in mm. 270–88 is for piano alone—this is the music to which Jankélévitch 
likely refers. 
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In this break, which interrupts the singing of the angels, the sounds of the il y a suddenly 
rise to the surface. We listen for the angelic voices, but we hear something else, something that 
their silent pause allows us to hear. Something deeply unsettling lingers in their absence, 
something which had been there all along but which had until now remained below the threshold 
of our attention. 
The cessation of the seraphic singing leaves a void that is “immediately filled with the 
mute and anonymous rustling” of the il y a, an auditory effect which Levinas likens to the 
“murmur of attendants” filling the “place left vacant by the one who dies.”271 Emptiness takes on 
an aural presence—its reverberations invade us, imposing upon us the simple, ineluctable fact 
that there is. 
For Levinas and Jankélévitch, intense experiences of sleeplessness or wakefulness 
heightened the sense of a sublime blankness at the heart of being. In Existence and Existents 
(1947), Levinas described the phenomenon of nocturnal insomnia.272 In Debussy et le mystère, 
Jankélévitch illustrated a different form of insomnia, a diurnal insomnia associated with the 
phenomenon of noon. Where Levinas depicted the invisible presence of the darkest night, 
Jankélévitch fathomed the obscurity that remained even in the brightest moment of the day. 
Jankélévitch explored the mystery of midday (le mystère de midi), the “mystery of the sun at its 
                                                 
271Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 4.  
272The endless night of insomnia unveiled the primordial anonymity of existence. Staring into the 
blackness, watching vigilantly but with nothing to occupy the gaze, the existent became the “object of an 
anonymous thought.” Levinas, Existence and Existents, 63. One felt the eyes of the night upon oneself. “It is the 
night itself that watches,” Levinas wrote. Captive to “this anonymous nightwatch,” trapped in the interminable 
instant of insomnia, the subject found itself “locked helplessly in the infinitude of frozen time.” One came to know 
not the freedom of the instant, but its immobility, its impotency, its inescapability. Severson, 69, 48. 
Levinas described insomnia as an experience of the “impossibility of nothingness.” Levinas, Time and the 
Other, 50. Insomnia presented the conscious subject with a situation that “will never finish,” installing a “vigilance 
without refuge in unconsciousness.” Ibid., 48–49. 
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zenith, mystery of the panic summer and the blinding silence.”273 Parallel to the sublime horror 
of a nocturnal vigilance was the tragic splendor of high noon.274 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
273Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 82–3.  
274As that exact moment of the day in which the sun, at the peak of its trajectory, suspended for an instant 
between ascent and descent, suffused everything with la lumière glorieuse, unveiling all of Nature’s “resplendent 
and graceful spectacle,” leaving nothing in shadows, the “meridian point” of midday was akin to that gateway which 
Nietzsche had called the Augenblick (“moment”). As it had in Nietzsche’s Also sprach Zarathustra, the figure of 
midday served in Debussy et le mystère as the perfect symbol for the “two-fold character of enlightenment.” Max 
Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid 
Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 36. Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
Dialektik der Aufklärung was originally published in 1947. 
Berthold Hoeckner has described “Adorno’s aesthetics of the Augenblick” in Programming the Absolute: 
Nineteenth-Century German Music and the Hermeneutics of the Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002), 15. Hoeckner reminds us that, in articulating the premise of his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno “did not choose the 
word Moment (moment), but rather the more idiomatic Augenblick—literally, “an eye’s glance.” 
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Figure 4. Debussy, Le Martyre de saint Sébastien, mm. 271–89 (vocal score) 
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For Levinas, the inescapable solitude of the night of insomnia freezes time: “From the 
moment one is riveted there, one loses all notion of a starting or finishing point.”275 Jankélévitch 
experiences the “heavy burden” of a “solidarity with the cosmos” in Debussy’s musical 
invocations of the stillest hour of the day.276 It is possible, Jankélévitch suggests, to experience 
insomnia even during the daytime. The insomnia of noon imposes a similar suspension of 
temporality: midday is “the dilated hour when all of nature hesitates, overwhelmed by the heavy 
meridian presence of all things.”277 At the “apogee” of the day, existence is at its “maximum” 
and “anxiety” at its “heaviest.”278 
The words that Sébastien recites in mm. 272–89 effectively narrate the suspension of his 
subjectivity within the crystal of midday (figure 4 above).279 Over the murmuring of the 
orchestra, Sebastian speaks the following lines: “I hear another song.”280 What song is this? It is 
the song to come—Sebastian is prophesying the resumption of the angels’ singing. He hears the 
angels before we do: “I hear the seven eternal lutes. / The lilies produce all the light, / They 
compose the whole melody.”281  
Yet we do not hear this melody as Sebastian does. What we hear is the heartbeat of the 
bassline and the oscillating chords in the strings and winds—the earthly counterpart to the 
                                                 
275Levinas, Time and the Other, 48. See also Levinas, Existence and Existents, 58–61. The inescapability of 
being, the impossibility of withdrawing from being, instills in us, Levinas claims, a profound sense of “malaise, or 
disquiet.” Emmanuel Levinas, On Escape, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 
58. 
276Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 74.  
277Ibid., 83.  
278Ibid., 76. To the absent presence of Levinas’s darkness, Jankélévitch opposed the present absence of the 
daylight: “To the nothingness of midnight, which is nothingness in the void and the obscure non-being, which is 
pure negative Nothing, the dying sun opposes its nothingness of midday, which is absolute plenitude, acute 
actuality, extreme positivity.” Ibid., 81. 
279Ibid., 81: “Midday is comparable to the crystal whose transparency is also a resistance and consistency, 
whose limpidity signifies impenetrability.” 
280D’Annunzio, 101. 
281Ibid., 101–2. 
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heavenly music that has transfixed Sebastian. This moment of scission is the moment in which 
symbolism and existentialism converge, transpiring separately yet simultaneously.  
Listeners are trapped between Sébastien’s verbal account of soundless singing and the 
disquieting nonverbal sounds of the here below, between what they cannot hear and what they no 
longer wish to hear. In the moment of midday, “something keeps us in a state of mysterious 
anticipation that makes the heart beat stronger and faster.”282 In this moment of virtual insomnia, 
“something keeps us in suspense on the threshold of adventure and the imminence of impending 
catastrophe.”283 This “something” is the situation of existing without knowing, something with 
which the majority of French audience members could not help but identify both during and in 
the early wake of the Second World War. 
This is a situation from which we wish to escape. In this moment, we hope for 
redemption. “All those who see, all those who hear are struck with stupor and terror.”284 Of the 
lilies, Sébastien says: “You cut them back, and they re-grow. / You break them, they rise again. / 
Their stem is imperishable.”285 In the instant between death and rebirth, the music changes 
expression again, becoming animando in m. 283, as Sebastian sees the lilies seeing him: “See, 
see! They look at me / like angels covering their eyes / for the terrified.”286 
In m. 286, an arpeggiated pentachord, the strings of the “eternal lutes,” announce the 
return of the seraphic voices (figure 5 below). The insomnia of midday recedes. After the death 
                                                 
282Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 77. 
283Ibid.  
284D’Annunzio, 102.  
285Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 77. 
286D’Annunzio, 102. 
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of the morning arrives the birth of the afternoon. Here is what would have been, for Jankélévitch, 
a rare moment of redemption in Debussy’s oeuvre.287 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
287Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 22. “Debussyan time is not open to the future and hope, but rather 
exudes the inexpressible charm of the seasons fled or, as Recueillement said, the ‘smiling regret’ of the 
superannuated years; this is what we divine much later, and one year before the Ballade de Villon á s’amye, in the 
heartbreaking and glacial Prélude entitled Des pas sur la neige; whence comes those steps? where do they go? Man, 
having come out of the unknown, returns to mystery, and he walks aimlessly in the snow, bitter regret enveloping 
like a shroud the landscape of abandonment, loneliness, and desolation.”  
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Figure 5. Debussy, Le Martyre de saint Sébastien, mm. 290–309 (vocal score) 
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With Jankélévitch and Levinas’s phenomenological ears, so to speak, Debussy’s 
sonorous psychism, in saint Sébastien, can be heard and understood as an expression of both the 
trembling of human suffering and the yearning for salvation. At the same time, concealed within 
their acoustic reality, these musical traces of psychic life suggest something which is purely 
imaginary, but which, for all that, is no less real—the idea and the call of an inaudible, 
impossible music, the mysterious strains of the Other, the thauma of the One. 
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4.0  DRASTIC ECOMYSTERIOLOGY 
In the years after the Occupation, Jankélévitch turned away from wartime representations of 
Debussy in France, reorienting what he saw as overly rationalistic readings of the composer’s 
music. For him, Debussy’s music left an impression of the human as perpetually outside of 
itself—in other humans; in nature (in plants, animals, minerals); and in artistic creations (such as 
musical objects). Within the pages of Debussy et le mystère, Jankélévitch traced its patterns, 
constructing what I call a drastic ecomysteriology of Debussy’s music.288 
Jankélévitch’s text is drastic in the sense that it attempts, not to do without thinking, but 
to perform its thoughts, to bring together “doing and theorizing,” to demonstrate the unification 
in Debussy’s work of “speculative lucidity and creative genius.”289 Debussy et le mystère is an 
ecomysteriology in the sense that it maps mystery in the aesthetically constructed relationships 
not only between human selves, but also between these selves and the nonhuman aspects of their 
environments.290 
                                                 
288In the task of “letting air into the changeless being of the Eleatics,” Jankélévitch implemented “cognates 
of the verb draô.” Llewelyn, 69. The word drastique (“drastic”) comes from the Ancient Greek 
δραστικός (drastikós, “active, efficient”) and from δρᾶσις (drâsis, “strength, efficacy”), which itself comes 
from δράω (dráō, “to do”). By contrast, the word gnostique (“gnostic”) comes from the Ancient Greek 
γνωστικός (“of or for knowing, cognitive), γνῶσις (“gnosis, knowing”), and γιγνώσκω (“I know”). 
Abbate (in “Music—Drastic or Gnostic?”) has drawn these terms from Jankélévitch himself. In this 
chapter, I argue that the assertion that music is drastic means for Jankélévitch not that one should study live musical 
performances but that one should attempt to embody music’s liveness, or its drastic nature, in scholarship itself, in 
the act of writing about music.  
289Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 80. 
290Ecomysteriology is the only true neologism ventured in this dissertation. Combining the prefix “eco-” 
with the word “mysteriology,” it refers generally to that branch of mysteriology which studies ecomysteries, or 
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From within an ecosystem in which pneumata and grammata coexist simultaneously, 
Jankélévitch attempts to adopt a perspective that thinks, acts, lives, and listens between them. In 
the following chapter, I rely on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s elucidation of an ecological 
perspectivism in order to cast further light on depictions of self-distantiation in Jankélévitch’s 
Debussyan mysteriology. A fundamental de-centering, a process of “relearning” how to “look at 
the world,” opened, for Merleau-Ponty, onto the miraculous and mysterious “network of 
relationships” that we ourselves are as human beings in the world.291 Both Merleau-Ponty and 
Jankélévitch sought an understanding of Nature “at the jointure of Being and Nothingness,” the 
former in the realm of sight, the latter in the sphere of sound.292 
The static and geotropic tendencies of Debussy’s aesthetic worked together, for 
Jankélévitch, to produce a musical experience of worldly otherness. And when he glanced at the 
various “countenances” of Debussy’s music, he found that in some cases many sets of eyes—
some human, some not—met his own while in others there were no eyes to behold, only the 
sightless features of landscapes, the midday sun over the sea, the play of waves, a cloud in the 
sky, a gentle breeze. There in all of these surfaces, whether ocular or mineral, he saw reflected 
                                                                                                                                                             
mysteries related to the environment and the interrelationships between organisms and their environments, and it 
may be used more specifically as well, to describe any individual study of ecomysteries. The major part of Debussy 
et le mystère, concerned primarily as it is with grammatic mysteries (i.e., ecomysteries) consists of Jankélévitch’s 
depiction of Debussy’s works as the expression of a musical ecomysteriology (though Jankélévitch does not himself 
use this term, of course). To be clear: I am using the prefix “eco-“ only in its neutral sense (as short for 
“ecological”), which the Oxford English Dictionary gives as its primary sense. I am not using “eco-“ in its other, 
activist sense, which would not be appropriate in this case, since Jankélévitch remains reticent, in his 
ecomysteriology, about the kinds of political commitments that might follow from the set of aesthetic and ethical 
ideals that he finds to be embodied in Debussy’s music. 
291Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xxiv. “We witness every minute the miracle of related 
experiences, and yet nobody knows better than we do how this miracle is worked, for we are ourselves this network 
of relationships. The world and reason are not problematical. We may say, if we wish, that they are mysterious, but 
their mystery defines them: there can be no question of dispelling it by some ‘solution,’ it is on the hither side of all 
solutions. True philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world, and in this sense a historical account can give 
meaning to the world quite as ‘deeply’ as a philosophical treatise. We take our fate in our hands, we become 
responsible for our history through reflection, but equally by a decision on which we stake our life, and in both cases 
what is involved is a violent act which is validated by being performed.” 
292Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, ed. Dominique Séglard, 
trans. Robert Vallier (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 70. 
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the fragility of human life and the inhuman forces, those vicissitudes of fate, that give shape to 
that life: 
And thus, whereas the evil of the century involves the isolation of the ego in its self-
regard, in its exceptionality, in its incomparable promotion, the Debussyan human, 
ceasing to privilege himself, remains in pantheistic communion with all of the creatures 
and various facts; he does not get lost in the abysses of soliloquy or introspective 
meditation; but he is alternately fish of gold, elephant of felt and General of the 
Punchinellos, dancer of Delphi and dancer with rattlesnakes, pagoda in China, Capri 
lemon, and little cloud in the sky. Samuel Pickwick, Little Shepherd, and Mustard Seed. 
He is mask and puppet.293 
 
The faces of Debussy’s music were many, and the performance of othering, of opening selfhood 
to the perils of otherhood, that produced this facial multiplicity, constituted, for Jankélévitch, an 
ethical act. 
4.1 FROM RESISTANCE CLASSIC TO POSTWAR PROPHET 
As he had for intellectuals across the political spectrum in France, for both “the nationalist right 
and the political left since World War I,” Debussy became, for Jankélévitch as well in the years 
after World War II, a “matrix through which to reconstruct the ‘French.’”294 A participant in the 
French Resistance during the Occupation, Jankélévitch promoted, after Liberation, a portrait of 
                                                 
293Ibid., 73: “Et ainsi, au lieu que le ‘mal du siècle’ implique l’isolement de l’ego en son quant-à-soi, en son 
exceptionalité, en son incomparable promotion, l’homme debussyste, cessant de se privilégier lui-même, rest en 
communion panthéistique avec l’ensemble des créatures et des faits-divers; il ne se perd pas dans les abîmes du 
soliloque ou de la méditation introspective; mais il est tour à tour poisson d’or, éléphant de feutre et général des 
Polichinelles; danseuse de Delphes et danseuse aux crotales; pagode en Chine, citronnier à Capri et petit nuage dans 
le ciel. Samuel Pickwick, Little Shepherd et Grain-de-Sénevé. Il est masque et fantoche.” 
294Jane F. Fulcher, “Debussy as National Icon: From Vehicle of Vichy’s Compromise to French Resistance 
Classic,” Musical Quarterly 94, no. 4 (2011): 468–9.  
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Debussy that prolonged the Resistance’s wartime emphasis on “French classicism” and the 
“Western classic humanistic tradition.”295  
Yet Jankélévitch tied the aesthetic content of Debussy’s music to a radically different 
aspect of those cultural ideals. If Debussy assimilated principles of classical Greek philosophy, 
he chose to espouse virtues other than the intellectualism and individualism that the heirs to the 
French Enlightenment had elected to accentuate. Rather than a disciple of Apollo, Debussy was, 
Jankélévitch avowed, a “mystic”—he was “Dionysus and love-sorcerer.”296 
In “Debussy as National Icon: From Vehicle of Vichy’s Compromise to French 
Resistance Classic,” Jane F. Fulcher delineates the ways in which the idea of Debussy served as 
a substantial site of symbolic “contestation over endemic or defining French national values” 
throughout the twentieth century, from the pre-WWI views of the Ligue de l’Action Française to 
Pierre Boulez’s post-WWII interpretations of Pelléas. During the Vichy years in particular, 
writing about the music of Debussy became an instrument for the elaboration and promotion of 
widely divergent ideological and political agendas.  
Through programs for commissioning new musical works, the Occupation government 
not only encouraged a return to earlier French models of composition (including that of Debussy, 
whose music played an archetypal role), but also emphasized, through concert programming, a 
stylistic affinity between Debussy and Wagner.297 At the same time and from the same material, 
the French Resistance constructed an opposing version of “French classicism,” a “cultural 
counter-discourse” in which Debussy (both the man and his music) provided a “unified and 
                                                 
295Ibid., 471.  
296Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 150.  
297Leslie A. Sprout, “Music for a ‘New Era’: Composers and National Identity in France, 1936–1946” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2000). Fulcher, “Debussy as National Icon,” 468–9.  
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competing representation of the authentic French community and its values, as well as the 
individual’s and the artist’s place within it.”298 
The Resistance press sought to attenuate any affiliation between Debussy and Wagner, to 
assert Debussy’s embodiment of “true French classical values,” and to extol the opera Pelléas et 
Mélisande as a “work that quintessentially liberated French music from German dominance.”299 
Unlike the wartime essayists of the Resistance, who worked actively in their writings to sever 
any conceptual ties between Debussy and German music, Jankélévitch refused even to 
acknowledge the existence of such associations. After the war, Jankélévitch made exceedingly 
scant reference in print to anything German.300 The atrocities of the Second World War, the 
Holocaust, and his own wartime experiences led to a repudiation of “nearly all of German 
culture.”301 By 1949, Jankélévitch seemed to have already excised the German from his thoughts 
on music. Thus in Debussy et le mystère the name of Wagner does not appear.302  
Like the anonymous writers of Resistance pieces, Jankélévitch continued to find in 
Debussy a precious resource from which to extract a set of cultural values, a specifically French 
“cultural matrix” through which to institute a recovery and a reimagining of the universal human 
                                                 
298Ibid., 472. Fulcher examines three anonymous articles published in Resistance journals that had 
portrayed Debussy as an icon of French humanistic classicism. Two of the articles appeared in Musiciens 
d’ajourd’hui, the organ of the musical Resistance (“Debussy le libérateur” in June of 1942, and “Debussy. Musicien 
français,” in October of 1942). The third—also titled “Debussy. Musicien français”—was published in Les Lettres 
françaises in August of 1944. 
299Ibid., 473. Fulcher also notes that after the war some French composers, such as Olivier Messiaen and 
Pierre Boulez, perpetuated the rhetoric of the Resistance. 
300For more on Jankélévitch’s wartime experience, see note 204 above. 
301“Entretien,” Arc 75 (1979): 9. See also “Vladimir Jankélévitch: la vie (Entretiens),” in Suarès, Vladimir 
Jankélévitch, 94.  
302German culture is not completely absent, however. There are three references to the German philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche, whose poetic style of philosophical writing shares much in common with that of Jankélévitch. 
appears to emulate in his own work. Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 80, 84, and 148. There are also occasional 
references in footnotes to works by German composers (e.g., note 1, pg. 47, mentions Richard Strauss’s 
Heldenleben and note 1, pg. 121, Strauss’s Heldenleben and Alpensymphonie). 
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condition.303 In Resistance polemics, Debussy served as a repository of “classical” French 
values, such as “moral integrity,” “universal rights,” and “human liberty.”304 In Jankélévitch’s 
estimation, however, the virtues of Debussy resided not in his personification of the principles of 
the French Revolution, but in his perception of the mystery of existence. 
“Debussy senses mystery even there where there is no mystery,” Jankélévitch wrote.305 
Debussy’s music arose out of an experience that was “characteristic of all poetry”—an 
experience of “the mysterious in the commonplace.”306 Debussy poeticized the commonplace, 
perceiving the extraordinary within the ordinary. According to Jankélévitch, Debussy possessed 
an “extra-lucid sensorium through which the shadow of the irrational surrounding the presence 
of the person and the existence of physical things became to him perceptible.”307 The sense of 
mystery was, for Jankélévitch, Debussy’s greatest gift. 
4.2 JANKÉLÉVITCH’S DRASTIC 
To make his points ever more emphatic, Jankélévitch strove to approximate, within his own 
oeuvre, the mysterious effects that he perceived when experiencing Debussy’s music. He 
conceived philosophy itself as a sort of drastic performance. When reading Jankélévitch’s 
writing, it helps to imagine him on a stage, performing his work.308 
                                                 
303Fulcher, 471.  
304Ibid.  
305Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 13.  
306Ibid. 
307Ibid.  
308In an interview with Jacques Chancel, Jankélévitch discussed his relationship to the written word. 
“Vladimir Jankélévitch: The essence of my work comes under the oral. Jacques Chancel: There are nevertheless a 
lot of books. VJ: Certainly. But I am despite everything a philosopher who found expression through my teaching 
duties, orally. JC: This is true. VJ: My means of expression is spoken. Essentially. I’m a teacher. I am not a writer. 
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The following passage from Debussy et le mystère imparts a sense of the text’s 
performative tenor and brings forth most of its idiosyncrasies, encapsulating its author’s mode of 
expression and offering, as it were, a picture of Jankélévitch “in a nutshell”: 
At the outset of La Mer, the drawling theme, recognizable by its repeated notes, 
slowly emerges from the misty dawn like Anadyomene from the foam of the sea 
and rises gradually toward the first whiteness of morning. De l’aube á midi sur la 
mer (“From the dawn to midday on the sea”), which is a morning of world 
history, tells of the birth of music and the progressive prevalence of the melodious 
law over naturality. ῾Ως φιλοσοφίας οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς. The sounds are 
arranged in the formless nebula like, in the calls of the lyre of Orpheus, the 
obedient stones... 
 
There was at first a large noise, immense, confused, 
More elusive than the wind in the thickly covered trees. 
 
And Franz Liszt—who, along with Victor Hugo, heard on the mountain the 
monstrous clamor of nature and humanity—elsewhere welcomes Orpheus as the 
first musician magus to tame wild beasts and waterfalls, becomes, like Francis of 
Assisi, the orchestra conductor of the birds, and submits the barbaric elements to 
the law of meter and Harmony. To tell the truth, Debussy is less optimistic, and 
the Orphic success is not so complete in him. The Cimmerian monsters have not 
found in La Mer, like the Huns in Liszt, their Catalonian fields; all the dragons 
have not died. Jeux de vagues undoes once again what “midday over the sea” had 
accomplished, once again unleashes the fury of the elements... But if chaos finally 
prevails over civilization, the qualities remain nonetheless subject to a delectable 
and delicious order that is Beauty itself. And the “distant” is one of the forms that 
this modesty of physical presence takes on: presence is not tamed, but it is 
poeticized by absence and the mystery of the horizon.309 
 
In style and structure, this is precisely the sort of thing one regularly encounters when reading 
Jankélévitch’s Debussy et le mystère—long, complex sentences; evocative language; uncommon, 
                                                                                                                                                             
There is an important nuance. I have been heard to write books. But I’m not much a man of the pen. My craft is not 
writing. Writing today evokes the writer. In my time, it would have been applied to the schoolboy. Writing is not my 
field. My field rises from the word. It is oral communication that has been my main concern.” In Vladimir 
Jankélévitch: Qui suis-je? ed. Guy Saurès (Lyon, France: La Manufacture, 1986), 65. 
309Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 74–5. The passage in Ancient Greek is from Plato, Phaedo, 61a: 
“…ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς…” (“...as philosophy was indeed the greatest kind of music...”) 
Platon, Phédon, ed. Paul Couvreur (Paris: Hachette, 1896), 12. The verses of poetry come from Victor Hugo, “Ce 
qu’on entend sur la montagne.” Victor Hugo, Oeuvres complètes: Poésie, Vol. 4 (Paris: Eugène Renduel, 1838), 52. 
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but unspecialized terminology (rare, obscure, or archaic words); neologisms and philosophical 
concepts; poetic imagery; puzzling musical references. 
At higher levels of structure, a different set of difficulties emerges—the ambiguity of 
genre, for example. Is this philosophy or poetry, musicology or a musical score? How are we 
meant to read this text? Like the poet or the composer, Jankélévitch seems to write more for our 
ears than for our eyes.  
The chapters also defy convention. A brief prelude (“Debussy and Mystery”) and 
postlude (“Innocence and Springtime”) encircle three numbered chapters (“The Mystery of 
Fate,” “The Mystery of Midday,” and “The Girl with the Flaxen Hair”). Each chapter approaches 
Debussy’s musical constructions of mystery from a different angle. We do not learn until after 
the closing of the third chapter, not until the first lines of the postlude, that “The Girl with the 
Flaxen Hair” also designates a specific category of mystery—the mystery of innocence. 
Dialectical inversions abound. On some level, Jankélévitch appears to be simulating that 
seemingly spontaneous play of opposites which he finds to be a general characteristic of musical 
discourse. On another level, these reversals demarcate his phenomenological method. In his 
writings on music, he seeks to record the twists and turns of the mind as it tries, often 
desperately, to keep up with the unremitting fluctuations of musical time. 
4.3 ECOMYSTERIOLOGY 
Despite the enigmatic form of its presentation, Debussy et le mystère follows and traces a logic—
namely, that logic which Jankélévitch found to be regulating Debussy’s musical language of 
translucent mystery. This logic can be called ecomysteriological: it serves to communicate 
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environmental, ecological mysteries via the medium of musical art. For Jankélévitch, Debussy 
made audible a specific interpretation of the world, one which restored to nature what modernity 
had stripped from it—its depth, its unruliness, its mysteriousness. 
Debussy’s respect for nature’s chaos substantiated itself, according to Jankélévitch, in 
figurations of discontinuity and simultaneity. Jankélévitch declared that “Debussyan 
discontinuity” was ultimately “imposed by nature and not by inner life, by mysterious multi-
presence and not by the lyricism of a subjective pathos.”310 Rather than attempting to tame the 
presence of nature, Debussy “poeticized” it through techniques of perspective and distance, 
through “absence and the mystery of the horizon.”311  
Jankélévitch detected a polarity at work in Debussy’s musical explorations of the world 
of things (or what Jankélévitch called the realm of the “grammatic”). Horizontally, Debussy’s 
music induced immobility, slowing time to a standstill; vertically, it descended to the depths of 
being. To fully perceive the interaction of these twin axes, it was necessary, from Jankélévitch’s 
perspective, to adopt them, to embrace them, to come into contact with them, to project oneself 
into them—that is, to perceive them drastically. In this dimensionality, Jankélévitch’s views 
chimed with those of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, his contemporary, colleague, and even one-time 
tenant.312 
                                                 
310Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 75, 70. There are exceptions, as we saw in our analysis of Le 
Martyre de saint Sébastien in the previous chapter. Traces of the subjective remain in Debussy’s music, even in his 
music of grammatic mystery. 
311Ibid., 75.  
312Jankélévitch and Merleau-Ponty have not been compared often enough. They were colleagues at the 
Sorbonne from 1952 until Merleau-Ponty’s death in 1961. During the Occupation, Merleau-Ponty had lived in 
Jankélévitch’s Paris apartment. After Liberation, their thoughts would overlap in several areas. In this chapter, I 
focus on their ideas about aesthetic perception and worldliness.  
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4.3.1 Perspectivism: Vision and Intervision 
In Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945), philosophy emerged as the “reflection 
of pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into being.”313 The work of philosophy 
was to posit mysteries, to identify them and make them explicit. Philosophy, for Merleau-Ponty 
acted to disclose a “phenomenological world,” to articulate its ecological mysteries, to bring to 
awareness the intricacy of the intertwined, chiasmatic interactions between human beings and 
their environments, and to discern the perceptual embodiment through which we ourselves come 
to constitute this world.314 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, in Taylor Carman’s view, addressed a specific mystery, the 
mystery of perception, or vision.315 According to Françoise Dastur, the mystery of vision, for 
Merleau-Ponty, was an “enigma of presence, but “of a ‘splintered’ presence,” one which could 
“no longer be referred to the unity of an agency of presentation.”316 This enigma was therefore 
the “mystery of simultaneity”—the “mystery of a coexistence of everything in and through 
distance,” of that “deflagration of being” which “Cézanne attempted to paint.”317  
This simultaneity spoke to the dynamism of all matter, a quality to which phenomenology 
ought to have been attuned. Rather than a “doctrine or a philosophical system,” phenomenology, 
Merleau-Ponty claimed, was first of all a “movement.”318 As “painstaking as the works of 
                                                 
313Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Basic Writings, ed. Thomas Baldwin (New York: Routledge, 2004), 77.  
314Ibid.  
315Carman, Merleau-Ponty, 7.  
316Françoise Dastur, “World, Flesh, Vision,” in Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh, ed. Fred Evans 
and Leonard Lawlor (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 41. Merleau-Ponty, Dastur wrote, “hardly 
seems to have distanced himself” from the “exorbitant privilege” that the tradition of Western metaphysics has 
conferred upon the faculty of sight. ibid., 40. Rather, this privilege seemed “to find its culmination in the unique 
question that the author of Eye and Mind continues to ask from his first to his last book: what is vision?” 
317Ibid.  
318Ibid.  
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Balzac, Proust, Valéry, or Cézanne,” phenomenology had the “same kind of attentiveness and 
wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same will to seize the meaning of the world or of 
history as that meaning comes into being.”319 Phenomenology, like art, began in wonder. 
The way in which Merleau-Ponty describes the perspectivist vision of Cézanne’s painting 
resonates with Jankélévitch’s construal of Debussy’s musical impressions. Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of vision and the “glance” finds a sure counterpart in, and thereby helps to explicate, 
Jankélévitch’s notion of “intuitive intervision”—the glimpse, rather than the gaze, of 
philosophical sight/insight.320 
What vision reveals, for Merleau-Ponty, is mystery—the object of philosophy that is not 
itself an object (that, in Jankélévitch’s terms, is almost an object). Vision alone, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, “makes us learn that beings that are different, ‘exterior,’ foreign to one another, 
are yet absolutely together, are ‘simultaneity.’”321 This is precisely what Debussy’s music does 
(what it envisions) in Jankélévitch’s view:  
There is an infinity of things that we do not know and that music alone can 
express because, not being held to opt, like logic, between incompossibles and 
impenetrable contradictories, it knows how to translate elusive presentiments and 
conduct side by side, thanks to polyphony, several lines of independent discourse; 
the event is by it prophesied in its most tenuous premonitory symptoms, in its 
most imperceptible signs. Beyond the jealous circumscription of places in space, 
here is the trans-discursive language of omni-presence, which is also universal co-
presence.322 
                                                 
319Ibid., 77–8.  
320Jankélévitch discusses entrevision (literally, “seeing between”) in Philosophie première. See, e.g., 71–6, 
115–20, 156–60, 164–8, 169–73, 235–8, 260–6.  
321Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in Basic Writings, ed. Thomas Baldwin (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 318. 
322Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 14: “Il y a une infinité de choses que nous ne savons pas et que la 
musique seule peut exprimer parce que, n’étant pas tenue d’opter, comme la logique, entre les incompossibles et les 
contradictoires impénétrables, elle sait traduire les pressentiments évasifs et conduire de front, grâce à la polyphonie, 
plusieurs lignes de discours indépendantes; l’événement est par elle prophétisé en ses prodromes les plus ténus, en 
ses signes les plus imperceptiblement précurseurs. Par delà la jalouse circonscription des lieux dans l’espace, voici 
le langage transdiscursif de l’omniprésence, qui est aussi bien universelle co-présence.” 
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For Jankélévitch, Debussy composed in a musical language that was “coextensive with the 
universal and innumerable simultaneity of existence.”323  
Visual perspectivism, for Merleau-Ponty, constituted a “kind of world in between,” an 
“inter-relationality,” a “continuity of ourselves, others, and the natural world,” according to 
Wendelin Küpers.324 I argue that Jankélévitch grounded what can be called a theory of aural 
perspectivism in an experience of Debussy’s music. As Jankélévitch perceived the musical world 
that Debussy created, a multiplicity of simultaneous perspectives emerged and compelled him to 
move beyond himself, into the world of things, places, other people, and other times. 
4.3.2 Grammatic Mysteries 
The previous chapter dealt with pneumatic mysteries—mysteries of psychism, or inner life. This 
chapter mainly considers grammatic mystery, or the mystery of the landscape. The “language” of 
the landscape, according to Jankélévitch, is neither propositional nor representational. Rather 
than “allegorical and pneumatic,” it is “tautegorical, grammatic, and somatic.”325 Its voice is that 
of the “ambient mystery in which things bathe.”326 
In its literal sense, gramma (“letter”) denotes written language. Within Debussy et 
mystère, Jankélévitch uses the term grammatic in two different ways. The first is that of 
linguistic symbol, which becomes a problem when it functions as an overly concrete inscription 
of the pneumatic. This form of the grammatic tries to make the illegible fully legible, a process 
                                                 
323Ibid. Jankélévitch is speaking specifically of Pelléas et Mélisande here, but what he says reflects his 
understanding of Debussy’s music in general. 
324Wendelin Küpers, “Between the Visible and the Invisible in Organizations,” in The Routledge 
Companion to Visual Organization, ed. Emma Bell, Samantha Warren, and Jonathan Schroeder (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 25. 
325Ibid., 31.  
326Ibid.  
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much like, for example, netting a “butterfly in an iron mesh,” in Abbate’s apt expression.327 The 
second refers to the iron mesh itself. The material world of concrete objects embodies a form of 
the grammatic that Jankélévitch embraces (i.e., he embraces the literalness of the sensible forms 
of natural phenomena). 
Matter is mysterious, and the language that it “speaks” is no human language. When 
Debussy’s music speaks the language of things, it does so mysteriously. Jankélévitch initially 
insists that the “poetry of ontological mystery, in Debussy, is not a subjective reflection on this 
mystery: the music speaks directly, i.e., without symbolic mediation, the language of birds and 
springs.”328 Unlike the impressionist works of Gabriel Dupont, Debussy’s impressions of nature, 
for Jankélévitch, would appear to drive a wedge between the natural object and the human 
subject, separating gramma from pneuma. Unlike Dupont, it would seem that Debussy does not 
make the soul into a landscape, nor the landscape into a state of the soul. In his impressionism, 
Debussy somehow presents “inexhaustible nature” in “its most immediate form.”329  
Subsequently, however, Jankélévitch revises his earlier, hyperbolic formulation that 
Debussy’s music spoke directly the language of physical things. It in fact, he now claims, only 
speaks this language indirectly: “Even if it adheres closely to things and noises, Debussy's music 
is not going to identify with them.”330 Debussy avoids the “brutality and rawness of direct 
contact with their bitter harshness”: between the “sensible quality and the sensorium,” he admits 
the “modest ministry of art, a dampened art that sifts impressions and organizes sounds 
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330Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 74. 
107 
according to a certain measured order”—a “certain measured order” which generates neither a 
simple allegory of the human psyche nor a literal mimesis of nature itself.331  
Debussy, then, postulates a physics of the ontological mystery, but “there is no place in 
this physics—at the same time objectivist and unrealistic—for the servile onomatopoeia.”332 In 
Debussyan physics, “each noise, each sound, each breath is affected by an exhibitor (exposant) 
of transfiguration that sublimates it; so that the mystery of pure presence doubles as a mystery of 
unreality that we place poles apart from naturalistic imitation.”333 Transfiguring the grammatic 
manufactures that “muffled, approximate, infinite something which conditions like a halo or aura 
of mystery the most precisely drawn figures.”334 In Debussy’s music, “sensations are received 
indirectly or refracted through other sensations: ‘bells through the leaves,’ ‘reflections in the 
water,’ ‘imagery.’”335 Aesthetic transfiguration reveals Debussy’s musical art as an ecological 
medium.  
For Jankélévitch, “all the noises in Debussy are filtered through the leaves.”336 The 
leaves through which Debussy filters all noises are, of course, not real leaves, not the actual 
appendages of photosynthetic organisms. They are the figurative leaves of Debussy’s musical 
imagination. They are the lamina though which Debussy’s musical art mediates the sensible 
qualities of phenomenal reality. This lamina, this thin layer between the faculty of sensation and 
its objects, envelops an active process—the metamorphosis of a purely grammatic phenomenon 
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into an aesthetic experience. “Thanks to the interposed medium,” Jankélévitch states, “the close 
moves away without moving, and the present is absent sur place.”337 
The measured order of Debussy’s art produces something like an aesthetic hallucination 
of nature. In the impressionism of Debussy, the “truth of a blade of grass or a splash of water 
asserts itself to us in the most hallucinatory way of all,” Jankélévitch writes. “We live it, touch it, 
sense its presence,” for example, “in the miniscule black marks that race and shudder, like 
telegrams, over the staves of the Rondes de printemps.”338 In this musical hallucination of the 
natural landscape, we discover an impressionistic objectivity that is “discreetly evasive, idealist, 
and non-realist.”339 Thus the Debussyan landscape subtly engenders a “kind of spiritual state”—
a disembodied state that, paradoxically, supports a process of re-embodiment.340  
At the same time that it overtly excludes “all anthropomorphism, all reference to the 
subject,” Debussy’s music of ontological mystery unconsciously “humanizes nature.”341 There is 
everywhere an implied subject, but a subject that has been de-centered and exteriorized. In this 
dream of nature, subjectivity has become unhinged, destabilized. We are compelled to recognize 
ourselves in and as nature via the aesthetic mediation of Debussy’s impressions.  
How does Debussy accomplish this? Through what technologies does his aesthetic 
mediation operate? 
                                                 
337Ibid.  
338Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 36.  
339Ibid., 51.  
340Ibid.  
341Ibid., 37.  
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4.3.3 Technologies of Musical Ecomystery 
The remainder of this chapter constructs a comprehensive, yet critical taxonomy of the mysteries 
that Jankélévitch finds in the music of Debussy. Debussy et le mystère offers an analysis of the 
compositional techniques whereby Debussy forges a music that becomes other to itself, that 
becomes mysterious to itself.  
A consideration of Jankélévitch’s analysis of Debussy’s music in the second and third 
chapters of Debussy et le mystère yields a clear, but unarticulated thesis: The combination of 
horizontal immobility and vertical descent produces what is for Jankélévitch the pivotal motion 
of the Debussyan aesthetic—that of spiraling downwards. Stagnance, decadence, translucence, 
and instantaneity serve as the distinguishing features of Debussyan “mysteriology.”342 
4.3.3.1 Analyzing Mystery  In Debussy et le mystère, Jankélévitch analyzes the way in 
which philosophical mysteries and musical moments illuminate one another. In the preface, 
Jankélévitch’s adumbration of mystery proceeds primarily through a series of negative 
ascriptions, of designations of what the mystery is not. Jankélévitch’s apophatic technics 
culminate in the proposition that mysteries are not secrets. Yes, but what are they? The few 
positive formulations of mystery that do appear are only slightly more substantive than the 
negations: Mystery, Jankélévitch asserts, is a “climate of our fate and, literally, a sacrament,” an 
“insolubility” that “is made to be worshiped.”343  
Absent from these prefatory remarks, however, is most of what makes the book a 
compelling specimen of postwar French musicology. What is missing here, in other words, is 
precisely what permeates the majority of Jankélévitch’s text—namely, how music specifically 
                                                 
342Ibid., 31.  
343Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 11. 
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manifests mystery, how music invokes and reconnoiters the fate of humankind, how it actuates 
an apperception of the reality of the sacrosanct, of the palpable presence of an epistemic absence, 
of an acutely felt lack at the core of human knowledge. Also missing is any discussion of what a 
worship of insolubilities might consist, of what it would actually mean to employ the discursive 
methods of musicology and philosophy in order to answer music’s call to worship, in order to 
respond to the musical sacrament with a suitable expression of love, adoration, and devotion. 
A careful reading of Debussy et le mystère evinces that, for Jankélévitch, such an act of 
scholarly reverence still operates by means of an essentially analytical and critical procedure. 
There is, in Debussy et le mystère, no question of the compatibility of analysis and music, no 
question of the necessity of analytic intervention in order to reach the deepest levels of musical 
experience. There is only the question of what kind of articulation, of the form of analysis that 
will bring the listener as close as possible to the otherness of music without pretending to 
completely overcome this otherness, without mistaking the metaphor for the thing itself.344  
In Debussy et le mystère, Jankélévitch’s varied employment of the concept of mystery 
divulges its multiformity. The term “mystery” sometimes appears without qualification (as in, for 
example, “Debussy senses mystery even there where there is no mystery”).345 More frequently, 
Jankélévitch ascribes the notion of mystery to a variety of topics, from the “mystery of fate” to 
“the mystery of a beauty that is indifferent and already supernatural simply by its presence.”346 
In a few cases, he uses qualifiers to refer to specific types of mysteries (e.g., “the occult mystery 
                                                 
344In “Mystères limpides: Time and Transformation in Debussy’s Des pas sur la neige,” Steven Rings 
demonstrates the compatibility of music analysis and the conceptual paradox of translucent mystery, but he does not 
examine the form of analysis that Jankélévitch himself practices in Debussy et le mystère. Rings, “Mystères 
limpides,” 19th-Century Music 32, no. 2 (2008): 178–208. 
345Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 13. 
346Ibid., 13, 150. 
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and the limpid mystery” or “aquatic mysteries”).347 He also habitually puts into service the 
adjectival form of mystery—“mysterious things,” “the mysterious in the commonplace,” “the 
dying and mysterious vibrations of harmony”—and, less frequently, the adverbial form (e.g., “a 
bugle sounds mysteriously”).348 Finally, he enlists or generates compound words based on the 
term mystère, such as mystèriologie (“mysteriology”) and mystériophanie (“mysteriophany”).349 
Appendix A (pages 205–7) contains a complete list of the types of mystery in the text (with 
references to page numbers). 
For Jankélévitch, a sense of wonderment before the mystery of existence constitutes a 
uniquely human quality. Every facet of human reality contains a trace of mystery, and it is the 
challenge of metaphysics, Jankélévitch contends, to discern the mysterious in the least 
mysterious of places, in the mundane, the familiar, the everyday.350 What would seem to be 
completely devoid of mystery would be, for Jankélévitch, the ideal place for the metaphysician 
to seek out signs of the mysterious. Translucent mystery, that specifically Debussyan mystery 
which Jankélévitch elsewhere describes as the mystery “in full light,” the mystery of “clearness,” 
thus offers an apposite setting for mysteriological investigation.351  
Debussy et le mystère’s distillation of the translucent mystery constitutes a form of 
philosophical analysis. The breaking down of mystery into its essential elements and the 
correlation of these elements with musical gestures becomes a form of musical analysis from the 
moment Jankélévitch addresses the technical, stylistic means by which Debussy’s music 
implements its concretely mysterious effects. Though not always present, these means generally 
                                                 
347Ibid., 13, 54.  
348Ibid., 11, 13, 105, 122. 
349Ibid., 11, 32, 146. 
350Jankélévitch, Philosophie Première, 252–3.  
351Jankélévitch, “Vladimir Jankélévitch: la vie (Entretiens),” 83. 
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saturate Debussy et le mystère. Jankélévitch frequently refers to the structural inventions and 
characteristic gestures of Debussy’s musical style.  
In each chapter of his study, Jankélévitch approaches Debussy’s musical constructions of 
mystery from a different angle. The first chapter charts the interior world of human beings, the 
mystery of souls, the mystery of Psyche; the second surveys the exterior environment, the 
ambient mystery, the mystery of Physis. In these chapters, Jankélévitch moves from general 
philosophical concepts to particular musical examples. In the third chapter, he reverses his 
procedure, starting from a series of musical techniques (e.g., repeated notes, juxtaposed triads, 
juxtaposed sevenths and ninths) and traveling outward to abstract ideas (e.g., vertigo, sporadism, 
suddenty). 
Rather than performing a microanalysis of a single piece, Jankélévitch undertakes a 
macroanalysis of compositional techniques across an aggregate of Debussy’s works. 
Jankélévitch cites 118 individual works and movements from larger works, and he refers to 
many of them more than once. Appendix B (pages 208–11) lists these works (in the order in 
which they occur in the text) along with the total number of references. The second and third 
chapters of Debussy et le mystère contain the bulk of the analysis as well as the majority of 
Jankélévitch’s hand-written music examples (twenty-seven of the thirty examples). Appendix 
Three contains a complete list of music examples. The following consideration of the nature of 
music analysis in Debussy et le mystère thus primarily focuses on Chapter Two (“The Mystery of 
Midday”) and Chapter Three (“The Girl With the Flaxen Hair”). 
Jankélévitch employs three main types of assertions in his phenomenology of Debussy 
and mystery. First, he makes general statements about the nature of Debussy’s music without 
reference to specific works. Three examples are quoted below: 
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1. “Each Debussyan ‘image’ is like an instantaneous and static view of the ‘total 
presence’; each immobilizes, so to speak, one minute of the universal life of 
things, a slice of world history, and sets this vertical cut into its aeternum Nunc, 
beyond all becoming, unrelated to the before and after.”352 
 
2. “Debussy, like Verlaine and like Proust, does not know in fact of memory 
anything other than the instantaneous déjà vu, which is the glare of a millionth of 
a second; passeism [nostalgia for the past] tapers to presentism; where there had 
been a recapitulation of becoming, there is no more than the recognition of a 
sensible quality and the pulverization of punctual singularities.”353 
 
3. “Debussy is the poet of the dead water, the one where Narcissus contemplated his 
own image; he watches the reflections in the water, the puddles of golden brown 
light sleeping on the ponds and, like Tristan Lhermite, ‘the dreams of water lying 
dormant.’”354 
 
Second, Jankélévitch often denotes the significance of particular pieces without reference 
to compositional means. Examples include:  
1. “As Pelléas expresses the mystery of souls, the twenty-four Préludes, the Images 
for piano and the Images for orchestra, the Nocturnes for orchestra, the Estampes 
express the ambient mystery in which things bathe.”355 
 
2. “The Préludes are the language of the ontological mystery, which is a mystery of 
gratuitousness, that is to say, of co-presence, of multi-presence and omni-
presence.”356 
 
3. “Certainly midday is the hour of the rise of the subterranean, as this is the hour 
when, in the glowing illumination of its peroration, that first part of the Mer 
which recounts the eternal cosmogonic matinee of the ocean and the triumphal 
                                                 
352Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 32: “Chaque ‘image’ debussyste est comme une vue instantanée et 
statique sur la ‘présence totale’; chacune immobilise pour ainsi dire une minute de la vie universelle des choses, une 
tranche de l’histoire du monde, et elle fixe cette coupe verticale en son aeternum Nunc, c’est-à-dire hors de tout 
devenir, sans relation à l’après.” La présence totale is the title of a 1934 work of philosophy by Louis Lavelle. 
353Ibid., 33: “Debussy, comme Verlaine et comme Proust, ne connaît en fait de souvenir que le déjà-vu 
instantané, qui est éblouissement d’un millionième de seconde; le passéisme s’effile en présentisme; où il y avait 
récapitulation du devenir, il n’y a plus que la reconnaissance d’une qualité sensible et la pulvérisation des 
singularités ponctuelles.” 
354Ibid., 47–8: “Debussy, lui, fut le poète de l’eau morte, celle où Narcisse contemple son image; il guette 
les ‘reflets dans l’eau,’ les flaques de lumières mordorée qui dorment sur les mares et, comme Tristan Lhermite, ‘les 
songes de l’eau qui sommeille.’” 
355Ibid., 31: “Comme Pelléas exprime le mystère des âmes, les vingt-quatre Préludes, les Images pour 
piano et les Images d’orchestre, les Nocturnes d’orchestre, les Estampes expriment le mystère ambiant où baignent 
les choses.” 
356Ibid., 32: “Les Préludes sont le langage du mystère ontologique, lequel est un mystère de gratuitè, c’est-
à-dire de coprésence, de multiprésence et d’omniprésence.” 
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ascent of the chariot of light culminates; the angelus of midday, sensing the 
verdure, the wisteria, and the wetted roses, welcomes Pelléas at the end of the 
subterranean depths like the song of midday greets the sun, having finally 
emerged from the underwater depths.”357 
 
Third, Jankélévitch ties philosophical ideas directly to specific musical details, for 
example: 
1. “There is no end to describing the thousand ways that the Debussyan arabesque 
has of descending, as saint Sébastien says, ‘to the black doors.’ Sometimes the 
line swoops down from the heights onto the tonic like a sparrow hawk... Listen, at 
the beginning of the Faune from the Fêtes galantes, to the swift line of the flute 
that, plunging from the treble, serves as a prelude to the rhythmic obsession of the 
spell. In Syrinx, for solo flute, the ravishing melody hovers, twirls, rolls up its 
capricious triplets, then dives nose-down from the apices of the air as if to capture 
some prey below.”358 
 
2. “In the Suite Pour le piano, the motif of the Prélude, after an immense collapse, is 
stripped of all melodic inflection and reduced to its basic rhythmic pattern, i.e., to 
its backbone. For just as chromaticism is the decomposition of the melos (mélos) 
and, to the letter, the deliquescent arabesque, so pointillism is melos entirely 
decomposed and already mechanized, the arabesque after its return to materiality 
and molecular homogeneity: automatism seizes notes that have been vacated of 
all intentional signification; of the expressive and graceful arabesque there 
remains only a powder and a string of inert atoms in which the iterative staccato 
has taken the place of mobility. Here is thus where the melodic catabasis wants to 
come; here is the absolute, lethal, undifferentiated depth to which all elements 
return after a disintegration that standardizes them.”359 
                                                 
357Ibid., 81–2: “Certes midi est l’heure de la remontée des souterrains, comme c’est l’heure où culmine, 
dans l’éclairage éclatant de sa péroraison, cette première partie de la Mer qui raconte l’éternelle matinée 
cosmogonique de l’océan et l’ascension triomphale du char de lumière; l’angelus de midi, sentant la verdure, les 
glycines et les roses mouillées, accueille Pelléas au sortir des profondeurs souterraines comme le cantique de midi 
salue le soleil enfin dégagé des profondeurs sous-marines.” 
358Ibid., 91: “On n’en finirait pas de décrire les mille façons qu’a l’arabesque debussyste de descendre, 
comme dit saint Sébastien, “vers les noires portes.” Parfois le trait fond des hauteurs sur la tonique comme un 
épervier… Écoutez, au commencement du Faune des Fêtes galantes, le véloce trait de flûte qui, plongeant de l’aigu, 
prélude à l’obsession rythmique du sortilège. Dans Syrinx, pour flûte seule, la cantilène ravisseuse plane, tournoie, 
enroule ses fantasques triolets, puis fond en piqué du haut des airs comme pour capturer une proie.” 
359Ibid., 101–2: “Dans la Suite Pour le piano le motif du Prélude, au terme d’un vaste écroulement, reparaît 
indifférencié, dépouillé de toute inflexion mélodique et réduit à sa formule rythmique élémentaire, c’est-à-dire à son 
squelette. Car comme le chromatisme est la décomposition du mélos et, à la lettre, l’arabesque déliquescente, ainsi le 
‘pointillisme,’ c’est le mélos tout décomposé, déjà mécanisé, l’arabesque après son retour à la matérialité et à 
l’homogénéite moléculaire: l’automatisme s’empare des notes que toute signification intentionnelle à quittées; de 
l’expressive et gracieuse arabesque il ne reste plus qu’une poudre d’arabesque et un chapelet d’atomes inertes 
auxquels le staccato itératif tient lieu de mobilité. Voilà donc où voulait en venir la catabase mélodique; voilà la 
profondeur absolue, létale, indifférenciée à laquelle tous les éléments font retour au terme d’une désintégration qui 
les uniformise.” 
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3. “Infallible magician, Debussy has minutely calculated the relations of the 
tonalities, affinities, and attractions that are established between these multiple 
universes: the juxtaposition of C major and F sharp (or G flat) at the end of the 
second part of saint Sébastien and in the third act of Pelléas exude an 
incomparable majesty and grandeur; when Pelléas tells Mélisande: “I no longer 
see the sky through your hair,” Debussy sets the barest key against the richest, the 
blank austerity of C major against the sumptuousness of F sharp major, the 
minimum against the maximum. Ce qu'a vu le vent d'ouest juxtaposes rising and 
falling chords in two sumptuous palettes: F♯–E♭–A and C–G♯–D.”360 
 
This last type of proposition constitutes, in tandem with the notated music examples, the 
most concrete layer of Jankélévitch’s music analysis.361 
Behind the richly variegated renditions of Debussy’s soundscapes in the second and third 
chapters of Debussy et le mystère lies an integral juxtaposition of two apparently antipodal 
metaphors of movement. On the one hand, the second chapter adduces the immobility of 
Debussy’s compositions, their inability or their refusal to progress or regress. Instead of moving 
forward or backward in linear fashion from one place to the next, they simply spin in place, fixed 
to a spot, whirling around and around, endlessly moving but never going anywhere. The third 
chapter, on the other hand, returns again and again to the ubiquity of the “Debussyan 
Arabesque,” to the pervasive presence of a fundamental descent within Debussyan immobility, to 
the innumerable ways in which the works of Debussy, despite their horizontal suspendedness, 
assume a downward trajectory. 
                                                 
360Ibid., 107: “Magicien infaillible, Debussy a minutieusement calculé les rapports de tonalités, affinités, 
attractions qui s’établissent entre ces multiples univers: la juxtaposition de do majeur et de fa dièse (ou sol bémol) à 
la fin de la deuxième partie de saint Sébastien, ainsi qu’au troisième acte de Pelléas, dégage une impression de 
majesté et de grandiose incomparable; lorsque Pélleas dit à Mélisande: “Je ne vois plus le ciel à travers tes 
cheveux,” Debussy confronte ainsi le ton le plus nu et le plus riche, la blanche austérité de do et la somptuosité de fa 
dièse majeur, le minimum et le maximum. Ce qu’a vu le vent d’ouest juxtapose des accords montants et descendants 
en deux palettes somptueuses: fa♯–mi♭–la and do–sol♯–ré.” 
361Where he does not cite concrete musical detail in the body of the text, Jankélévitch sometimes provides 
such detail in a footnote and often as a series of details from a variety of pieces. In fact, the majority of the footnotes 
in Debussy et le mystère are references of this kind.  
116 
4.3.3.2 Debussyan Horizontality For Jankélévitch, the static, the stagnant, and the stationary 
served as essential elements of a Debussyan aesthetics. The stagnancy of Debussy’s music arose 
from its abnegation of temporal becoming and from its suppression of nostalgic impulses. 
Debussy’s radicalism resided in his effort to efface from his musical creations all signs of 
development and recapitulation. At the core of Jankélévitch’s reading was the notion that 
Debussy attempted to produce atemporality within an essentially temporal art form. Debussy’s 
music aimed to arrest the continuous flow of time, to dwell outside of the passage of time, in the 
eternal “stillness of the present.”362  
Memory and the past, Jankélévitch argued, entered infrequently and unbidden, but, when 
they did, they embodied the spontaneous and spasmodic quality of Debussy’s music: “Even the 
past,” Jankélévitch wrote, “comes back in Debussy with lightning, not as a fanned-out reverie, as 
in that romantic melancholy which is only complacent rumination and harping regret, but 
through brusque flushes and sudden fulgurations.”363 The frozen landscapes of Debussy’s 
musical “poems of stagnancy” permitted memories of the past only in the form of an 
“instantaneous déjà vu,” only as a kind of isolated sonorous snippet, ripped from the context of 
narrative remembrance, dislodged from the framework of temporal continuity, from the stable 
setting of “intensive duration.”364 
When Merleau-Ponty described Cézanne’s paintings, he drew attention to the nexus of 
their depth and their instability. In some of Cézanne’s work, it seemed that “things began to 
move, color against color,” Merleau-Ponty wrote.365 Through the visual medium of painting, 
                                                 
362Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 33.  
363Ibid.  
364Ibid. 
365Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” 311. 
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Cézanne portrayed a kind of spatialized time, a “vertical time” the experience of which led 
Merleau-Ponty to perceive a depth within the unfolding of time.  
He came to understand time as chiasmatic rather than purely linear. Turning away from a 
conception of temporality as progressive, synthetic, and cohesive, Merleau-Ponty set his sights 
on a time “without fictitious ‘support’ in the psyche,” a time which was, in the words of Glen A. 
Mazis, “lodged within the world in its savage or brute being.”366 Certain depths, “held within 
landscapes,” caused the perceiver’s time to “burst, to reverse, to be released” into the world of 
things.367 
Like Levinas, Jankélévitch, Brelet, and others, Merleau-Ponty had aimed to improve 
upon Bergson’s philosophy of time. For Merleau-Ponty, the internal structure of time itself was 
often disunitary and multi-directional. Temporality sometimes functioned according to what he 
termed the “barbaric principle.”368 There were moments, Merleau-Ponty claimed, in which past 
and present would “flash forth in transformative bursts,” leaping from one into the other, 
disrupting the continuity of Bergsonian duration.369 In such moments, the horizontal flow of time 
was disrupted; it seemed to stand still, even to move in reverse. In such moments, time became 
vertical; in such moments, what Merleau-Ponty called the “Memory of the World” enveloped 
bodily perception and exposed it to the depths of worldly time.370 
A kind of deep time irrupted, for Jankélévitch, in Debussy’s music as well. The “stubborn 
past,” Jankélévitch claimed, tears delicately through the fabric of Debussy’s music as an 
                                                 
366Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968), 267; Glen A. Mazis, “Merleau-Ponty and the ‘Backward Flow’ of Time: The 
Reversibility of Temporality and the Temporality of Reversibility,” in Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics, and 
Postmodernism, ed. Thomas W. Busch and Shaun Gallagher (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
58. 
367Mazis, 58.  
368Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 267.  
369Mazis, 59.  
370Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 70; Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 194.  
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expression of “obsession rather than memory.”371 Figures of obsession—of fixed ideas, of 
assiduously maintained and unchanging thoughts—became one of the key devices whereby 
Debussy articulated musical stagnancy (i.e., the inability to go forward musically). Jankélévitch 
quoted examples of obsessive gestures in Lindaraja and Nuages.372  
The past as obsession arrived in Lindaraja in the form of a “dissonant pedal C♯,” an 
“unliquidated, undigested, unabsorbed idée fixe” which survived “from the key surpassed by F♯ 
major” and lingered “almost until the end.”373 The uncontrollable persistence of a tone as a 
symptom of musical preoccupation also transpired in Nuages, where, “two measures from the 
tonic final B, an F-natural still lingered,” feigning the initiation of a modulation to the key of C 
(figure 4.1).374 The tendency for specific pitches to linger after the supplantation of the harmonic 
contexts in which they first appeared and in which they had functioned logically displayed, for 
Jankélévitch, the persistence of an element from the past that constituted a musical representation 
of an obsessive quality. 
 
 
                                                 
371Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 34. 
372A piece for two pianos composed in 1901, Lindaraja was not published until 1926, eight years after the 
composer’s death.  
373Ibid. 
374Ibid. 
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Figure 6. Debussy, Nuages (Nocturnes, n° 1), mm. 98–102 (transcription for 2 pianos by Maurice Ravel) 
 
 
Other techniques also signaled the presence of torpidity in Debussy’s music. Table 3.1 
collates the examples of musical stagnancy that Jankélévitch provides in the first section of his 
second chapter. 
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Table 1. Types and Techniques of Stagnance in Debussy’s Music 
 
Pieces by Debussy Types of Stagnance Musical Techniques 
Colloque sentimental “flagrant reminiscence” ____ 
“the soft, the autumnal, the 
withered that is outside of time” 
“loose rhythms” 
the Prélude Pas sur la neige 
and 
the first Ballade de Villon 
“icy landscape” 
“poems of stagnancy” 
“nothing matures, nothing 
becomes” 
____ 
Lindaraja “the stubborn past persists and 
clings...[as] obsession rather than 
memory” 
[fixation] 
“a dissonant pedal C#, surviving from the 
tone surpassed by F sharp major lingers 
almost until the end” 
Nuages [fixation] “at two measures from the tonic final B, an 
F♮ still lounges...and feigns initiating a 
modulation in C” 
Fêtes “disarray, dawdling, and general 
lassitude” 
[fixation] 
“at the end...the rhythms unravel 
themselves: ¾ and 2/4 alternate” 
Sirènes “disaggregation” 
[steadiness] 
[fixation] 
“the final pianissimo” 
Canope “indolence...excluding any 
progress, floats...without basis” 
[fixation] 
_____ 
Brouillards 
and 
Feuilles mortes 
“that kingdom of autumn...where 
the swift come to leave behind all 
nervousness” 
“cottony” rhythms 
La Mer 
and 
Parfums de la nuit 
_____ “trailing quarter-note triplets” 
the first movement of the 
Sonate de violon, 
the Interlude from the Sonate 
pour flûte, alto et harpe, 
and La neige danse 
“something hypnotic that invites 
sleep” 
“repeated notes” 
Le son du cor s’afflige “dolence and languor” _____ 
“Golaud pleading in the fifth 
act” of Pelléas, 
the Hindu chant of Boîte à 
joujoux, 
the first Ballade de Villon, 
La Grotte,  
and Des pas sur la neige 
_____ “trailing rhythms” 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
En sourdine, Faune, Puerta 
del Vino, Colloque, Lindaraja, 
Soirée dans Grenade, Iberia 
(Second Part, Les parfums de 
la nuit in 36–8. the B♭ pedal at 
the beginning of Rondes de 
printemps. Prélude of the Suite 
Pour le piano, p. 1–3 and 7–
8.) 
_____ “the immobile axis of the pedals” 
(Iberia I, in 19–20, 22–3; II. 
Soirée dans Grenade (B♯ 
rubbing against a pedal of C♯). 
Lindaraja. Rhapsodie pour 
saxophone et orchestre, in 4–7 
and 11–2. Puerta del Vino) 
“rhythmic viscosity, indolent 
friction, and relaxed 
approximations of ‘three for two’” 
“the formulas of the habanera rhythm” 
Vent dans la plaine 
and 
the Epigraph Pour remercier 
la pluie au matin 
“obsession” “Ostinato” 
Voiles 
and 
Isle joyeuse 
“discontinuity” “the hexaphonic scale” 
“rarefied notes” 
“spacing of...degrees” 
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Besides obsession (i.e., the inability to move away from a persistent idea, image, musical 
gesture) and indolence (i.e., the disinclination to alter a currently existing state of motion or to 
direct that motion toward a particular end), the guises of the immobile in Debussy included the 
dormant, the instantaneous, the interrupted, the languorous, the hypnotic, the soporific, the 
kinematic, the gyratory, the vertiginous, the voluble, the rhapsodic, the variational, the 
decorative, the atmospheric, the modest, the prefatory, the throttled, the dolorous, the 
discontinuous, the disjointed, and the decadent, among many others.  
Appearing in a variety of conceptual manifestations, then, the central theme of 
Debussyan immobility mediated most of the interaction between philosophical thought and 
musical art in the second chapter of Debussy et le mystère. The table below contains a summary 
of the musical techniques that Jankélévitch associates with the “vain loopings of Debussyan 
immobility” in the second chapter of his book.375 
 
 
Table 2. Musical Techniques of Debussyan Immobility (Debussy et le mystère, Ch. 2) 
 
“cottony” rhythms repetition foreign notes juxtaposed tonalities 
“loose” rhythms compound rhythms foreign chords pauses 
“drawling” triplets thematic variation added sixths alternating meters 
repeated notes descending arpeggios “erratic notes”376 melismas 
pedals trills tonal relations “aimless” quintuplets 
ostinatos glissandos parallel ninths “swirling” arpeggios 
habanera rhythms “quasi corni” parallel sevenths augmentation 
hexaphonic scale spacing of parts dissonance diminution 
 
                                                 
375Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 40.  
376By “erratic,” Jankélévitch implies both that such notes deviate from the expected course of musical 
events (e.g., that they are outside the key or mode) and that they wander, seeming to come out of nowhere and then 
vanish, apparently returning whence they came and thus leading nowhere as well. Jankélévitch also refers to such 
notes as “aberrant” and as “escapees from the scale.” Debussy et le mystère, 68. 
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Certain techniques received more empirical justification than others. The second 
chapter’s ten notated musical examples furnish the strongest evidentiary basis. All but two serve 
to compare two or more reduced fragments of music.377 All but two feature the music of 
Debussy.378 
 
 
Table 3. Correlations of Music and Philosophy (Debussy et le mystère, Ch. 2) 
 
Example Musical Techniques Philosophical Concepts 
2 distant marches interruption and discontinuity 
3 
the spell of the Siren song (three ninths of the 
parallel dominant and the triplet that connects 
them) 
voluptuousness, lassitude, enchantment, 
mesmerism 
4 
oscillation between minor and major second, 
quarter-note triplets, drawling and repeated notes, 
chromatic descent 
exaltation, sublime violence, 
voluptuousness, anguish, indolence, 
panic, vertigo 
5 softly fading final chords space, distance, fatigue, lassitude, somnolence 
6 “quasi corni” sonorities space and distance 
7 pitches “very remote from the principal key” space and distance 
8 “très lointain” space and distance 
9 added sixths space, distance, independence, and coexistence 
10 abrupt gestures: “erratic notes”
379 and “luminous 
traits” space, distance, and light 
11 habanera rhythms and parallel sevenths fragmentation and objectivity 
 
 
 
Space and distance secured the greatest number of the second chapter’s notated music 
examples (n°s 5–10). As the subject of the chapter’s sixth section, they also engendered a wealth 
of impressionistic textual references: while some further illustrated the techniques introduced in 
the notated examples (i.e., softly fading final chords, “quasi corni” sonorities, pitches “very 
                                                 
377All but n° 4, which contains a single melodic passage from Dialogue du vent et de la mer, and n° 8, 
which presents an excerpt from Isaac Albéniz’s Fête-Dieu à Seville). 
378All but n° 7, which compares three pieces of Albéniz, and n° 8, above.  
379See the previous note. 
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remote from the principal key,” “très lointain,” added sixths, and abrupt gestures), the rest 
exemplified two additional methods of generating musical impressions of space and distance—
the extreme differentiation of register between parts and the protrusion of natural accidentals in 
flat and sharp keys. 
Conventionally the province of the visual arts, space and distance were made to enter, in 
Debussy’s compositions, the essentially temporal medium of music. Creating an “effect of 
distance,” Jankélévitch wrote, was the “great magical specialty” of Debussy’s art: 
No music in the world, except perhaps that of the two great national geniuses of 
Europe, Mussorgsky and Albéniz, has given us a comparable impression of 
immensity, of space, and of the open air. It is the principle of perspective and of 
cosmic ubiquity that thus distributes creatures, meteors, and minerals in the 
simultaneity of their coexistence.380 
 
With purely temporal means, Debussy produced an illusion of spatial distribution. Debussyan 
distance thus referred to the amount of virtual space between simultaneously coexisting musical 
entities, between musical events that occurred at the same time, but in different places. For 
Jankélévitch, the proliferation of spatializing and distancing effects in Debussy’s music reflected 
the workings of an aesthetic that aimed to produce, within and through itself, what it was not—to 
encompass and to become that which was other than itself. Techniques for producing 
impressions of space and distance in music facilitated Debussy’s departure from the temporal 
continuity and sequential development of traditional conceptions of musical form. Such 
techniques also played an important role in Debussy’s creation of a music of “stasis, presentism, 
instantaneity on the one hand, objectivism on the other.”381  
                                                 
380Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 60: “Aucune musique au monde, sauf peut-être celle des deux plus 
grands génies nationaux de l’Europe délivré, Moussorgski et Albeniz, ne nous donne une impression comparable 
d’immensité, d’espace et de plein air. C’est le principe de la perspective et de l’ubiquité cosmique qui distribue ainsi 
créatures, météores et minéraux dans la simultanéité de leur coexistence.” 
381Ibid., 32. 
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As well as the “quasi corni” sonorities from the étude Pour les sonorités opposées and 
“De rêve” (Proses lyriques, n° 1) portrayed in music example n° 6 from Debussy et le mystère, 
Jankélévitch described the “distant Marseillaise” that arrived “in the last Prélude from the edge 
of the horizon, together with the dowsing of the final rocket” (figure 3.2); the “distant ringing of 
trumpets” in Khamma that “carries to the temple an echo of the siege that has put the city at 
stake” (figure 3.3); the “military bugle” that “sweetly sounds in the distance in Boîte à joujoux, a 
poetic and mysterious curfew” (figure 3.4) and in the third tableau the shepherd who “plays the 
chalumeau in the distance...” (figure 3.5); and the “nostalgic call that rings out from the horns in 
the interlude that precedes the last scene from Act III” of Pelléas et Mélisande (figure 3.6).  
Like the “almost horns” in the examples above, several other musical devices 
corroborated the exhibition of space and distance. The wide “spacing of the parts,” for example, 
manufactured a similar “impression of immensity.”382 Jankélévitch cited the expansive melodic 
range of several works: “the pianissimo of Brouillards, the Terrasse des audiences, and the étude 
Pour les sonorités opposées all occupy the extended keyboard” and “Nuages utilizes the scale in 
all its fullness.”383 Another citation combined the spacing of parts with the dissonance and 
“immobile axis of the pedals”: at the end of the Hommage à Haydn, the “theme in G major floats 
vertiginously high in the treble over a gently dissonant pedal C♯.”384 
                                                 
382Ibid., 63.  
383Ibid.  
384Ibid., 63–4.  
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Figure 7. Debussy, Feux d’artifice (Préludes II, n° 12), mm. 93–101 
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Figure 8. Debussy, Khamma, mm. 7–8 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Debussy, Boîte à joujoux, Prélude, mm. 39–54 (piano score) 
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Figure 10. Debussy, Boîte à joujoux, 3e Tableau, mm. 27–36 (piano score) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Debussy, Pelléas et Mélisande, Act III, scene iii, mm. 77–87 (vocal score) 
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Jankélévitch also stated that “nothing exudes the mysterious suggestion of distance like 
those brusque refulgences that, for several seconds, disclose a pitch very remote from the 
principal key.”385 Here he located an “Albénizian” streak in Debussy. In musical examples 7 and 
8, Jankélévitch introduced several excerpts by the Spanish composer Isaac Albéniz in order to 
illustrate the “Albénizian” predilection for “brusque refulgences,” for sudden, unanticipated, and 
brief disclosures of remote pitch material.  
The category of the “brusque refulgence” subsumed the remaining techniques of space 
and distance: the close temporal proximity of “chords issuing from very distant keys” in Feuilles 
mortes, the étude Pour les degrés chromatiques, the interlude between the first two scenes of Act 
III of Pelléas, and the Sonate pour flûte, alto et harpe; the luminous vibration of “added sixths” 
in “De soir,” “La flûte de Pan” (Chansons de Bilitis, no. 1), and Lindaraja (depicted in music 
example n° 9); the “erratic” or “aberrant” notes at the ends of “De grève” and “Chevaux de bois,” 
in the fourth act of Pelléas, from “one end to the other” of Cloches à travers les feuilles, at the 
“outskirts of the final coda” in Gigues, and in The snow is dancing, the étude Pour les 
agréments, Fêtes, “De soir,” the Sonate pour flûte, alto et harpe, Canope, Jeux de vagues; the 
“luminous traits” of Feux d’artifice, the études Pour les arpèges composés and Pour les degrés 
chromatiques, Cloches à travers les feuilles, Poissons d’or, Damoiselle élue, Éventail and Placet 
futile from the Poèmes de Mallarmé, Ondine, Voiles, and Boîte à joujoux.386 
Some of Jankélévitch’s descriptions of Debussyan distance appear to contradict earlier 
postulations about the music’s fundamental immobility. In “Debussyan space,” for instance, 
Jankélévitch alleged that sounds “approach one another, move away from one another, going 
                                                 
385Ibid., 64.  
386Ibid. 65–9. 
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from presence to absence before being definitively extinguished in the original silence.”387 The 
immobility of Debussy was not that of an absolute motionlessness; rather, it was that of a 
relative linear immobility, of a concerted diverting of the developmental tendency of musical 
temporality into a horizontally stationary whirlwind. This did not mean that it never moved upon 
the plane of linear progression, but that it exerted the better part of its energies in the effectuation 
of a different type of motion.  
If horizontally stagnant, Debussy’s music was by no means vertically immobile. As it fell 
from the height of a trajectory the upward path of which remained largely unsounded, it 
attempted, albeit never fully successfully, to prolong the instant between the attainment of its 
vertical apogee and its falling back toward the perigee. 
4.3.3.3 Debussyan Verticality  The third chapter of Debussy et le mystère inspected 
minutely this “falling back,” which, for Jankélévitch, constituted the most characteristic 
perpendicular orientation of Debussy’s compositions. The figure of the “descending arabesque” 
captured the Debussyan declination, a verticality of “disaggregation, fall, and catagenesis...to the 
letter, decadence.”388 A falling backwards from the light, a slow descent into darkness. A return 
to the earth. A “general heaviness makes all beings gravitate in parallel toward the underground 
and the dead water.”389  
Géotropisme was the word that Jankélévitch chose to anoint the inherent decay of 
Debussy’s music. In Debussy et le mystère, the largest number of musical devices and examples 
populated the prophecies of “The Girl with the Flaxen Hair,” a chapter devoted to chronicling the 
varieties of Debussyan decline that followed upon the zenith of the midday sun as it began to 
                                                 
387Ibid., 61. 
388Ibid., 89. 
389Ibid.  
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recede toward the horizon. The following table recounts those compositional techniques that, for 
Jankélévitch, betrayed a geotropic tendency. 
 
 
Table 4. Techniques of Geotropism (Debussy et le mystère, Ch. 3) 
 
“crumbling” 
arpeggios 
parallel chords pedals tremolos 
superimposed 
tonalities 
tonal relationships unresolved 
dissonances 
glissandos 
staccato juxtaposed sevenths and 
ninths 
sharp pitches and 
keys 
triplets 
melodic descent “processionary” consonances “aberrant” notes spacing of parts 
chromatic descent juxtaposed dissonances the major triad modulations 
harmonic “collapse” major seconds “gently sonorous” cadences 
repeated notes trills pianissimo parallel 
intervals 
juxtaposed triads bitonality “muted” contrary motion 
 
 
 
Of the thirty music examples in Debussy et le mystère, seventeen appear in the third 
chapter (the most in any single chapter). All feature exclusively excerpts from Debussy’s pieces, 
and all illustrate variations of downward mobility. All describe one or more of the “thousand 
ways that the Debussyan arabesque has of descending.”390 Taken together, they demonstrate the 
heterogeneity of geotropic declension in Debussy’s music. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
390Ibid., 90.  
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Table 5. Correlations of Music and Philosophy (Debussy et le mystère, Ch. 3) 
 
Example Musical Techniques Philosophical Concepts 
12 swift melodic descent of a solo flute geotropism 
13 curved contour, spacing of notes, rejoining of the keynote by movement of fourth and fifth 
persuasiveness, voluptuousness, 
languidness, grace, flexibility 
14 alteration of rate and depth of descent regret, despair, non-being 
15 “unstable” and “precarious” bass lines, parallel triads, “fleeting” dominant sevenths panic falling, permanent insecurity 
16 chromatic descent desperation, flight from existence, the attraction of the abyss 
17 parallel dominant chords, harmonic “collapse” dread, flight, fright, the panic of modesty 
18 chromaticism, “whirling” sixteenth-notes triplets modesty and softness 
19 chromaticism modesty and softness 
20 chromaticism modesty and softness 
21 delicate articulation, reduced harmonies, an incurvate phrase autumnality and etiolation 
22 juxtaposed triads, immense staccato chords continuous discontinuity 
23 contrary motion of triads immensity (unlimited vastitude) 
24 descending parallel sevenths infinite adventure, irreconcilable dissonance 
25 unresolved ninths stabilized dissonance 
26 juxtaposed ninths stabilized dissonance 
27 juxtaposed ninths stabilized dissonance 
28 juxtaposed ninths stabilized dissonance 
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Depictions of descending arabesques pervaded the text as well. Though example n° 12 
portrayed the “swift line of the flute...plunging from the treble” at the outset of Le faune from the 
second set of Fêtes galantes and the “ravishing melody” for solo flute that, in Syrinx, “hovers, 
reels, winds its capricious triplets, then melts away by diving from the heights of the air as if to 
capture some prey below,” the Debussyan arabesque more often fell, Jankélévitch averred, by 
“feuille morte, from an aerian and, so to speak, planar fall”: 
For the material, which is submitted in Debussy to the attraction of the depths, is 
not heavy body, but winged creature—fairy of vapor and mist like the “exquisite 
dancers” in the sixteenth Prélude, imponderable gnome like Shakespeare's Puck, 
satin shuddering like the Fan of Mallarme, sails on the water.391 
 
Several musical gestures typified the motion of the dead leaf as it floated through the air 
toward the ground below: the “floating and slow descent” of the “long line of thirty-second 
notes” that moved downwards “from one end of the keyboard to the other in the Terrasse des 
audiences”; the “light garland of sixteenth notes” that floated through the first scene of Act II of 
Pelléas and was “lowered in stages to the grave”; the “descending succession of ascending 
arpeggios” in “De rêve” that fell in a “gliding flight like that of seagulls”; the “calm and slow 
abatement of triplets” that, in Ondine, described “circles in the air to at last gently pose 
themselves to the surface of the water”; the “progressive touching down to the original key of 
D♭” at the end of La puerta del Vino; the “rapid arpeggios, crumbling from the heights,” 
deposited on the tonic F♯ at the end of Poissons d’or.392 
From repeated notes and juxtaposed triads, sevenths, and ninths to the major second and 
bitonality, the musical features that organized Jankélévitch’s analysis in the third chapter served 
to further demonstrate the “downward inclination” of that arabesque which, in Debussy’s music, 
                                                 
391Ibid., 91.  
392Ibid., 91–2. 
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“as soon born, tended to die.”393 The “verticality” of Debussyan harmony confirmed a 
renunciation of horizontal progression: Debussy’s “harmony of mystery,” that is, resulted not 
from “meditative or dialectical depth,” but from “mere co-presence” and from the “pure fact of 
being there.”394  
For Jankélévitch, Debussy’s compositional method relied “less on modulations than on 
the magical attraction of presences, on the radioactivity of chords, on harmonic resonances.”395 
The displacement, replacement, and alternation of Debussy’s harmonies consisted above all in 
the “contrails of triads juxtaposed without transition,” in their generation of “heterogeneous 
tonalities that act on each other at a distance, to attract each other across the void.”396 
Jankélévitch interpreted the phenomenality of Debussy’s “vertical style” in a number of 
examples.397 The juxtaposition of triads and other chords suffused Debussy’s creations. Example 
n° 22 of Debussy et le mystère rendered the “immense staccato chords” that “make the two 
pianos sob softly” in the second part of En blanc et noir.398 The text brimmed with further 
instances. In two cases—at the end of the second part of saint Sébastien as well as in the third act 
of Pelléas—Debussy apposed the “barest key with the richest, the blank austerity of C major 
with the sumptuousness of F♯ major, the minimum with the maximum.”399 Likewise, in Ce qu’a 
vu le vent d’ouest there was a concurrence of “rising and falling chords in two sumptuous 
palettes: F♯–E♭–A and C–G♯–D.”400 Juxtaposed vertical sonorities reverberated similarly in the 
third part of Iberia, at the beginning of the third act of Pelléas, at the end of Clair de lune from 
                                                 
393Ibid., 104.  
394Ibid. 
395Ibid., 105. 
396Ibid.  
397Ibid., 106.  
398Ibid., 108. 
399Ibid., 107. 
400Ibid. 
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Fêtes galantes, at the end of Prélude à l’après-midi d’un faune, in the “distant ringing of the 
horn that resounds in Feuilles mortes,” at the end of La soirée dans Grenade (Estampes, no. 2), 
and in Lindaraja and the Rhapsodie pour saxophone, where they were chanted to a habanera 
rhythm.401 
Additional examples of juxtaposition recalled themes of Debussyan immensity and 
immobility. When juxtaposed triads deviated “by contrary motion,” spreading “forth in opposite 
directions toward the two ends of the scale,” they created an impression of “unlimited vastitude”; 
in this regard, example n° 23 compared excerpts from II.i, II.ii, and IV.ii of Pelléas, the second 
movement of Pour le piano, and Gigues.402 When, on the contrary, juxtaposed chords fled “in 
parallel downwards either by collapsing or chromatic sliding,” they evoked—like those repeated 
notes into which the arabesque “decomposed” when it had “reached the absolute horizontal,” 
unable to go any lower—the “zero point,” the “zenith of the depth where all slope vanishes,” the 
“absolute Low.”403  
Regardless of the motion, however, juxtapositions of triads and of seventh and ninth 
chords reinforced the sporadisme of Debussy’s musical ideation; they concretized the 
dissociation of spatio-temporal progressionality that defined Debussy’s artistic project. 
Nonetheless, the “stubborn past” occasionally interpolated Debussy’s juxtaposed tonalities and 
their transmission of the instant and of suddenty.404 Usually in the form of a pedal, obsession 
encroached, vitiating the impact of “instantaneous transport” and offering in place of the 
continuity and development of modulation a monotonous prolongation of the same.405 
                                                 
401Ibid., 107–8.  
402Ibid., 109. 
403Ibid., 101. 
404Ibid., 110.  
405Ibid.  
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Traditional conceptions of consonance and dissonance became disfigured and 
reconfigured in Debussy’s musical schema of static decline. Debussyan dissonance, according to 
Jankélévitch, “far from being the path between two tonalities, leads to further dissonance.”406 
There in Debussy’s music 
where consonant chords succeed each other as a series of immobilities of the 
instantaneous “Nunc” or of static positions, dissonant chords in turn lose their 
vectorial finality in order to become ends-in-themselves; they cease to designate 
other chords of which their entire anagogic intention would be to resolve. We 
touch here upon the analogic correspondence between Debussyism and 
Impressionism, between acoustics and optics: just as Impressionism dissolves the 
Manichean polarity of shadow and light, which is that of positive and negative, 
recognizing only splashes of color, solar vibrations, and an innumerable variety of 
shades, likewise Debussyan chords form a parade of all equivalent atmospheres, 
all valid in their irreducible heterogeneity, all equally superficial or equally deep, 
according to the aspect in which they are considered.407 
 
Despite Debussy’s emancipation of dissonance, a reign of some sort of pandiatonic 
relativism or atonality did not ensue. Instead, Jankélévitch argued that in Debussy’s case “we 
should speak of an augmented hedonism” in which the composer has a taste for all the notes, 
loves them all with an “immeasurable dilection,” but in which his appetite for the “very sharp” 
produced a predilection for “rich, sharp tones.”408  
Debussyan harmony incited, for Jankélévitch, a perspectival turn. The exteriorizing thrust 
of “Debussyism” radically undermined the sovereignty of the isolated and exceptional ego. 
Merleau-Ponty had similarly located in Cézanne’s painting, as John Sallis has noted, not only a 
“depth of perspectivism,” but also an enigmatic “exteriority consisting in the envelopment and 
mutual dependence of things.”409 For both Jankélévitch and Merleau-Ponty, the de-centering 
                                                 
406Ibid., 111.  
407Ibid., 111–2. Emphasis added. 
408Ibid., 119. 
409John Sallis, Shades—Of Painting at the Limit (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 42. 
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operation of perspectivism served to attenuate egocentric behavior, flushing out the rational 
subject and driving it toward a position of ecocentrism. 
Just as Jankélévitch had done with respect to Debussy, Merleau-Ponty identified 
something that could be called drastic in the aesthetic designs of Cézanne. Merleau-Ponty found 
that in Cézanne’s paintings time deflagrated, bursting into flames, falling and rising ceaselessly 
like a phoenix from the ashes. Jankélévitch detected a similarly irruptive effect in the 
discontinuity and simultaneity of time in Debussy’s music. Debussyan ecology fabricated, within 
a temporal medium, the space between things, their coexistence and their codependence. 
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5.0  MYSTERIES OF THE DIALECTIC 
During the 1930s, the ideas of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger permeated intellectual activity in 
France. The success of German phenomenology’s French reception threatened to eclipse the 
reign of Henri Bergson’s philosophy, which had served in the early twentieth century as the most 
widely recognized and highly respected form of modernist French thought. The earliest French 
exponents of phenomenology called attention to the similarities between its fundamental claims 
and those of Bergson—both held that immediate experience yielded the most pertinent content 
for philosophical analysis, that intuition served as the faculty through which philosophy could 
gain access to such content, and that the elaboration of a new conception of time constituted 
philosophy’s most urgent task. By the 1940s, as philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty worked to develop original and distinctly French configurations of 
phenomenology, they increasingly emphasized their distance from Bergsonian ideas.  
As phenomenology became French, those who carried out the transformation reckoned 
with the charge that had loomed over every new form of philosophizing in France since 1900—
namely, that it was just another “warmed-over Bergsonism.”410 French phenomenologists, in 
fact, departed from Bergson primarily on the issue of time, a crux of both Bergsonism and 
                                                 
410Suzanne Guerlac, Literary Polemics: Bataille, Sartre, Valéry, Breton (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 194.  
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phenomenology.411 French phenomenologists of music, likewise, defined the originality of their 
work by its difference from Bergsonian durée.412 
For Bergson, la durée, sometimes translated as “duration,” described the principal quality 
of “the immediate data of consciousness.” That is, human beings experienced psychic states 
(such as joy, desire, hope, or sorrow) not as distinct, isolated phenomena, but as a continuous 
temporal flux in which individual sensations became distinguishable only in retrospect. Within 
this flux, there was succession, but no distinction between the elements comprising it: “each, 
representative of the whole, is distinguished from it and isolated from it only for a thought 
capable of abstracting.”413  
We have already seen how Jankélévitch supplemented Bergsonian continuity with his 
own emphasis on discontinuity, or the “mutationism of the fiat.”414 Other philosophers of music 
confronted Bergson as well. In 1949, in her lengthy treatise, Le Temps musical: Essai d’une 
esthétique nouvelle de la musique, musicologist Gisèle Brelet presented musical harmony 
specifically as an exception to Bergsonian durée; for her, Bergson’s “succession sans 
distinction” failed to account for the phenomenon of the “harmonic interval,” which, for Brelet, 
instituted a purely interior, qualitative, nonspatial distinction: 
If it is true, as Bergson thought, that durée is continuity and fusion, every 
distinction effected in it would then appear as the expression of an intrusion of 
space; but there exists precisely a qualitative distinction that is properly temporal, 
which it is the very character of the harmonic interval to incarnate.415 
 
                                                 
411Lyotard, Phenomenology, 113.  
412The second chapter of Bergson’s Essai sur les données immédiates de conscience considers the 
multiplicity of conscious states and the idea of duration. Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de 
conscience, 6th ed. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908). 
413Ibid., 77. 
414Jankélévitch, Debussy et le mystère, 32–3.  
415Brelet, Le Temps musical, 105. The translation is Lippman’s. Qtd. in Lippman, History of Western 
Musical Aesthetics, 444. Lippmann omits the original emphasis on l’intervalle harmonique. I have restored it above. 
All other translations of Brelet are my own unless otherwise indicated.  
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With la durée, Bergson was trying to indicate a time of pure becoming, a time which could not 
be measured or quantified (i.e., a time in which no distinctions could be introduced). What 
distinguished musical time from Bergsonian durée was, for Brelet, the “primary fact” of music 
itself—namely, that there was in sonority an immanent temporal logic, a naturally occurring 
network of distinctions and connections.416 
The harmonic interval, for Brelet, had two separate, but related meanings. The 
measurable distance between two or more distinct tones sounded simultaneously was a properly 
spatial relationship (i.e., that of pitch or frequency). Nevertheless, Brelet asserted, there was 
another kind of harmonic interval, one based on a nonspatial proximity—that of tonal kinship, or 
consonance. The interval of the second, for example, was, spatially, the smallest interval; 
harmonically, however, the “smallest” (i.e., the nearest-related or most consonant) interval was, 
for Brelet, the fifth. It was the “tonicity” of the latter type of interval that produced a “properly 
temporal” distinction within musical time.417 
Bergson served, for Brelet, as one of the two most important historical voices for 
understanding musical aesthetics. Implicit in Bergson’s philosophy of musical time was a notion 
that Brelet, in her own scholarship, sought to articulate and demonstrate—the fact that “the 
musical work is the lived duration of a consciousness.”418 Brelet’s other inspiration-cum-
challenge was 19th-century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. In constructing her 
phenomenology of music, she set out to improve upon the insights of Bergson and 
                                                 
416Ibid.  
417Lippman, History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 444–5. Brelet based her notion of tonal kinship on the 
overtone series. Thus the octave, according to this scheme, is virtually “one and the same tone,” and the fifth is the 
first, i.e., the “shortest,” interval.  
418Ibid., 53. See below note 434.  
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Schopenhauer, both of whom had, in her view, committed themselves to a transcendent, rather 
than an immanent, metaphysics of music. 
Even before Le Temps musical (1949), Brelet had published Esthétique et création 
musicale (1947), a more concise philosophy of her aesthetics of new music. At least one 
musicologist has made light of the historical proximity of Brelet’s philosophy of new music 
(Esthétique et création musical, 1947) to that of another, much better known study, Theodore W. 
Adorno’s 1949 Philosophie der neuen Musik.419 Until now, however, there had been no attempts 
to shed further light on this proximity, none to consider its implications for our understanding of 
postwar music aesthetics, none to draw out and examine these implications concretely through a 
lengthy comparison of the ideas of Brelet and Adorno. Where the previous two chapters of this 
dissertation have detailed the dovetailing of philosophical ideas between Jankélévitch and his 
contemporaries, the current chapter explores the rift between postwar French and German 
conceptions of musical aesthetics, measuring the distance between Brelet and Adorno’s 
philosophies of music.  
On the surface, they would seem to have had much in common. Both practiced an 
immanent critique of music. Both assumed the dialecticality of music. Both emphasized the 
indispensability of history to the aesthetics of new music. Both judged music according to the 
ways in which it shaped time, the ways in which it generated truth-content, the ways in which it 
handled mystery. And yet, just below that shared surface, divergences quickly proliferated. 
Brelet and Adorno’s differences came to a head in their views on the music of Igor Stravinsky. 
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Whereas, for Adorno, Stravinsky effectively eradicated all traces of mystery from his music, for 
Brelet, he brought the mysterious essence of music to life in a dynamic and singular fashion. 
5.1 IMMANENT METAPHYSICS 
As she made clear in Le Temps musical, Brelet had grown tired of the pervasiveness of 
“transcendental metaphysics” in philosophical analyses of Western art music. She advocated a 
different kind of metaphysics, one better suited to explaining the art of sound. Philosophers, 
Brelet declared, often “flattered themselves,” thinking that they had “grasped” the “hidden 
essence” of music.420 They had at least rightly recognized the value of seeking to grasp this 
hidden essence: 
Music has not ceased to exert a sort of fascination for philosophical speculation, 
precisely through this enigma, in which all the others seem to be summed up, 
which offers up to human thought its nature at once double and profoundly 
singular. Philosophers in all civilizations have recognized the eminent privilege of 
musical experience among all other forms of human experience. They have seen 
there at once the order and harmony of the world as well as the passions of the 
human; and the Chinese, sensing the necessary reconciliation of two antinomic 
aspects of music in living music, have seen that through music the human can re-
form its soul to the image of that harmony of the world which music is designed 
to reflect.421 
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Yet philosophers in the West, Brelet implied, had failed to “clarify the intimate nature of musical 
art,” for, in their philosophies, music had only been the “point of departure and the pretext for a 
metaphysical adventure driving it far away from itself.”422  
In her apologia of a new metaphysics, Brelet focused on Schopenhauer and Bergson 
because each offered, from her perspective, a compelling, even if ultimately unsatisfactory, 
philosophy of musical time. Schopenhauer’s “conception of music” contained “some brilliant 
insights,” Brelet maintained, but “always at a certain moment the insight is deformed, concrete 
experience is left behind, and metaphysics comes to inflect music according to its own 
decrees.”423  
For Schopenhauer, musical time was the “irrational becoming of a dissatisfied will, 
always separated from itself and in search of itself, always striving for the unreality of an 
elsewhere.”424 In Schopenhauer’s philosophy, music unfolded the “history of the will” and 
revealed the “internal evolution of sensibility, oscillating ceaselessly between its two 
fundamental affective modes: pleasure and pain, peace and despair.”425  
Yet within this oscillation music was, for Schopenhauer, “only dissonance and conflict—
veiled but undoubtedly always apparent behind the veil that dissimulates them.”426 The 
“essential defect” of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics was “that of confounding psychological duration 
and musical time.”427 Schopenhauer’s aesthetics supported not “musical time in its most valuable 
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metaphysical originality,” but the “pathological becoming of Wagnerism,” which was “precisely 
the inverse of musical time.”428 
Brelet claimed that Bergson—like Schopenhauer before him—located in music the 
perfect “symbol” of “absolute reality.”429 Bergson appealed to “musical time” in order to explain 
the “essence of duration”—to convey an “intuition” of the “essence” of time.430 He argued that 
melody manifests an experience of that immediate continuity which defines the “succession 
without distinction” of pure duration.431 In perceiving the pure movement of melody, we 
perceived the thing itself. In listening to movement that was not attached to a “moving thing (un 
mobile),” in listening to change wherein there was nothing that changed, we encountered 
“concrete duration, in its original purity, before it was contaminated by space and 
intelligence.”432  
Brelet related philosopher Gabriel Marcel’s remark that “a certain philosophy of music 
[had been] enveloped in [Bergson’s] theory of concrete duration.”433 Unfortunately, Brelet 
lamented, Bergson’s theory distorted “beforehand the musical time that it invoked.”434 Rather 
than “questioning music objectively,” Bergson forced it to “testify in favor of pure duration.”435 
For Brelet, musical time was a “decisive refutation of Bergsonian duration.”436 Bergson’s 
“theory of immediate duration” did not reflect our consciousness of music and the musical 
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work—it abolished this consciousness, Brelet said. Like consciousness itself, music “is not in 
time, but contains it and generates it.”437 
What Bergson described in his experience of the “unity of melody” was not, from 
Brelet’s vantage, an aesthetic experience: “For Bergson, listening to melody is to be ‘lulled’ by 
it, to surrender to flux, to the immediately sonic, to coincide completely with musical becoming 
in a sort of ecstasy and mystical fusion.”438 In Brelet’s view, Bergson’s philosophy demanded, in 
order to “experience lyrical and musical emotion,” the abdication of the will of the listening 
subject.439 The Bergsonian experience of music required temporarily incapacitating the ego’s 
“active and resistant powers,” inducing in the subject a “state of perfect docility.”440 That a 
single duration lay buried within the experience of music as its “hidden essence” was, for Brelet, 
an “illusion”: Bergsonian ecstasy distorted the perception of music and confounded the three 
durations of musical time (creator, work, and performer).441 
What was lost in Bergson’s metaphysics, according to Brelet, were the “most elementary 
data of musical experience”: Bergsonism inhibited that “triple duration”—of creator, work, and 
performer—which lived in musical time.”442 And yet Bergson, in spite of the deficiencies of his 
theory, still pointed to an essential aspect of musical time, one which occupied a great deal of 
Brelet’s attention: 
As we have attempted to demonstrate in Esthétique et création musicale and as 
we will show in more detail here [in Le Temps musical], it is indeed the intimate 
time of the musician that is inscribed in his work: here is the truth of Bergsonism. 
Bergson has grasped, in a profound intuition, that beyond its form, the musical 
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work is the lived duration of a consciousness, that melody truly resuscitates a 
duration that it imposes on our own.443 
 
If Bergson had scrutinized music more thoroughly, pursuing it to its foundations, Brelet 
contended, he would have turned away from “immediate duration and directed his attention to an 
other metaphysics of time.”444  
In the correct perception of musical time, its triple duration, and its metaphysical 
structure, Brelet placed the source of aesthetic experience, or the lived experience of mystery. To 
musical time belonged a “mysterious and wonderful power to unite the dynamism of time and 
the perfection of form, to cause them to become integral to one another, to withdraw into itself 
outside of time,” and yet to preserve of time “what in it is most alive, its power of eternal 
rebirth.”445 As both a principally temporal and a principally lived art, music was, for Brelet, a 
peculiar repository of mystery. 
For her part, Brelet attempted to understand metaphysics as the “effect of musical 
time.”446 Whereas philosophy had typically used music as a mirror in which to see its own a 
priori convictions better reflected, making music into the “slave” of an “external” and 
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“transcendent” metaphysics that “exploited it for its own purposes,” Brelet aimed to extract 
philosophical principles from the inner workings of music.447 Rather than a “transcendental” 
metaphysics, like that of Schopenhauer or Bergson, Brelet aimed to produce an “immanent” 
metaphysics of music.448  
In Le Temps musical, Brelet’s “immanent metaphysics of music” brought together two 
antinomic strands of aesthetic thought into dialectical tension. Traditionally, philosophy had 
offered a series of transcendent metaphysics of music.449 While philosophers had discerned 
correctly, in Brelet’s view, that the “rules of musical technique” embodied metaphysical 
principles, they invariably misidentified these principles, claiming to have found them not within 
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but somewhere outside of music’s technical rules.450 Schopenhauer, for example, detected in 
music’s formal laws not the indication of an autonomous metaphysical logic, but the summation 
of his own philosophical ideas.  
In reaction to philosophy’s misappropriation of music, thinkers like Eduard Hanslick 
sought to banish all metaphysics from the domain of music aesthetics. In constructing an 
aesthetics without metaphysics, Hanslick restored the autonomy of music’s fundamental 
principles, but, Brelet maintained, he left himself in a position in which he could no longer say 
anything meaningful about them. His “purely technical aesthetic” could offer only a “negative 
conception of musical time and musical thought.”451 
Brelet emphasized the congruity between an immanent metaphysics of musical time and 
an “autonomous aesthetics” that purported to be “like a purely technical vision of music, taking 
sustenance solely from the analysis of musical structure.”452 Providing such an aesthetics with 
the “means for completing itself, or rather for constructing itself on a firm foundation,” an 
immanent metaphysics gathered up the “fruits of Hanslick’s formalism,” conferring a “positive 
character” upon this formalism. “Brought back to the essence of music,” Brelet wrote, “the 
technical becomes a living reality.”453 
Music’s structural materials became truly significant (i.e., relevant to aesthetic 
experience), according to Brelet, upon the recognition that they did not require the invention of a 
new medium in which to suspend them, only the discovery of the one in which they were already 
suspended—namely, that of music itself. For Brelet, an immanent procedure, having penetrated 
to the very heart of musical being, permitted the discovery of musical time—the immanent 
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metaphysical dimension of music and the “ultimate reason for its autonomy and self-
sufficiency.”454 
In adopting the turn from transcendence to immanence, Brelet aligned herself with a 
predominant trend of twentieth-century Western philosophical thinking, whose echoes resonated 
far beyond the phenomenology of her day.455 It also brought her, at least nominally, into 
intellectual proximity with Theodore W. Adorno, who also propounded an immanent method of 
philosophical analysis. Adorno characterized as “immanent,” for example, the “advanced 
dialectical method” that he employed in his Philosophy of New Music.  
According to Max Paddison, Adorno’s brand of dialectical thinking aimed to “discover 
the universal within the particular, i.e., immanently, without doing violence to the particular by 
imposing the concept from the outside.”456 Thus an immanent analysis of the extremes of new 
music would focus on the particular elements of those extremes, immersing its concepts “within 
the materiality of musical works and within the tiniest, and apparently most insignificant details 
of musical life.”457 Such an analysis would seek in the objects of new music (in its works and its 
technical procedures) the means for expressing the relation of those objects to truth. 
Adorno’s negative dialectic aimed at the nonidentical in things. As the “core concept” of 
Adorno’s philosophy, the nonidentical “paradoxically” designated “an empty space for a 
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concept” or even a “cipher.”458 Truth, for Adorno, was inseparable from the nonidentical—from 
“those objects of experience that reason occludes,” from “something that concepts fail to 
subsume.”459 The truth of the nonidentical occurred, for example, in the experience of a “trace of 
revelation” in certain artworks.460 Adorno grounded aesthetic experience in something 
mysterious—the enigmaticalness of artistic gestures in which works of art “say something and in 
the same breath conceal it.”461  
Adorno’s immanent method, like that of Brelet, ventured into the interior of musical 
phenomena not merely to describe music’s technical procedures but to interpret and explain 
them—to demonstrate their relation to musical truth. Unlike Brelet, Adorno resisted locating 
music’s truth-content in the category of musical time, placing its determination instead in the 
way in which individual works shaped through their “immanent law of form” the fundamental 
contradiction “between subject and object, between interior and exterior.”462 This immanent law 
nonetheless always involved time in some fashion in Adorno’s philosophy of music, and it is on 
the plane of a dialectics of musical time that the philosophies of Brelet and Adorno come to 
intersect. 
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5.2 THE DIALECTICALITY OF MUSIC 
For both Brelet and Adorno, it was Stravinsky who took center stage. In Gisèle Brelet’s 
Esthétique et création musicale (1947), Stravinsky was the hero. In Theodore W. Adorno’s 
Philosophie der neuen Musik (1949), he played the role of villain. The allure of Stravinsky, the 
baffling yet compelling nature of both his music and his fame, riveted Adorno and Brelet, though 
each came to different conclusions about the aesthetic and ethical implications of Stravinsky’s 
mysterious power. Both heard in Stravinsky’s music a movement toward origins and primordial 
experience. For Adorno, this movement was regressive; for Brelet, it was timeless. 
Though neither Brelet nor Adorno discounted the stature of the composer, neither agreed 
upon the precise nature of this stature nor upon its ultimate significance. Neither agreed, that is, 
on the true status of Stravinsky’s oeuvre. The level of disparity generated in reading side by side 
these logically incompatible but historically synchronous interpretations of Stravinsky’s work 
itself quickly reaches drastic proportions, presenting a situation in which, with Fredric Jameson, 
one is wont to exclaim—“It’s dialectical!”463  
Despite the discrepancy in their particular conceptions of the dialectic, Brelet and Adorno 
both posited a general dialecticality as the first principle of musical aesthetics. For both, the 
success or failure of composers’ works rested on the degree to which their music harnessed the 
productive capacity of dialectical contradiction. Stravinsky’s music rose or fell with its ability to 
take what seemed to have been intractable and incommensurable—what seemed to have 
immobilized thought, permanently freezing its progress in a static antinomy—and to make of it 
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the means for a dialectical compositional practice in which musical thought could find its proper 
movement and activity.  
While Adorno, in Philosophie der neuen Musik, condemned Stravinsky’s works for their 
abnegation of the dialectical, Brelet commended Stravinsky in Esthétique et création musicale 
(and two years later as well in Le Temps musical, 1949), and she did so, I argue in what follows, 
precisely because Stravinsky’s compositions embodied, in her view, the consummation of the 
mystery of immanent metaphysics, or what I call a “phenomenological dialectics.” Stravinsky’s 
music enacted, in Brelet’s words, a “complete union of intelligibility and reality”—a kind of 
timeless yet of-this-time musical present.464 Whereas for Brelet the process of creating such a 
union represented the dialectical progression par excellence, Stravinsky’s “self-proclaimed 
order” was, for Adorno, “nothing but a mask for chaos.”465 For Adorno, the only true 
dialectics—the one turned on its head—refused all pretense to “positive transcendence” and kept 
faith only with the binding of knowledge and its objects to the powers of “determinate 
negation.”466 
From the conceptual distance that separates the philosophical methodologies of Brelet 
and Adorno, as well as from the friction that exists between their treatments of Stravinsky, I 
fashion a dialectical portrait of oppositional dialectics, thus putting into motion a hitherto 
unacknowledged historical valence of the dialectic. In the years immediately following the 
Second World War, dialectical thought assumed various guises, and a comparison of positive 
and negative formations serves to bring the details of each into greater relief.  
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Such a comparison displays and clarifies the dialectical precepts of Brelet’s 
phenomenology of music. It also provides an opportunity to pursue the fulfillment of Adorno’s 
own wish, expressed in 1950, that “the Stravinsky section [of Philosophie der neuen Musik] 
would be read as carefully as the section on Schoenberg.”467 Finally, complementing Jonathan 
Cross’s investigation of the ways in which Stravinsky’s modernism “informed, influenced, and 
provoked later generations of composers,” it furnishes another context, both historical and 
philosophical, in which to not only interpret Stravinsky’s peculiar brand of modernism, but also 
consider the relevance of that brand to contemporaneous French thought.468 
5.2.1 A Tale of Two Dialectics 
To determine the aesthetic value of any music, dialecticality served as the ultimate criterion for 
both Brelet and Adorno. Their conceptions of the dialectic differed radically, however. Negative 
Dialectics, the capstone of Adorno’s philosophical project, exposited an “anti-system” aimed at 
ridding dialectics of its “affirmative traits without reducing its determinacy.”469 Brelet’s 
published writings, by contrast, included no purely philosophical works on system or method. In 
contrast to the negative dialectics of Adorno, Brelet employed, in her philosophical 
considerations of music, a different form of dialectical reasoning derived from the thought of the 
French philosopher Louis Lavelle.470  
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In an homage to Brelet, music sociologist Ivo Supičić noted that Brelet’s philosophy 
resembled that of Lavelle “in many respects,” an insight the depth of which has never been 
adequately established.471 Indeed, Brelet voiced more than once her esteem for Lavelle; what’s 
more, she was later chosen to introduce Lavelle’s magnum opus Manual de méthodologie 
dialectique when it first appeared in print in 1962. She envisioned aesthetics and musical time 
through the theoretical lens of Lavelle’s phenomenological dialectics, and her portrayal of 
Stravinsky as the composer of the eternal musical present also drew upon Lavelle’s reflections.  
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno charged philosophy with the task of deciding “whether 
and how” there could “still be a philosophy at all” after the fall of “Hegel’s dialectics.”472 In the 
wake of Hegel’s “unsuccessful attempt to use philosophical concepts” in order to manage 
everything “heterogeneous to those concepts,” Adorno proposed a “movement of negation” 
incapable of synthetic closure, a negativity that ceaselessly undermined all “available 
positivities” until it had “only its own destructive energy to promote.”473  
Like Adorno, Lavelle set out to provide an “accounting” of philosophy’s “relationship to 
dialectics” and to break from the methodological bases of traditional philosophy.474 In her 
preface to Lavelle’s Manual de méthodologie dialectique, Brelet voiced the high regard in which 
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she held Lavelle’s dialectical method.475 According to her, Lavelle rejected “not only the 
mathematical method [of philosophers such as Descartes], but in general that constructive and 
genetic method to which all great philosophies had committed themselves.”476 Unlike the falsely 
synthetic methods of Hegel or Hamelin, which endowed the subject with a “creative efficacy that 
it did not possess,” a “true method,” such as that of Lavelle, heeded the “authentic subject,” 
which could exercise its creativity only “at the level of participation.”477 
That which was dialectical in Lavelle took place within participation itself at the level of 
an irreducible contradiction between the “sensorial” and the “intelligible.”478 In Lavelle’s work, 
the “dialectic of participation” entailed “producing” the sensorial (as opposed to reducing it) by 
means of the intelligible. Lavellian dialectics aimed not to convert the given through rational 
construction, but to chart the correspondences that had “settled” between the constructive 
activity of the intellect and the given material of the sensorial realm. We produce the sensorial 
(i.e., what is given to us) through making sense of it. The given comes to be, for us, when we 
give meaning to it. 
                                                 
475Lavelle’s manual of dialectical methodology was his final work, published posthumously in 1962. 
Lavelle’s first published work, Brelet notes, developed a dialectic of the sensible world (Dialectique du monde 
sensible, 1921). In Esthétique et création musicale, Brelet makes reference to necessity of such a dialectic (without, 
however, citing Lavelle explicitly): “Art is choice. And it must take simple and even conventional forms if it is to 
surpass sensualism and realize that ‘dialectic of the sensible world’ which allows it to gain mastery over itself. For 
sensualism is the enemy of sensation; sensualism weakens sensation, whereas form strengthens its power.” Brelet, 
Esthétique et création musicale, 35–6. According to Robert Jones, Lavelle’s magnum opus is his four-volume 
Dialectic of the Eternal Present. For Brelet, the notion of the “eternal present” will come to be incarnated in the 
concrete rational time of Stravinsky’s music, as discussed below. 
476Gisèle Brelet, preface to Manual de méthodologie dialectique, by Louis Lavelle (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1962), v.  
477Ibid., vii. Octave Hamelin (1856–1907) was a French philosopher who, according to Gutting, “combined 
the spiritualism of [Charles] Renouvier [1815–1903] with something like Hegelian dialectic in his well-regarded 
Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation (1907).” Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century, 15. 
478Brelet, preface to Manual de méthodologie dialectique, xiii. Lavellian methodology, for Brelet, 
embraced “the entire life of the subject in its double operation of thinking and willing, but also in its sensible and 
affective powers.” Ibid. 
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The word dialectical, for Lavelle, designated a “living method” for analyzing the 
“activity of consciousness,” ascertaining the different “levels” of the participating subject, 
determining structures of particularity on the “plane of individuality,” and recovering “common 
laws on the plane of rationality.”479 The dialectic should, at “each level of consciousness,” 
according to Lavelle, recover “horizontally the connections between things, between ideas, or 
between values, and vertically the connections between values, ideas, and things.”480 Only the 
comprehensiveness of a multilinear dialectical method, Lavelle contended, could hope to 
“embrace the articulations between all the elements of the real.”481 
Avoiding the “hubris” of the “synthetic method,” the Lavellian dialectic promoted the 
“attentive humility…[of] analysis.”482 Even as a method that was itself “wary of the claims of 
method,” dialectical analysis for Lavelle inclined “toward a system,” but an “open” system, one 
which placed no absolute limits on the “progress of analysis” and never entertained the illusion 
of fully rejoining the “concrete in its qualitative richness.”483 Lavelle designed and employed his 
dialectical method in order to recover something of being at its source—in the subject itself and 
the “concrete actions” constitutive of that subject, including especially the “reflexive act” 
through which it freely participated in the “creative act.”484 
Lavelle attempted to wed dialectics to a new form of ontological thinking, one which 
respected the sensorial dispositions that always underlie philosophy’s cerebrations. It is human 
beings who practice philosophy, and they do so for “reasons” that cannot be reduced to purely 
rational, logical incentives. Such pre-rational provocations to engage in philosophical speculation 
                                                 
479Louis Lavelle, Manual de méthodologie dialectique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 108.  
480Ibid. 
481Ibid.  
482Brelet, preface to Manual de méthodologie dialectique, viii. 
483Ibid.  
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include surprise, wonder, and astonishment. Like Jankélévitch and a whole lineage of 
philosophers, Lavelle asserted that the “perpetual miracle of initiative” spurred the work of 
philosophy.485 For Lavelle, the mystery of having been thrown into the world was followed 
immediately by the mysterious act of intentionally throwing oneself into the world and by that 
nebulous interior process through which this act took place.486 
5.2.2 Antinomies of Philosophy 
Like the work of Heidegger, the later Husserl, and many French phenomenologists, Lavelle’s 
philosophy grounded the activities of consciousness in lived experience. Lavelle did not identify 
himself with the phenomenological movement, nor did he ever label his work as 
phenomenology. He would have referred to his own philosophy as an ontology.487 Like Bergson, 
                                                 
485Louis Lavelle, De l’être (Paris: Aubier, 1947), 9. Aristotle, in the second chapter of the first book of his 
Metaphysics, wrote that “it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they 
wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater 
matters, e.g., about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the 
universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a 
sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders)…” Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross, 
accessed 3 March 2016, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html.143.  
486Colin Smith has described the “two emotional attitudes underlying philosophical speculation” that 
Lavelle articulates: “In the first place surprise at the ‘perpetual miracle of initiative,’ or ‘my own insertion into the 
world.’ The mystery of this self-insertion resides less in the act performed than in the inner fiat whereby this act is 
brought about, in ma présence active à moi-même, in the feeling of responsibility toward myself and the world. This 
permanent initiative which is the point of insertion of myself into the world is the stuff of being; Lavelle holds that 
being and act are ultimately identical. The second striking factor of experience is ‘that ever actual presence from 
which I never succeed in escaping.’ This, to put it another way, is the cogito which enables me to pick out from the 
totality of being a being which is my own. These elements coalesce into self-consciousness apprehended as freedom 
of initiative.” Smith, Contemporary French Philosophy, 48. 
487Louis Lavelle, Introduction to Ontology, trans. Wesley Piersol Murphy (New York: Carlton Press, 1966). 
The method that Lavelle employs to study existence is a phenomenological dialectics, however (as outlined in his 
Manual de méthodologie dialectique). In her introduction to the Manual, Brelet emphasizes the aesthetic and ethical 
thrust of Lavelle’s method: “The Lavellian method is not a pure logic: it appears to be more both an ethic and an 
aesthetic. The spirit of subtlety there unceasingly comes to balance the spirit of geometry, taste and a sense of the 
concrete there checks constructive ambition. Philosophical truth cannot be, according to Lavelle, enclosed in a 
system of syllogisms—and the Spinozist form adopted by the Methodology must not delude us. In a very curious 
and quite significant unpublished work, Paradoxes on Method, Lavelle confesses that there are no more rules for 
method than there are for the work of art. Like the artist, the mind cannot create under duress. It must be given the 
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Lavelle influenced the generation of thinkers who produced French phenomenology, even as 
those thinkers often attempted to distance themselves from him. French phenomenologists also 
sought separation from German phenomenology, however, and in some cases Lavelle offered 
them the means necessary to do so. 
Levinas, for instance, turned to Lavelle’s philosophy as a way to see beyond the “tragic 
despair” of the German philosophical tradition, phenomenological or otherwise. Lavelle’s 
discernment that, “seen from within,” the present always is, that it is neither replaced in the 
future nor captured in the past, that the future and the past exist “only to the extent that they 
participate through memory and anticipation in the present,” provided, for Levinas, an 
“unexpected solution.”488 Rather than a “return to idealism,” Lavelle surmounted this despair 
through an “affirmation of being.”489  
Brelet took what she called the “exact measure of the Lavellian ontology” as its ability to 
“appease the traditional antinomies between active and passive, act and given, immanence and 
transcendence, being and appearance.”490 For her, using phenomenology to go, as it were, 
beyond phenomenology provided a highly significant impetus for the movement, via a Lavellian 
                                                                                                                                                             
freest and most natural play, it must go at his own pace, in a perfect availability that allows it to accommodate the 
free gifts of inspiration. If the Lavellian method is wary of the claims of method, this is because it places its trust in 
the living mind.” Brelet, Manual de méthodologie dialectique, v–vi. 
[“La méthode lavellienne n’est pas une pure logique: davantage apparaît-elle à la fois comme une éthique 
et une esthétique. L’esprit de finesse y vient sans cesse équilibrer l’esprit de géométrie, le goût et le sens du concret 
y font échec à l’ambition constructrice. La vérité philosophique ne saurait selon Lavelle s’enclore en quelque 
système de syllogismes—et la forme spinoziste qu’adopte la Méthodologie ne doit pas nous leurrer. Dans un inédit 
très curieux et bien significatif, Paradoxes sur la méthode, Lavelle confesse que selon lui il n’y a pas plus de règles 
pour la méthode que pour la création de l’œuvre d’art. Tel l’artiste, l’esprit ne peut créer sous la contrainte. Il faut lui 
laisser son jeu le plus libre et le plus naturel, il faut qu’il aille son train, dans une parfaite disponibilité qui lui 
permette d’accueillir les dons gratuits de l’inspiration. Si la méthode lavellienne se méfie des prétentions de la 
méthode, c’est qu’elle fait confiance à l’esprit vivant.”] 
488Qtd. in Moyn, Origins of the Other, 112.  
489Ibid. 
490Brelet, preface to Manual de méthodologie dialectique, xiii. 
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dialectical phenomenology, toward an immanent metaphysics, toward a concrete understanding 
of musical ontology.491 
For Adorno, a living-breathing ontology would have been fundamentally incompatible 
with negative dialectics. Dialectics, Adorno argued, should serve to critique the principles of 
existing ontologies.492 Despite its emphasis on negation, Adorno’s dialectics attempted above all 
to avoid positing negation itself as just “another downright ‘first,’” as one more first principle on 
which to build a philosophical system.493 To posit the “concept of nonconceptuality” as the 
foundation of some sort of nonontological ontology would be to hypostatize that concept and 
thus to act “counter to its meaning.”494 It would transform the dialectic into a nondialectical 
configuration of thought. 
Phenomenology served, for Adorno’s dialectical reasoning, as another example of 
philosophy’s failed attempts to reintegrate the fragmented identity of the modern subject.495 
Phenomenology did too little, in Adorno’s view, to distinguish itself from the “constitutive 
primacy of subjectivity, the old idealism” that lay concealed there.496 Adorno pronounced 
                                                 
491Llewelyn discusses the notion of “ultra-phenomenology” in relation to Levinas’s philosophy: “Levinas 
goes on to practice ultra-phenomenology when he interprets the ethical as the exteriority to itself of temporality, the 
invasion of dia-chrony into the unity of retentive and protentive time.” Llewelyn, 69.  
492Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 136.  
493Ibid.  
494Ibid.  
495Galen Johnson describes some of the writings of Adorno and Walter Benjamin as antiphenomenologies 
in “Continental Aesthetics: Phenomenology and Antiphenomenology,” in Phenomenology: Responses and 
Developments, ed. Leonard Lawlor (New York: Routledge, 2014), 87–110. 
496Theodore W. Adorno, Against Epistemology, 179–80: “All the fundamental distinctions drawn by formal 
ontology and the theory of categories attached to it—the doctrine concerning the division of the regions of being and 
their categories of being, as also concerning the constitution of the material ontologies that fit them—are…the main 
headings of phenomenological studies.”  
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phenomenology the “system in ruins.”497 Phenomenology became, in Adorno’s hands, a failed 
jailbreak: 
In phenomenology, the bourgeois spirit strives mightily to break out of the prison 
of the immanence of consciousness, the sphere of constitutive subjectivity, with 
the help of the same categories as those implied by the idealistic analysis of the 
immanence of consciousness.”498 
 
To the extent that phenomenologists deny the primacy of mediacy as the “demand to 
arbitrate dialectic concretely,” they participate “phantasmagorically,” Adorno claimed, in the 
material production of thought, exchanging the experiences of actual subjects for a “reification of 
the spiritual capacities of the subject.”499 To the extent that phenomenology eliminates the 
“activity of the experiencing subject from the determination of the cognitive significance of the 
object,” it evades the requirements of dialectical critique and lapses into the perpetuation of 
“flagrant” antinomies.500 In this failure lies phenomenology’s unconscious truth process—its 
unintended demonstration, through its historical content, that philosophical antinomies of 
cognition and experience cannot be appeased or reconciled by means of thought alone.  
Antinomies tend to paralyze thought, preventing it from moving either forward or 
backward. They disclose an “absolute structural limit” in “either thought or reality,” as Jameson 
has observed.501 The practice of a “truly dialectical thinking,” for Jameson, consists in the 
“dynamic and productive act of setting” antinomies “in motion.”502 The “vocation of the 
dialectic itself,” according to Jameson, is to “hold two distinct dynamics, two distinct systems of 
                                                 
497Ibid., 212. “With phenomenology bourgeois thought turns to its end in dissociated, fragmentary 
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of ideas is the system in ruins…”  
498Ibid., 189. 
499Ibid., 24, 38; Roger Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience (Albany: State University of New York 
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law or well-nigh scientific regularities, together within the unity of a single thought,” a single 
thought which is furthermore a contradiction—i.e., a unity of opposites in which “tension and 
negativity divide as much as they relate, or relate as much as they divide.”503 Rather than 
something that “blocks and suspends movement,” dialectical contradiction is that “within which 
movement takes place,” and more precisely a movement away from the inveterate patterns of 
“common sense” or “non-dialectical thought.”504 
Adorno’s dialectic of aesthetic modernism, for Jameson, locates the “truth content” of art 
in the “technical innovations” of specific works and in the deep-seated contradictoriness of these 
innovations.505 Though neither figures in Jameson’s history of the dialectic’s valences, both 
Lavelle and Brelet formulated and put into practice a distinct dialectical methodology that 
differed from Adorno’s in both its style of argumentation and its conclusions. Brelet employed 
the dialectic concretely, like Adorno, within the realm of musical aesthetics. She also attended 
carefully to history and to cultural practices. And yet she found that the application of a certain 
kind of phenomenological dialectics resulted not in the prolongation and exacerbation of 
antinomies, but in their appeasement and reconciliation. 
5.3 ANTINOMIES OF NEW MUSIC 
Adorno confined his Philosophie der neuen Musik to a study of “two protagonists”—Schoenberg 
and Stravinsky.506 For “only in the extremes,” he contended, did the essence of new music “take 
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506Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 7.  
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shape distinctively”; only the extremes could impart “knowledge” of the “truth content” of new 
music.507 Adorno judged Schoenberg and Stravinsky according to their respective responses to 
the problem of new music—according to how they handled in their compositions the “objective 
antinomies” to which the “logical progress of music” had led.508  
The antinomies of new music could only be overcome, Adorno argued, if “followed 
through, without any illusion, to their limit,” as in the works of Schoenberg.509 Against progress, 
Stravinsky’s attempted “restoration of the past,” in Adorno’s view, pretended to resolve the 
problem of new music by ignoring it, by hiding the uncertainties of the new behind the 
perdurable and unchanging façade of the old.510 
Brelet’s philosophy of new music emphasized the work of three composers. In Esthétique 
et création musicale, Brelet discussed Hindemith alongside Schoenberg and Stravinsky. She 
recommended the aesthetic systems of each composer, recognizing them as legitimate and viable 
responses to the demands of the new. Brelet also inspected new music with respect to its 
antinomies. The organization of her investigation followed the unfolding of her dialectical 
method of thought. Brelet divided her study of aesthetics and musical creation into two main 
sections, the aesthetics of sonic form and the aesthetics of temporal form.511 Within these 
sections, she delineated a series of dialectical relationships, between psychology and aesthetics, 
material and form, old and new. The movement of the dialectic is constant, the specific 
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508Ibid., 3–4.  
509Ibid., 4.  
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511Brelet’s Le Temps musical, completed in 1949, expands and develops the ideas introduced in Esthétique 
et création musicale in order to produce a philosophy not only of new music, but of all music. Le Temps musical is 
in two volumes, the first itself divided into two parts, “sonic form” and “rhythmic form,” the second on “musical 
form.” The first volume treats the acoustic materials of music, the second their formal organization in time.  
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relationships between concepts continuously shifting according to the demands of the underlying 
dynamic of cognition and its objects.  
As it unfolds, the mechanism of the dialectic distinguishes between true and false 
antinomies, between those antinomies which, within a given historical moment, pertain to music 
and those which do not. 
5.3.1 Antinomy 1: Psychology / Aesthetics 
Brelet’s attempt to thus construct an emphatically “pluralistic aesthetics” gainsaid Schoenberg’s 
claim that “musical aesthetics cannot claim to be normative,” that “it can only make note of what 
is without being able to prescribe what should be.”512 For Schoenberg, Brelet wrote: 
The discoveries of the creator cannot be the result of pure speculation; they are 
necessarily an expression of experience, that of the living act of creation, where 
they are proven intuitively. Preconceived theory, i.e., theory posited outside of the 
experience of the creative act itself, impedes its free development, and no longer 
allows it to reach those original values that are immanent to it and to which it 
spontaneously orients itself. Aesthetics must refrain from enacting statutes that 
would break the momentum of creative freedom by finally separating it from its 
intimate ideal.513  
 
A pluralistic aesthetics, however, would not merely reflect upon music passively, according to 
the standards set by works themselves; it would also seek to actively shape the direction of 
musical creation. It would seek to respect both the “eternal essence of music” and the “personal 
                                                 
512Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, vii.  
513Ibid.: “Les découvertes du créateur ne peuvent être en effet le résultat d’une pure spéculation, elles sont 
nécessairement l’expression d’une expérience, celle de l acte vivant de la création, où elles sont éprouvées 
intuitivement. Toute théorie préconçue, c’est-à-dire posée hors de l’expérience même de l’acte créateur, entrave son 
libre développement, et ne lui permet plus d’atteindre ces valeurs originales qui lui sont immanentes et vers 
lesquelles il s’oriente spontanément. L’esthétique doit donc s’interdire d’édicter des préceptes qui briseraient l’élan 
de la liberté créatrice en la séparant définitivement de son idéal intime.” 
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and historical” mission of each composer.514 In constructing such an aesthetics, Brelet 
maintained that she began from an analysis of concrete musical works and only then turned to 
the “a priori conditions” that made these works possible, conditions which defined the essence 
of music.515 
As its main concern, Brelet’s musical aesthetics posited the “problem of music’s 
foundations,” a problem of “practical and concrete value” for anyone who experienced music.516 
The foundations that musical aesthetics revealed and described were neither purely “preexisting” 
nor “exempt from the movement of the concept.”517 Rather than seeking to explicate what was 
“aesthetically right and wrong at the heart of the objects” of music, Brelet aimed to comprehend 
what was more and less aesthetically effective given the ontological requirements of music.518  
For Brelet, an aesthetic configuration, whether “conscious or unconscious,” underlay 
every act of musical creation.519 It was a foundational aspect of musical reality, a “necessary 
condition for the existence of the work.”520 It was also true, however, that the creative act itself 
gave rise to a dialectical interaction that in turn affected the formation of aesthetic designs: in the 
act of creation, a connection materialized between the “personality of the artist” and an external 
“world of sensations and forms.”521 There was an ongoing negotiation between the “immediate 
psychological motives” and “sovereignly free creative impulse” of the musician and the 
“inherent requirements of musical art.”522 While exploring the world of musical “sensations and 
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forms,” composers discovered an “aesthetic imperative” that came to regulate their “artistic 
will.”523 
Two types of creational tendencies emerged, depending upon which pole, psychological 
or formal, a composer’s works accentuated.524 It was the aesthetic imperative that mediated these 
poles, that enabled musical creativity to travel between the “realm of pure experience” and the 
“world of musical forms.”525 The psychological type tended toward expression, the formal type 
toward construction. New music, however, appeared, in Brelet’s account, relatively free of 
psychological predilections and bent almost entirely in the direction of composition as an 
“intellectual act informing the universe of sounds.”526 Hindemith, Schoenberg, and Stravinsky 
seemed to concern themselves almost exclusively with that dialogue of material and form which 
Brelet designated as the essence of music.  
Psychological experience still played a role in the aesthetic productivity of twentieth-
century composers, but this role was largely a negative one. New music principally distinguished 
itself, for Brelet, in its awareness of “that dialectic of material and form which is immanent to the 
creative process.”527 The composers that Brelet chose to study had, from her perspective, 
engaged in “reflection and critical thinking,” submitted their “auditory intuitions to the 
dialectical experience of forms,” and constructed an aesthetic “system” that gave their work its 
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la forme aussi bien que le musicien de type formel: l’expression possède sa forme comme la forme son expression.”] 
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“consistency.”528 They had each participated to some extent in aesthetic speculation, performing 
a “critical reflection that moves from auditory intuition” to the “form that takes shape in it and 
that mysteriously [obscurément] founds it.”529 
Brelet thus minimized the relevance of what was an essential component of Adorno’s 
dialectics of new music. Psychological expression had been, for Brelet, the province of 
nineteenth-century composers and the music of romanticism. The expression of unconscious 
psychic states remained, for Adorno, a principal source of musical value in the twentieth century; 
moreover, the articulation of this latent content constituted one of the most important tasks for 
his aesthetic theory of new music.  
While psychological expression “inspired” the works of the “radical Schoenberg,” the 
“antipsychological Stravinsky,” Adorno argued, patterned his work on a “damaged subject.”530 
For Brelet, on the contrary, the egos of Stravinsky’s musical subjects were not “damaged,” the 
gestures of Stravinsky’s music did not, as Adorno claimed, rehearse a “comportment” that 
resembled “mental illness.” Rather, they reflected the workings of a compositional subject 
compos mentis. It could be said of Brelet’s Stravinsky exactly what Adorno said of Schoenberg: 
“The genuinely revolutionary element in his music is the transformation of the function of 
expression.”531 
In Stravinsky’s music, “passions are no longer faked.”532 Yet neither are they real, 
“registered in the medium of music” as “undisguised, corporeal impulses of the unconscious, 
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shocks, and traumas.”533 In Stravinsky’s music, passions are no longer. For Brelet, this is what is 
new in Stravinsky’s music and what constitutes one of its chief aesthetic accomplishments. 
5.3.2 Antinomy 2: Material / Form 
Dialecticality, albeit twisted into a negative conformation, operated as the aesthetic paradigm for 
Adorno’s analysis of new music. The “guiding category” of this analysis, Adorno claimed, was 
“contradiction”: particular works of new music succeeded “to the extent that they shaped the 
contradiction” between form and material, construction and expression, subject and object.534 
The efficacy of the shaping of contradiction in music depended on the ability of its formal 
organization to consistently capture the intrinsic and ceaseless movement that characterized this 
contradiction. In new music, the equidistant and static disposition of musical form reflected an 
increasing disintegration of musical material.  
According to the narrative of Adorno’s Philosophie der neuen Musik, Schoenberg and 
Stravinsky provided antithetical responses to the dissolution of temporal progress in music. 
Schoenberg sought to actively break out of the stasis into which the dialectic of musical 
expression and construction had fallen. Stravinsky meanwhile shirked the demands of the 
antinomical situation of modern music, attempting to establish “static form” as the “immutable 
and obligatory law of the new musical language.”535 
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534Ibid., 24. 
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Brelet, like Adorno, examined the extremes of new music. She rendered these extremes 
differently than Adorno, however. For her, they found expression in Hindemith, at one extreme, 
and in Stravinsky, at the other. In between them lay the aesthetics of Schoenberg. 
For Brelet, a dialectic of material and form had served as the “very essence of the 
creative process,” not only in new music, but throughout the “history of musical thought.”536 
In this dialogue of material and form, which is the very essence of musical 
thought, initiative can come from one or the other. And we will distinguish 
between two fundamental creative approaches: that of material inspiration and 
that of formal inspiration. In the first approach, form seems to be inferred from 
the listening experience; in the second, form makes this experience possible. 
Tonality, which is justified both a priori and a posteriori, can be transformed by 
means of a disruption—in favor of empiricism or formalism—of the balance 
between the material and the form that it realizes. One may want to bend it toward 
a greater fidelity to acoustic truths or to maintain the rigor of its form and bend 
acoustic truths to its requirements. Art either overcomes its conventions or it 
affirms them: the mind aspires to the conquest of the sonic world, or else seeks 
only the conquest of itself, of its freedom and its constructive power; it wants to 
penetrate more deeply into the concrete, to overcome the a priori of its forms, or 
else to overcome the concrete and to turn itself toward its pure powers.537 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
in radically different ways: “Stravinsky underlines the ‘standing still’ character of his music through the deliberately 
undynamic structure of his phrases; in the twelve-tone technique stasis is produced almost against the will of the 
composer through the density of the material. Remarkably enough, it is precisely through this idea that the new 
music is most closely related to impressionism—to which in almost every other respect it is opposed. One could 
regard Schoenberg’s most recent work as an attempt to break out of this stasis, while Stravinsky is trying to ordain it 
as the immutable and obligatory law of the new musical language.” 
For the philosopher of endlessly restless negativity, stasis served as a passing bell: to come to a standstill, 
to bring dialectical movement to a halt, was to capitulate to the concept (i.e., the whole, the totality, the universal), 
or, worse, to celebrate this capitulation (precisely what Adorno accused Stravinsky’s music of effectuating). 
536Brelet, Esthétique et création musical, 36.  
537Ibid., 45: “Dans ce dialogue de la matière et de la forme, qui est l’essence même de la pensée musicale, 
l’initiative peut venir de l’une ou de l’autre. Et nous distinguerons deux démarches créatrices fondamentales: celle 
qui est d’inspiration matérielle, et celle qui est d’inspiration formelle. En la première de ces démarches, forme 
semble se déduire de l’expérience auditive, en la seconde, elle rend possible cette expérience. Si l’on considère la 
tonalité, qui se trouve justifiée à la fois a priori et a posteriori, celle-ci peut être transformée au moyen d’une 
rupture, en faveur de l’empirisme ou du formalisme, de l’équilibre entre la matière et la forme qu’elle réalise. On 
peut vouloir l’infléchir vers une fidélité plus grande aux faits sonores, ou bien vouloir maintenir la rigueur de sa 
forme et plier les faits sonores à ses exigences. L’art s’affranchit de ses conventions ou les affirme: l’esprit aspire à 
la conquête du monde sonore, ou bien ne cherche que la conquête de lui-même, de sa liberté et de son pouvoir 
constructeur; il veut pénétrer plus profondément dans le concret, s’affranchir de l’a priori de ses formes, ou bien 
s’affrançhir du concret et recueillir vers ses purs pouvoirs.” 
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All new music essentially either extended tonality or transformed it. Attempts to transform 
tonality, to depart from its doctrines, began in reflections on either music’s matter or on its form, 
in physics or in philosophy.  
Brelet observed that most composers did not derive their aesthetic conceptions from 
“sonic material” in its “pure state”; rather, tradition delivered “sonic material” to them as a 
“composite of material and form.”538 The “originality” of Hindemith and Stravinsky stemmed 
from their discovery of the extremes, their “particularly acute awareness of the wider 
possibilities involved in musical thought.”539 At the empirical end of the spectrum, Hindemith 
founded a “new aesthetic precisely on the isolation of [purely sonic] material and its natural 
forms.”540 Stravinsky, working from the opposite extreme, determined sonic material entirely 
through his conception of musical form. Schoenberg traversed the mean between these extremes: 
he devised a formalistic system of aesthetic construction that moved away “from immediate 
acoustic facts only in order to better reach them.”541 
Brelet defined the “aesthetics of Hindemith” as “an attempt to eliminate from musical 
thought the a priori forms by which the mind seeks to impose upon sounds an order that does not 
come from those sounds themselves.”542 Hindemith wished to “read” in the “formal material” of 
sonority itself the signs of an originary, natural language of auditory experience, one “written” 
prior to the arbitrarily inscribed conventions of classical tonality.543 Hindemith’s empiricist 
aesthetics amounted to a “determinate conception of sonic facts and not a mere enregistering of 
                                                 
538Ibid., 56. Adorno agrees: “…the ‘material’ is itself sedimented spirit, preformed socially by human 
consciousness.” Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 32. 
539Brelet, Esthétique et création musical, 56.  
540Ibid.  
541Ibid., 62.  
542Ibid., 46.  
543Ibid. 
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these facts.”544 This aesthetics was not absolutely empirical, however. It did not “completely 
eliminate the a priori”; instead, it speculated on sonority’s “natural forms,” adopted or rejected 
them, and then arranged those which it had selected in order to make possible the “future 
construction of the musical work.”545 
In Hindemith, form was discovered “within the material itself”; in formalist composers, 
like Schoenberg, the dialogue between material and form took place “under the authority of a 
very abstract aesthetic.”546 Schoenberg’s harmonic system began, like Hindemith’s, with the 
“natural forms immanent to sonic material,” but, unlike Hindemith’s, it departed from them in 
order to create not a new tonality, not a more natural “natural harmony,” but a “factitious 
harmony,” an “atonal harmony” in which the “superposition of thirds” gave way to the 
“superposition of fourths.”547 A harmonic schema built on the fourth encompassed the “totality 
of sounds of the chromatic scale,” leading to a system of musical thinking that achieved, “despite 
its factitiousness, greater fidelity to sonic facts [than that of classical tonality],” since it permitted 
“integral systematization.”548 
                                                 
544Ibid., 51.  
545Ibid., 50–1. What Hindemith seeks, says Brelet, is “precisely not the abolition of musical thought, but its 
enfranchisement—its freedom to avoid the a priori frameworks of conventional tonality and enter into direct contact 
with the immanent forms of auditory experience.”  
546Ibid.  
547Ibid., 59–60. See also ibid., 36: “Whatever the differences between the various harmonic systems, it 
seems that their shared ambition is always to reconstruct the sonic edifice from one of its fundamental forms. Just as 
classical harmony founds itself on the superposition of thirds by generalizing that principle, Schoenberg has 
attempted to envisage all acoustic facts from the angle of the fourth. And he locates evidence for the validity of his 
harmonic theory in the fact that, by the superposition of fourths, one attains entirely naturally all the tones of the 
chromatic scale. Thus sonic material as a whole is reduced to a single element.” 
[“Quelles que soient les différences qui séparent les divers systèmes harmoniques, il semble que leur 
ambition commune soit toujours de reconstruire l’édifice sonore à partir de l’une de ses formes fondamentales. De 
même que l’harmonie classique se fondait sur la superposition des tierces, en généralisant ce principe, Schonberg a 
essayé d’envisager la totalité des faits acoustiques sous l’aspect de la quarte. Et il trouve une preuve de la validité de 
son système harmonique en ce que, par la superposition des quartes, on atteint tout naturellement la totalité des sons 
de l’échelle chromatique. Ainsi la matière sonore tout entière est ramenée à l’unité.”] 
548Ibid., 60. “Schoenberg demonstrates in effect that by the superposition of thirds it is impossible to 
encompass the totality of sounds of the chromatic scale, whereas construction by fourths can lead to a chord that 
contains the twelve tones of this scale.” 
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Hindemith and Schoenberg attacked conventional tonality from the same direction, but 
with opposite destinations in mind. For both, the “scandal of the concept of alteration” provided 
the instigation.549 Hindemith wanted to emancipate tonality from the accretions of history and 
culture, Schoenberg to free musical thought from the tyrannical order of tonality altogether. 
Whether overhauling tonality in order to save it or queueing it for demolition, their harmonic 
systems nonetheless shared the same conceptual foundation—the chromatic scale.550 Hindemith 
adopted the chromatic scale as the point of departure for a new tonal system; Schoenberg took 
the same collection of twelve tones and used it to underwrite an anti-tonal method. 
In Brelet’s estimation, there was, however, an even more radical option, one which might 
appear at first to be reactionary: It was not necessary to abandon the traditional framework of 
tonality in order to renew sonic material and musical thinking. In Stravinsky, tonality appeared 
capable of “supporting the richest and most unexpected sonic sets,” so long as it allowed for the 
“indefinite extension of the use of foreign notes.”551 Stravinsky constructed “new sensations by 
means of the most banal acoustic facts”: new sensations arose not from new material, but from 
                                                                                                                                                             
[“Schönberg montre en effet que par la superposition des tierces, il est impossible d’embrasser la totalité 
des sons de l’échelle chromatique, tandis que la construction par quartes peut conduire à un accord qui contient les 
douze sons de cette échelle.”] 
549Ibid., 38–9. 
550Ibid., 41–2. “Modern harmonic systems aim to embrace the full complexity of sonic facts, but they also 
seek to embrace it with a simple form. Whether the system of Schoenberg or that of Hindemith is considered, the 
one and the other, however differently they may be inspired, generalize tonality in order to make it both more 
comprehensive and simpler. The one and the other are based on the chromatic scale in order to achieve that 
comprehensive systematization of sonic material which is denied to classical harmony. And in them chromaticism 
for the first time truly acquires value as a scale insofar as it is harmonically founded, i.e., reduced to a simple form.” 
[“Les systèmes harmoniques modernes veulent embrasser toute la complexité des faits sonores, mais ils 
cherchent aussi à les embrasser en une forme sinple. Que l’on considère le système de Schonberg ou celui de 
Hindemith, l’un et l’autre, si différents qu’ils soient d’inspiration, généralisent la tonalité afin de la rendre, à la fois 
plus compréhensive et plus simple. L’un et l’autre prennent pour base l’échelle chromatique afin de réaliser cette 
systématisation intégrale de la matière sonore qui est refusée à l ‘harmonie classique. Et le chromatisme pour la, 
première fois acquiert chez eux véritablement valeur d’échelle dans la mesure où il est fondé harmoniquement, 
c’est-à-dire ramené à une forme simple.”] 
551Ibid., 63.  
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new configurations of old material.552 Producing unprecedented musical percepts from no less 
than the “most banal and worn material” was, for Brelet, truly drastic.553  
Stravinsky’s “extreme formalism” corresponded to “one of the fundamental possibilities 
of musical thought”—the liberation of style from material.554 Style, from Brelet’s standpoint, 
expressed a coherent aesthetic, a consistent pattern of thinking “organized around a fundamental 
option.”555 Brelet detected in Stravinsky a renewal of music that concerned “neither harmonic 
principles nor harmonic language” but that arose solely from the “discovery of a new style, of 
new categories capable of organizing musical thought.”556  
Whereas, in Schoenberg’s formalist aesthetics, the “creative power of form” gave rise to 
a “new sensoriality,” Stravinsky’s radical formalism emancipated musical thought from the 
tyranny of sensoriality, from the autocratic rule of the “sensorial perspective.”557 Indifferent to 
its material, Stravinsky’s compositional aesthetic fed on “itself and its pure powers.”558 From 
even the “most arid sonic material,” Stravinsky’s style caused a “profound musicality” to 
emerge.559 To depose the sensorial regime, Stravinsky inaugurated a new temporal order, an 
order drawn from an elevation and reconfiguration of the rhythmic and metric dimension of 
music. 
                                                 
552Ibid.  
553Ibid., 64.  
554Ibid., 65.  
555Ibid.  
556Ibid., 66.  
557Ibid., 64. 
558Ibid.  
559Ibid., 65.  
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5.3.3 Antinomy 3: Old / New 
Discerning the operation of the dialectic in new music, for both Brelet and Adorno, required 
coming to terms with the ways in which that music related to what came before it, the ways in 
which it incorporated and readministered elements from previous configurations of the tradition 
to which it belonged. For Brelet and Adorno, that is, history furnished a repository for a 
dialectical aesthetics of music. It was in its relationship to the musical past that the musical 
present revealed the extent of its dialectical reach. In music’s materials and procedures, the 
operation of the dialectic manifested itself in the intermediation of the old and the new.  
Understanding Stravinsky entailed comprehending the manner in which he subjected 
inherited materials of compositional practice to the procedures of his own modernist aesthetic. 
Brelet and Adorno sustained similar, but inverted emphases regarding some aspects of 
Stravinsky’s inheritance. For both, the music of Wagner and Debussy provided a context outside 
of which Stravinsky’s music could not be truly grasped. Differences in their individual assays of 
Stravinsky’s works stemmed in part from deviations in their appraisals of Wagner and Debussy. 
Brelet, however, presented a wider array of precedents for appreciating Stravinsky. She 
discussed Stravinsky’s classicism, and she focused upon another nineteenth-century composer 
whose experiential aesthetic, in her view, prefigured that of Stravinsky—Pyotr Il’yich 
Tchaikovsky. 
In discussing Stravinsky’s dialectical treatment of old and new, Brelet turned from the 
dialectic of material and form that governed the aesthetics of sonic form to a more general 
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dialectical relationship between the sonic form and the temporal form of music.560 Sonority has 
both an objective form (i.e., harmony) and a subjective form (i.e., temporality).561 Harmony, in 
Brelet’s philosophy, was an “Apollonian form”—the object of “pure speculation and 
contemplation.”562 Temporal form enclosed an “objective and formal aspect related to the sonic 
material,” but it was of “Dionysian essence.”563 In and through temporal form, “affectivity and 
all the indistinct powers of being” were introduced into music, for time, “even in its simplest 
forms,” could only be “experienced.”564  
The following dialectical pairings accomplish a number of tasks. They clarify Brelet’s 
understanding of the history of new music. They demonstrate, albeit more succinctly, the motion 
of Brelet’s phenomenology of musical aesthetics. Through a juxtaposition of Adorno and 
Brelet’s views on the relationships between pairs of composers, the importance of historical time 
in their respective philosophies becomes apparent. At the same time, the importance of an 
ahistorical element also crystallizes.  
5.3.3.1 Wagner / Debussy Adorno employed the notion of “static form” to describe the 
central structural dilemma confronting twentieth-century music. For “different reasons” in 
“different schools” of composition, an equidistance of events characterized the structural 
organization of musical works, not only leading “concepts like development and progression” to 
                                                 
560Sonic form, in Brelet’s terminology, means harmony, or the arrangement of tones in an imaginary pitch 
space. The arrangement of sonic forms (i.e., harmonies) in time is what Brelet calls temporal form. 
561Ibid., 73: “Sonic sensoriality possesses a double form—a harmonic form and a temporal form—and 
musical thought only realizes itself through the indivisible actualization of the one and the other.” [“Le sensible 
sonore possède une double forme : une forme harmonique et une forme temporelle, et la pensée musicale ne se 
réalise qu’en l’actualisation indivisible de l’une et de l’autre.”] See also ibid., 79: “Thus, to the aesthetic of harmonic 
speculation that the work embodies must be added the aesthetic of the work itself, the aesthetic of temporal form and 
of lived time.” [“Ainsi, à l’esthétique de la spéculation harmonique que l’œuvre incarne, doit s’ajouter l’esthétique 
de l’oeuvre elle-même, l’esthétique de la forme temporelle et du temps vécu.”] 
562Ibid., 74.  
563Ibid.  
564Ibid. “To listen to sonority,” Brelet writes, is “to accompany its temporal deployment of the living 
momentum of our interior duration, is to live with it, instant by instant, its becoming, at the same time embracing the 
total curve.”  
175 
“increasingly lose their meaning,” but also creating a situation in which music related 
“indifferently to time.”565 The roots of the new music’s formal stasis reached back, as Adorno 
traced them, most saliently to the music dramas of Wagner, and they found an environment 
especially conducive to growth in the impressionist music of Debussy. 
For Adorno, the “spatialization” of temporal movement—that “pseudomorphism of 
music on painting” cultivated by Debussy and carried to fruition by Stravinsky—had its origins 
in the self-abnegating qualities of Wagner’s music.566 Stravinsky learned the art of 
“timelessness” from Debussy, whose musical impressions routinely frustrated the expectations of 
“those listeners schooled in German and Austrian music.”567 When the “guileless ear” listens to a 
work of Debussy, Adorno noted, it “strains through the breadth of the piece to hear whether ‘it is 
coming’; everything seems to be preparation, a prelude to musical fulfillments, to the ‘swan 
song’ that never arrives.”568 
From Adorno’s vantage, Wagner’s operas appeared as “giant packages” partitioned in 
advance according to the notion of the “beat.”569 The abstract temporal framework of the music 
drama presaged the “temporally disparate parallelism” that came to dominate the styles of both 
Debussy and Stravinsky.570 For Brelet, Wagner cleared a space in which “harmonic thinking and 
                                                 
565Qtd. in Paddison, 177. 
566Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 141. 
567Ibid., 138. 
568Ibid.  
569Theodore W. Adorno, In Search of Wagner, trans. Rodney Livingstone (New York: Verso, 2005), 22. A 
decade before finishing Philosophy of New Music, while in exile in New York and London during the war, Adorno 
had treated the temporal stagnancy of Wagner’s music in greater detail. Written in 1937–8, the first edition of 
Adorno’s Versuch über Wagner was published by Suhrkamp in 1952. For Adorno, the “gesture of striking a blow” 
regulated everything in Wagner’s compositional design, for which “the whole idea of beating” was “fundamental.” 
The “notion of striking, of beating time” apportioned the “giant packages [i.e., containers]” of his music dramas. 
ibid., 20. Yet, Adorno declared, for all his striking and beating, Wagner produced nothing but a purely abstract and 
empty notion of time. Though perfectly suited to the needs of performers and conductors, the beat served, for the 
composer, as a “fallacious method of mastering the empty time” with which he started. ibid., 23. 
570Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 140. Theodore W. Adorno, Philosophie der neuen Musik, 73: “des 
zeitlich disparaten Nebeneinander.” 
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musical time, in their freshness, could be born anew.”571 Wagner himself, in Brelet’s view, failed 
to fulfill the promise of restoration; instead, it was Debussy who, through the “chord-timbre of 
impressionism,” would “rediscover” musical time.572 While retaining the general 
“instantaneism” of Wagnerian harmony, Debussy’s music nonetheless enacted an inversion of 
the basic temporal experience of Wagner’s music.573 
Rather than using the newly won “autonomy of sonic material” as a means for expressing 
the inquietude of ordinary human time (i.e., psychological duration), Brelet’s Debussy fashioned 
from the self-sufficiency of individual chords and timbres an impression of their inherent 
temporality—an impression of purely musical time “having only itself as an end.”574 Rather than 
yoking sonority to the “momentum and desire of an obscure and perpetually unsatisfied 
sensoriality,” Debussy distributed musical becoming into a collection of “precious and 
incomparable instants,” each complete unto itself.575  
                                                 
571Brelet, Le Temps musical, 693.  
572Ibid., 694. 
573Ibid. “Like Wagnerism, Impressionism is an instantaneism in which the chord became as absolute as it 
had been relative in the tonal regime and discovered itself as self-sufficient timbre. But because it is not based on 
psychological duration [like Wagnerism], the chord-timbre of Impressionism reveals its essential and specific 
intelligibility, a concrete and qualitative intelligibility that rises from the depths of itself, and not that intelligibility 
of borrowing which confers upon the classical chord its submission to the a priori framework of tonality. Yet this 
concrete intelligibility of the chord reveals not only sonic form, but the natural temporal form of sonority: and the 
ephemeral instant of psychological duration flourishes in the eternal present of sonic duration, immediate musical 
time, enriched by a brand new music that will rediscover musical time as it is immediately given in sonority and 
sonic relations.”  
[“Comme le wagnérisme, l’impressionnisme est un instantanéisme où l’accord, de relatif qu’il était en 
régime tonal, devient absolu, se découvre comme timbre à soi-même suffisant. Et parce qu’il n’est plus rapport à la 
durée psychologique, l’accord-timbre de l’impressionnisme révèle son intelligibilité essentielle et spécifique, une 
intelligibilité concrète et qualitative qui monte des profondeurs de lui-même. et non cette intelligibilité d’emprunt 
que confère à l’accord classique sa soumission au cadre a priori de la tonalité. Or, cette intelligibilité concrète de 
l’accord révèle non seulement la forme sonore, mais la forme temporelle naturelle de la sonorité: et l’instant 
éphémére de la durée psychologique s’épanouit en l’éternel présent de la durée sonore, temps musical immédiat, 
rich d’une musique toute neuve qui retrouvera le temps musical tel qu’il est immédiatement donné dans la sonorité 
et à l’intérieur des rapports sonores.”] 
574Ibid. 
575Ibid., 694–5. 
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Where Wagner’s music had, for Brelet, only passively reflected to listeners the 
mercuriality of temporal flux, Debussy’s music offered human consciousness the opportunity to 
realize “its most profound vow, that of living in time and out of time, of rejoining, despite time, 
the actuality of its act, of tasting finally that perfect repose which resides in the sufficiency of the 
present.”576 As the “negation of musical time,” the psychological duration of Wagnerism had 
engendered, “from the temporal point of view,” only a “negative form”; nevertheless, Brelet 
argued, this same psychological duration also generated a “sonic form that would prove to be 
[temporally] positive in Debussy.”577 
Wagnerian becoming failed to realize the original temporal possibilities of its sonic 
innovations. Dispelling the “disquieted psychological duration of romanticism,” Debussyan 
becoming embodied the perpetual rebirth, “beneath the psychological instant that passes and 
flees,” of the “eternal instant,” an instant which endured, according to Brelet, because it was “the 
Epicurean instant of a sensorial pleasure,” an instant which seemed “to arrest time.”578 In 
actualizing an “Epicurean duration,” Debussy’s “auditory imagination” reacquired musical time 
in the “immobile mobility of the harmonic instant,” in the “immediate incarnation” of the 
“musical present.”579 
As a way of conceptualizing the relationship between the dimensions of sound and time 
in musical art, Debussy’s impressionism represented, from Brelet’s perspective, one of the 
reliable aesthetic possibilities available to the composer.580 Yet the impressionist aesthetic 
presented the possibility of danger as well: since the music of impressionism derived its 
                                                 
576Ibid., 692.  
577Ibid. Emphases in the original. 
578Ibid., 695. Emphasis in the original. 
579Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
580Brelet, Esthétique et musical création, 84.  
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temporality from the “objective time of sonic material,” it would always possess a tendency to 
“detach itself from lived duration” and thereby “come to be dissolved in static harmonic 
relations, wherein all becoming vanishes.”581  
5.3.3.2 Debussy / Stravinsky  In France, Adorno claimed, the “development of painting’s 
productive forces so prevailed over those of music” that French composers like Debussy “sought 
refuge in great painting,” appropriating its techniques to compensate for the paucity of their own 
compositional resources.582 To musically simulate the “luminous effects” of impressionist 
painting, Debussy assimilated one of its principal procedures—the “juxtaposition of spots of 
color.”583 Instead of strokes of paint, Debussy lightly dabbed the canvas of his musical 
impressions with “fundamentally static and temporally exchangeable harmonic complexes.”584  
In organizing music according to a principle that belonged not to it, but properly to the 
visual medium of painting, Debussy “spatialized” music, presenting an art of time as an art of 
space. Debussy’s music nonetheless retained a trace of becoming and temporal progressivity. 
Some connection still existed between his “individual timbre complexes.” Despite their 
discreteness, these complexes “merged while resounding,” their tones “swimming” into one 
another and producing “something like a sensual infinity.”585  
It was in Stravinsky’s music that the process of spatialization became absolute. 
According to Adorno, Stravinsky acquired from Debussy the “spatial conception of sonorous 
                                                 
581Ibid. Adorno makes a similar observation: In the “undynamic” nature of his impressionist music, Adorno 
contended, Debussy offered an important response to the “illusory and futile” dynamism of Wagner’s style. For 
Adorno, Debussy’s compositions exhibited an ever increasing “atomization of the thematic substance,” until the 
melodies had been “reduced, as in a laboratory, to elementary combinations of tones.” Adorno states, moreover, that 
the “radicalism” of atomization in some of Debussy’s “most masterful pieces cost them their popularity” and that 
“Debussy’s late style,” in reaction, amounted to an “attempt once again to indicate a kind of temporal musical 
progression without sacrificing the ideal of hovering.” Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 139 and 186, note 10.  
582Ibid. 
583Ibid. 
584Ibid., 138. 
585Ibid., 141. 
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planes of music,” the atomistic conception of “melodic models,” and the technique of “partial 
complexes.”586 Stravinsky took these things from Debussy and squeezed the remaining life out 
of them, severing the “bonds between the complexes” and demolishing the “vestiges of the 
dynamic-differential procedure.”587 In thus extinguishing the light from Debussy’s “luminous 
effects,” Stravinsky purged the last signs of “subjective experiential time” from musical 
impressionism.588 
Debussy’s music, for Brelet, represented not a pseudomorphism of painting, but a 
metamorphosis of temporal experience. Debussy drew his compositional technique not from the 
visual arts, but from “sound in itself and for itself,” from sound “as a sufficient absolute and as a 
stable system resting only on itself.”589 Debussy constructed “sonic form” through an analysis 
and presentation of the “image of the musical present of sound.”590 To loosen the grip of the 
musical theme was not, in Brelet’s consideration, to spatialize music. It was, in Debussy’s case, 
to reconceive progress in terms of a “harmonic Stimmung,” allowing musical time to 
“spontaneously flow” from the “natural relationships” between sonorities.591  
In the “atmospheric” development of Debussy’s impressionism, musical duration sprang 
“from the harmonic instant.”592 The reasons for temporal stasis in Debussy’s music were, Brelet 
averred, musical reasons. Debussyan duration was “in a certain sense static insofar as it” tended 
to be “only the explicitation of a harmonic simultaneity.”593 In itself, harmony was “immobile” 
and negated the “becoming of melody”; thus impressionistic melody imprisoned the listener 
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588Ibid.  
589Brelet, Le Temps musical, 698. 
590Ibid. Emphasis in the original.  
591Ibid., 699.  
592Ibid.  
593Ibid.  
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within the harmony.594 In Debussy, the “melodic motif,” according to Brelet, arose from the 
harmony and returned thereto: it was “only, so to speak, the epiphenomenon of harmony.”595 
Debussyan melody dispersed itself in “melodic atoms.”596 Yet, within the “complete 
unfolding of the work,” within the becoming of pure harmony, these atoms “came together, 
intermingled, and secretly communicated.”597 They no longer spoke the language of thematic 
development. Their sussurations reflected the schematism of impressionistic harmony, in which 
each chord received a “meaning and an original color scheme,” acquiring a richness that “tonal 
schematism” had suppressed: 
The triad is no longer a gaunt skeleton—pure form—but a dense and living substance: 
freed from the formal veils with which tonality had masked it, it glistens and gleams, 
shines from its natural and original brilliance, which musical thought had always 
ignored—which it had itself switched off; and similarly the isolated sonority, no longer 
the banal and replaceable element of a form valuable outside of itself, recovers its flesh, 
becomes alive and vibrant, sensory and colorful: and each sonority, each chord is now a 
unique and precious individuality that sonic form respects and confirms.598 
 
In the temporality of impressionism, the “present flourishes in becoming” and “becoming is 
condensed in the present,” and these two inverse movements produce the same effect—the 
“supremacy of the present,” the “absorption of becoming within an eternal present.”599 
In his attitude toward musical time, Stravinsky presented, in Brelet’s thought, not a 
reflection of Debussy, but a reversal. Where Debussy deployed harmony “according to its 
internal rhythm, in a strictly sonic musical time that was sufficient outside of rhythmic form,” 
                                                 
594Ibid. 
595Ibid., 700.  
596Ibid.  
597Ibid.  
598Ibid., 700–1: “L’accord parfait n’est plus squelette décharné, pure forme, mais substance vivante et 
dense: délivré des voiles formels dont le masquait la tonalité, il scintille et resplendit, brille de son éclat naturel et 
originel qu’avait toujours ignoré la pensée musicale, qui l’avait elle-même éteint; et semblablement la sonorité 
isolée, n’étant plus l’élément banal et remplaçable d’une forme valant hors d’elle, retrouve sa chair, devient vivante 
et vibrante, sensible et colorée: et chaque sonorité, chaque accord sont maintenant des individualités uniques et 
précieuses que la forme sonore respecte et confirme.” 
599Ibid., 701.  
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Stravinsky excavated and promoted an inherent temporality, a temporality buried deep within the 
heart of music itself:  
In Stravinsky, in his latest manner most of all, the musical material becomes 
dissolved in temporal form. Through the diversity of styles and sonic conceptions 
that by turns he adopts, the temporal conception that his music realizes remains 
unchanged. And, alone among all composers to have perceived that essential and 
stripped down (dépouillé) musicality which resides in temporal form, he abandons 
little by little the sonic riches of Sacre in order to keep only that original 
conception of time expressed therein, a conception which he will endeavor to 
realize more and more in its purity. Thus the evolution of Stravinsky toward a 
stripped down style seems to be a withdrawal into the properly temporal 
originality of his music.600 
 
For Brelet, rather than developing a temporary rhythmicity, Stravinsky’s music absolutized 
temporalization. 
In Debussy, the fluidity of rhythm marked “the victory of concrete musical time, sprung 
from sonority, over the abstract form of rhythm, the victory of the eternal present of sonority 
over rhythmic becoming.”601 In impressionist rhythm, “la carrure [periodic phrasing] and the 
measure, with its preformed framework of equal instants, vanish.”602 In Stravinskyan time, 
everything sonorous fell away in an experience of “that elemental power of homogeneous 
time…expressed in the carrure.”603 Meter became the sole source of musical form in 
Stravinsky’s music of “concrete rational time.”604 
                                                 
600Brelet, Esthétique et musical création, 152: “II semble que chez Strawinsky, en sa dernière manière 
surtout, la matière musica1 se dissolve en sa forme temporelle. A travers la diversité des styles et des conceptions 
sonores que tour à tour il adopte, la conception temporelle que sa musique réalise subsiste inchangée. Et, seul entre 
tous les compositeurs à avoir perçu cette musicalité essentielle et dépouillée résidant en la forme temporelle, il 
abandonne peu à peu les richesses sonores du Sacre pour ne garder que cette conception originale du temps qui s’y 
exprimait et qu’il tentera de plus en plus de réaliser dans sa pureté. Ainsi l’évolution de Strawinsky vers un style 
dépouillé semble être un repliement sur l’originalité proprement temporelle de sa musique.” 
601Brelet, Le Temps musical, 702.  
602Ibid.  
603Brelet, Esthétique et musical création, 152. For Brelet, la carrure referred to the general metrical 
framework of the music. See section 5.4.5, below. 
604Brelet, Le Temps musical, 680. 
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While the measure was lifeless in other music, it came to life in Stravinsky’s music. “In 
other music,” Brelet wrote, the measure was “only the virtual marker of a rhythm that 
corresponded solely to a lived content.”605 In Stravinsky’s works, “rhythm and measure 
converged”; the measure, no longer a “virtual marker,” became “directly actualized.”606 
Stravinsky displaced the “center of gravity of musical form” from rhythm to meter: 
…for in homogeneous time—in that central temporal experience which is the 
basis of the music of concrete rational time—rhythmic reality and metric 
intelligibility are confounded, or, rather, it is the intelligibility of meter that 
constitutes the very reality of rhythm.607 
 
Brelet found that the “living content” of Stravinsky’s compositions resided in the paradox of 
homogenous time.608 
5.3.3.3 Stravinsky / Wagner  “Violently, Stravinskyan rhythm proclaims its identity with 
meter; in a frenzy, meter shows itself to be capable of constructing rhythm through its virtues 
alone.”609 For Brelet, Stravinsky’s music was violent, but its violence was a constructive 
violence. Stravinsky directed the severity of his compositional techniques not toward a 
destruction of impressionistic sonority, but toward an intensification of classical rationality.  
Stravinsky founded his aesthetics of music on a conscious decision to “entrust to music 
the mission of realizing ‘rational time.’”610 Stravinsky was, for Brelet, a “classic in the strongest 
sense of the word,” a classic who penetrated to the “very heart of classicism—the experience of a 
time essentially obedient to the acts of reason.”611 Stravinsky’s classicism thus consisted not in 
                                                 
605Brelet, Esthétique et musical création, 158. 
606Ibid.  
607Brelet, Le Temps musical, 681: “…car dans le temps homogène, expérience temporelle centrale qui est à 
la base de la musique du temps rationnel concret, se confondent la réalité rythmique et l’intelligibilité métrique, ou 
plutôt c’est l’intelligibilité du mètre qui constitue la réalité même du rythme.” 
608Ibid., 681.  
609Ibid., 679.  
610Ibid., 678. 
611Ibid., 678.  
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the use of “certain formulas or classical forms (such as the symphony or the sonata),” but in “the 
kinship of his temporal experience with that of the classical.”612  
Adorno depicted Stravinsky’s aesthetic as a stylization of archaic violence with purely 
destructive consequences. By way of the “palpable melancholy of impressionism,” which had 
inherited “Wagner’s philosophical pessimism,” Stravinsky became, for Adorno, the ultimate heir 
to Wagnerian renunciation.613 Stravinsky earned, “with some exaggeration,” Adorno claimed, 
the title of a “Wagner who has come fully into his own, who has intentionally surrendered to the 
repetition compulsion,” who has capitulated to the “vacuity of the musical progression of the 
‘music drama’ without using the bourgeois ideals of subjectivity and development to mask the 
regressive impulse.”614 
For Brelet, however, the true scion of Wagner was not Stravinsky but Schoenberg, whose 
compositions fully realized the dissipative tendencies of Wagnerian romanticism. As an 
“originally negative form,” Schoenberg’s atonality ensued directly from Wagner’s 
expressionism, Brelet argued, and, “in a manner more consistent than the latter,” sought to 
“achieve a music of pure becoming.”615 Stravinsky, by contrast, had more in common, in 
Brelet’s assessment, with Tchaikovsky, a Russian composer who also possessed a fondness for 
the music of the classical period. Despite stylistic dissimilarities, they shared a fundamental 
aesthetic and ethical value—the implementation of discipline in music. 
                                                 
612Ibid. Emphasis in the original.  
613Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 140. If, for Adorno, Schoenberg salvaged and reaped the subjective 
vestiges of music’s dialectical promise in the wake of Wagner’s razing of tonality, the fulfillment of the objective 
implications of Wagnerian regression awaited the “empty eyes” and the “angry gaze” of Stravinsky’s “music about 
music.” Ibid., 132, 137. 
614Ibid. Adorno further noted that Stravinsky recommenced, acknowledged, and openly celebrated the 
technique that had given rise to the “older critique of Wagner,” that of having used his “motivic technique” to 
“hammer the music into the heads of the musically stupid, the kind of listener destined for industrial mass culture.” 
(This “older critique” is Nietzsche’s.) 
615Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 101. 
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5.3.3.4 Wagner / Tchaikovsky Adorno and Brelet agreed on the source of deficiency in 
Wagner’s music: Wagner’s works, they both claimed, suffered from an inadequate supply of 
dialectical process. For Brelet and for Adorno, Wagner’s one-sided musical dualism produced 
repetition, expression, stasis, and becoming without adequately exploring the relationships 
between these aspects and their opposites.  
Brelet and Adorno both imputed the falsity of Wagner’s compositions to a distortion of 
music’s essential capacities. Adorno concluded that the “exteriorization” of the “quasi-physical 
intensity” of the pervasive beating gesture of Wagner’s music coincided with a “reflex” that 
imitated a “reified, alienated reality.”616 This, for Adorno, explained the music’s lack of temporal 
development.  
For Brelet, the central problem of Wagner’s music also resulted from a category 
mistake—not that of subordinating musical time to the conductor’s baton, but of enchaining it to 
“psychological duration,” by which Brelet meant the irrational, unpredictable, unsatisfactory 
temporal realm of immediately intuited experience.617 Because of its disproportionate elevation 
of psychological duration, Wagner’s music could not be experienced temporally, as it were, on 
its own terms; the excessive promotion of a purely intuitive, pre-reflective conception of time 
came at the expense of any truly concrete and living experience of musical time. The musical 
simulation of psychological becoming projected only a false, mechanical impression of time.618 
                                                 
616Adorno, In Search of Wagner, 25. Which, Adorno claimed, Wagner falsely put forward as though it were 
the “utterance of undivided man.” 
617The notion of psychological duration plays a significant role in Brelet’s aesthetics of music. Bergson’s 
“immediate duration” may be its closest conceptual counterpart. Durée in Bergson’s philosophy refers to pure time, 
to “Real Duration,” the notion of which becomes accessible “only through inner states,” through “immediate, or 
purely qualitative, experience.” Bergsonian duration thus constitutes a “notion of time radically independent of 
space and for this reason completely inaccessible to reflective consciousness.” Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: 
An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), 66 and ff.  
618Musical time, from Brelet’s perspective, was in truth an essentially contemplated, formal, and 
constructive entity. For Brelet, the “omnipotence of psychological duration” in Wagner’s musical aesthetic entailed 
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In Brelet’s account, an essential quandary of form beset every composer of romantic 
music. Temporal experience in art only became possible through the mediation of form. 
Although romantic music would like to transform itself into a music “no longer of the act and 
actuality, but of the unknown and unrealized,” a music that aimed to be “faithful to becoming,” 
to adhere to a sphere of temporal reality whose “obscure virtualities” resisted acts of 
determination and form, Brelet asked whether such a music could really express becoming 
without annihilating the very thing it was trying to express.619 Did not the act of expressing 
becoming also determine it—i.e., destroy it? 
In the case of Wagner, whose music captured a mere phantasm of true becoming, the 
answer was certainly yes. When romantic composers attempted to inscribe within their works the 
“gropings, the pentimenti, the improvised look of the creative process,” they only reconstructed 
becoming, instead of immediately expressing it.620 Even in a “music of becoming,” Brelet stated, 
the musical work escaped from “real becoming.”621 Even if form arose in the realm of pure 
becoming, it did so through the mediating “activity of the artist,” and it could only be 
constructed on the “level of actions, not of sentiments or pure sensations.”622 
                                                                                                                                                             
a dismantling of the “frameworks of the harmonic thinking and rational time of classicism” but proposed in its place 
no viable scheme for rebuilding and reorganizing music’s formal and temporal edifice. Brelet, Le Temps musical, 
693.  
Wagner’s romantic art had an “essentially negative and negating character”; it served to systematically 
undermine “harmony and melody, tonality and rhythm, and finally thematism—i.e., all the determinations of 
classical form that had introduced intelligibility into musical becoming.” Where there had been rationality, order, 
objectivity, Wagner posited the “imprecision,” “fluidity,” and “instantaneity” of psychological becoming. He 
created a “new sonic material” in the “image of psychological duration,” using the materials of musical sound to 
drive a wedge between the parameters of form and expression, effectively carrying out a negation of musical time in 
the process. Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 101. 
619Ibid., 101, 97. 
620Ibid., 98.  
621Ibid., 99. 
622Ibid. Brelet argued that romantic music, as an attempt to express pure becoming, implicitly payed 
“homage to intelligible form” in the same way that “Bergsonian analyses of immediate duration” indirectly deferred 
to the very intelligence they had set out to devastate. Brelet often likened Wagner’s music to the philosophy of 
Bergson. Both, she claimed, manifested but failed to resolve the fundamental contradiction between intelligence and 
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Wagner presented only one aspect of musical romanticism, however. “There are two 
romanticisms,” Brelet wrote.623 One, the destructive path, had been cleared by Wagner; the 
other, the constructive course, had been charted by Tchaikovsky.624 
Wagnerian music, along with “German music in general,” emphasized, for Brelet, the 
“Dionysian aspect of time.”625 As a result, it tended to assimilate a “diversity of psychological 
content,” a content “irreducible in its materiality and its humanity” and “necessarily opposed to 
form.”626 In Wagner, the “obscure forces of becoming” eclipsed the Apollonian quality of time, 
permanently disrupting the internal equilibrium of his work.627 In Tchaikovsky, however, 
romanticism overcame the “conflict of the formal and expressive within psychological duration 
itself” through the “discipline of musical time.”628 
Rather than German music’s reification of “immediate human experience,” which 
sacrificed “artistic form” to the demands of “extrinsic expression,” Tchaikovsky’s romanticism 
                                                                                                                                                             
becoming. In the romanticism of Wagner, as in Bergsonism, “pure becoming” appeared “unthinkable”: “either 
thought, in determining it, annihilates it, or, refusing to determine it, recognizes that it is beyond all possible 
determination.” Wagner’s attempts to impose form on his romantic evocations of pure becoming, like attempts to 
formulate conceptions of Bergsonian duration, thus withered under the corrupting influence of his object. Brelet, 
Esthétique et création musicale, 102. 
623Ibid., 120.  
624Ibid., 141: “There are thus two musics of becoming: a music of pathological becoming, wherein the soul 
surrenders to the passivity of its states and no longer knows anything of time but its destructive powers; and a music 
of formal becoming, wherein the soul, identifying itself with its internal momentum, recovers the creative powers of 
time and the harmony of musical form. Unlike pure empiricism, which destroyed the intrinsic requirements of 
musical time, the lyricism of subjective duration, as we find in Tchaikovsky, is made to agree with it and rejoin it; 
yet this is because a secret formalism animates this second sort of empiricism.” 
[“Il est donc deux musiques du devenir: une musique du devenir pathologique, où l’âme s’abandonne à la 
passivité de ses états et ne connaît plus du temps que ses pouvoirs destructeurs; une musique du devenir formel, où 
l’âme, s’identifiant à son élan intérieur, retrouve les pouvoirs créateurs du temps et l’harmonie de la forme musicale. 
A l’inverse de l’empirisme pur qui détruisait les exigences intrinsèques du temps musical, le lyrisme de la durée 
subjective, tel que nous le trouvons chez Tschaïkowsky, s’accorde avec lui et le rejoint: mais c’est qu’un formalisme 
secret anime cette deuxième sorte d’empirisme.”] 
625Ibid.  
626Ibid.  
627Ibid.  
628Ibid.  
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successfully merged the “expressive and living content” of the music with its form.629 While 
Wagner only achieved a “synthesis between experience and form” outside of musical time 
(which, according to Brelet, he essentially failed to create), Tchaikovsky inaugurated a “living 
and creative temporal scheme” that appeased the “antinomy of becoming and form.”630 He 
discovered a “premusical form” that “spontaneously” appealed to the “sonic content” of his 
music.631 His pathétisme was not pathologique, like that of Wagner; its essence was active, not 
passive, and it gave expression to a musical form that unfolded in an “autonomous musical 
time,” wrenching the music’s “emotional content” from the “passivity of pure duration” and 
transforming it into a positive and creative force of affectivity.632 
To balance the competing demands of psychological duration and musical time, 
Tchaikovsky harnessed the formal powers of empirical time. Unlike Wagner, in whom the 
“experience of time as given” precluded the “experience of time as activity and creation,” 
Tchaikovsky, according to Brelet, uncovered the “formal qualities” of becoming, demarcating a 
constructive role for psychological duration in musical creation. Whereas Wagner created an 
“irreducible duality between theoretical form and expressive content,” elevating expressionism 
to the level of “abstract theory,” Tchaikovsky brought “subjective duration into agreement with 
musical time.”633 
                                                 
629Ibid., 121.  
630Ibid., 121, 118.  
631Ibid., 121–2. 
632Ibid., 122.  
633Ibid., 125–6. See also ibid., 136: “While the passive duration of Wagnerian music only passed by and 
fled irremediably, the positive becoming of Tchaikovsky develops and progresses. And like the duration of Creative 
Evolution [i.e., Bergson], it soars upwards toward the future while preserving its past. The instants accumulate 
instead of being liquidated and compose by their sum a duration that escapes the elapsing of time and in a certain 
manner rejoins eternity. Thus becoming is realized within a present that performs its positive and creative virtues.” 
[“Alors que la durée passive de la musique wagnérienne ne faisait que passer et fuire irrémédiablement, le 
devenir positif de Tschaïkowsky est épanouissement et progrès. Et comme la durée de L’Évolution créatrice, il 
s’élance vers l’avenir tout en conservant son passé. Les instants s’ajoutent au lieu de se détruire et composent par 
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Having sundered form and expression, Wagner’s pathological romanticism collapsed—
unable to muster the discipline necessary to reach the shores of musical time, it sank beneath the 
waves of psychological becoming. The “originality of Tchaikovsky’s romanticism” was to have 
“overcome the conflict of the formal and the expressive within psychological duration itself, to 
have recognized that this duration, for its completion, required the discipline of musical time.”634 
Thus in addition to successfully aestheticizing psychological experience, the expressionism of 
Tchaikovsky fulfilled an “ethical function”—the “role of producing discipline.”635  
5.3.3.5 Tchaikovsky / Stravinsky  Expression, in Tchaikovsky’s romanticism, preserved the 
equilibrium of musical form: “concrete schemes of duration” conciliated the “conflict between 
thought and experience.” 636 Tchaikovsky transmuted the immanent forms of his own 
psychological material according to the requirements of musical duration in order to express 
original musical forms.637 
Genuinely musical creation, Brelet claimed, consisted solely in the individual work’s 
“reconquest” of the “musical time of sonority.”638 This movement toward musical time took 
place through the “askesis of the creator from psychological duration to musical time”—a 
                                                                                                                                                             
leur somme une durée qui échappe à l’écoulement du temps et rejoint d’une certaine manière l’éternité. Ainsi le 
devenir se réalise à l’intérieur d’un présent qui accomplit ses vertus positives et créatrices.”] 
634Ibid.  
635Ibid. 
636Ibid., 132.  
637Ibid., 133: “In Tchaikovsky, on the contrary, sonic form is not simply deduced from psychological 
content; rather, the latter is relived according to the intuition of musical time. Thus experience is fully transmuted 
into form: expression no longer has anything of the extrinsic; rather than inducing a relinquishment of musical time, 
expression now resides within musical time itself.” 
[“Chez Tschaïkowsky au contraire, la forme sonore n’est pas simplement déduite des contenus 
psychologiques, mais ceux-ci sont revécus selon l’intuition du temps musical. Ainsi le vécu se transmue-t-il 
intégralement en forme: l’expression n’est plus rien d’extrinsèque, elle ne nous contraint pas à déserter le temps 
musical, mais nous la trouvons à l’intérieur de ce temps musical même.”] 
638Brelet, Le Temps musical, 424.  
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practice of self-discipline that, having “purified” all the sentiments of psychological duration, 
came to dance in the “elation [l’allégresse] of the musical time of the work.”639  
Such an ascetic purification became meaningful, in Brelet’s view, as an “instrument of 
realization”: 
Musical time, far from being the pure negation of psychological duration, is the 
askesis of the latter toward its highest powers; psychological duration discovers in 
musical time the secret essence of itself, for it aspires to shake off that vacuity, 
inertia, and inefficiency that too often characterizes it and to conquer that 
plenitude and creative dynamism that belong to musical time.640 
 
In Brelet’s account, Tchaikovsky tapped into a “latent formalism” within his own “empirical 
duration,” and the formal empiricism of his music succeeded to the extent that it simultaneously 
occupied two parallel planes of temporality, that of particularized human subjectivity (i.e., 
psychological or expressive duration) and that of objective musical time.641 Brelet held that 
Tchaikovsky’s “best works” maintained a “harmonious balance between psychological duration 
and musical time,” but that, “in itself,” this balance was “fragile and unstable.”642 Tchaikovsky’s 
music sometimes lapsed into the unruliness of a “vulgar pathetism” or, conversely, into the 
mechanical regularity of a “purely technical” formalism.643 
It was left to Stravinsky’s music to jettison the elements of fragility and volatility in 
Tchaikovsky’s aesthetics, completing the ascetic process that Tchaikovsky’s music had initiated. 
Stravinsky stripped away the bits and pieces of the particular, the individual, and the human that 
still obstructed, in Tchaikovsky, the materialization of the pure formalism of musical 
                                                 
639Ibid. 
640Ibid., 425: “Le temps musical, loin d’être pure négation de la durée psychologique, est ascèse de celle-ci 
vers ses plus hauts pouvoirs; la durée psychologique découvre dans le temps musical l’essence secrète d’elle-même, 
car elle aspirait à secouer cette vacuité, cette inertie et cette inefficacité qui trop souvent la caractérisent et à 
conquérir cette plénitude et ce dynamisme créateur qui appartiennent au temps musical.” 
641Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 143.  
642Ibid., 142. 
643Ibid.  
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temporality. Tchaikovsky had located in his own “psychological experience” some “temporal 
schemata” that conformed to the laws of musical time. Because of the limitations of their 
inherent subjectivity, however, they lacked the “universal objectivity of Stravinsky’s.”644 
5.4 STRAVINSKYAN DIALECTICS 
In Adorno’s view, a genuinely musical time could not be drawn from the “reified order of time 
itself,” could not result from an abstract temporal gesture, but only from the application of a 
constructive principle which transformed that gesture into a moment within the “dialectical 
progression of substance” of a musical work, into a moment of expression within a work’s “inner 
historicity.”645 To wit, truly musical time could only come into existence, in Adorno’s 
conception, through the creation of musical form.  
For Brelet as well, musical creation invariably and inseparably entwined time, form, and 
expression. Brelet emphasized the relationship between the concrete reality of the musician (in 
terms of subjective experience and psychological duration) and the temporal progression of the 
musical work (in terms of “objective time” and “intrinsically musical form”).646 That which 
mediated this relationship was the “vocal act,” in which the “soul” of the musician made “an 
                                                 
644Ibid., 134. 
645Adorno, In Search of Wagner, 23, 32. The “temporal form of every music,” Adorno wrote in an essay on 
the relationship between philosophy and music in 1953, constituted its “inner historicity,” a temporal process that 
was immanent in the musical work, but that also echoed “real, external time”—that was in fact “real historical time, 
reflected as appearance.” Theodore W. Adorno, “On the Contemporary Relationship of Philosophy and Music,” in 
Essays on Music, trans. Susan H. Gillespie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 144. In Aesthetic 
Theory, Adorno made a similar statement about artworks more generally: “The latent processes in artworks, which 
break through in the instant, are their inner historicity, sedimented external history.” Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 85–
6.  
646Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 107.  
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impression of itself.”647 Through the voice, sonority created the “sensorial thing that will come to 
affect it and that, once produced, instead of being imposed passively, will awaken the act that 
created it.”648  
The voice, as the medium of the will, made of sonority its instrument and its work. It 
freed sound from its enchainment to signification and delivered it to “intelligence for the purpose 
of disinterested knowledge.”649 Liberated from an obligation to signify, to represent something 
external, sounds presented themselves to consciousness. Within the musical imagination, they 
came to express themselves as actions. “Musical expression,” Brelet wrote, was not “the 
expression of sentiments, of particular modalities of the soul, but the expression of its acts, of its 
ability to invent itself, to create its own forms.”650  
According to Brelet’s phenomenology, Stravinsky returned to the primordial phenomena 
of music—to sound and time. In desublimating and decorticating music’s contents, he made 
possible an active contemplation of the hyletic (i.e., incalculably sensorial) data of music. And 
thus, through the “living content of the measure,” his music furnished an aesthetic experience of 
the mystery of the eternal present. 
5.4.1 Desublimating Music 
For Adorno, all music originated in gesticulation and gesture, but, in the Western musical 
tradition, the “pre-linguistic” and gestural beginnings of music had been progressively 
                                                 
647Brelet, Le Temps musical, 410. 
648Ibid. 
649Ibid., 402.  
650Ibid., 421. 
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“sublimated” and “interiorized” into expression.651 Composers of “great music,” according to 
Adorno, had always aimed at creating an equilibrium between expression (into which they 
diverted the archaic physical impulse of gesture) and construction (the subjection of the “overall 
flow of the music to a process of logical synthesis”).652 Yet, beginning with Wagner in the 
nineteenth century, a tendency toward expressional desublimation had begun to overtake the 
composition of modern music.653  
From Wagner to Stravinsky, via Debussy, Adorno traced the breakdown of musical 
form.654 In addition to the propensity to dissociate the “musical continuum of time,” Wagner’s 
music anticipated the desublimational inclination of Debussy and Stravinsky in other specific 
ways, including the fragmentation of melodic material, the expansion of harmonic vocabulary, 
and the dissolution of tonally harmonic functionality.655 Wagner instituted a profound melodic-
harmonic disparity, and the various ways in which composers responded to this Wagnerian 
                                                 
651Adorno, In Search of Wagner, 24.  
652Ibid., 24.  
653In the “Viennese antiphony” of Beethoven, for example, “everything of a gestural nature” had already 
been “transmuted into intellectual development.” Yet in Wagner the expressive dimension of music regressed into 
gesture. Wagner, however, made the “intermittent gesture” his “fundamental principle of composition,” and, instead 
of developing (i.e., sublimating and interiorizing) the gestures of his music, he merely repeated them, presenting 
them as “essentially immutable and atemporal.” In refusing to submit them to a “process of transformation,” he 
circumvented the “necessity to create musical time.” Adorno, In Search of Wagner, 26. Desublimation is not a word 
that Adorno himself uses. Yet it aptly conveys the processes that he describes. 
654In terms of compositional technique, as Max Paddison has noted, Debussy linked, in Adorno’s view, 
“Wagner’s lack of true dynamic development through emphasis on the essentially ‘static’ and symbolic leitmotif and 
on instrumental colour” and “Stravinsky’s obsessive repetitions.” In terms of the philosophical, historical, and social 
“relationship of Subject to Object,” Debussy’s music embodied a “capitulation to the Object,” and the music of 
Stravinsky extended the “capitulation of the Subject to the ‘culinary’ objectivity of ‘elementary tonal 
combinations’” in Debussy’s mature works. Wagner, Debussy, and Stravinsky all renounced the aesthetic demands 
of adequately responding to the historical situation of the modern subject, seeking instead to “represent the archaic, 
mythical, and ahistorical in music, and to signify ‘nature’ and ‘fate.’” All three, Adorno argued, produced music that 
was “essentially undialectical in its relation to its material.” Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 256–7. 
655Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 138. 
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conundrum largely determined, from Adorno’s perspective, the course of Western musical 
aesthetics in the twentieth century.656 
For Brelet, however, an investigation of the historical process of what Adorno described 
as musical sublimation and interiorization revealed not the logical necessity of such a process, 
but its arbitrariness. Instead, Brelet imparted to music a radical agency: 
Music had been able to be language, language of ideas or emotions: it has not 
wanted it; and to banish once and for all that temptation, it created sound, essence 
of itself...657 
 
As if music had somehow effected, of its own accord, a retrogression—a return to its ontological 
origins, to sound, and, more precisely, to the “sounds of the voice.”658 To follow music 
                                                 
656As the “young Schoenberg” had discovered, the “tonal system” foundered under attempts to combine 
Wagnerian harmony with truly independent melodic lines. Two basic options remained to composers who decided 
to retain Wagner’s extended harmonic vocabulary: they could “dilute the melody” to the point where it became a 
“mere harmonic function,” or they could “violently decree melodic expansions” that clashed with the “harmonic 
schema.” While Debussy pursued the former possibility, it was Stravinsky, Adorno claimed, who fully drew its 
consequences: “Conscious of the weakness of the melodic implications, which actually no longer existed, he 
abolished the concept of melody entirely in favor of a truncated, primitivistic model.” Adorno, Philosophy of New 
Music, 186, note 10. The “calculatedly thin melismata” of Stravinsky, for example, descended directly from the 
“quasi-physical motif” of Debussy. ibid., 193. Only Schoenberg, in Adorno’s mind, actually succeeded in 
emancipating “melos and, by doing so, the harmonic dimension itself.” ibid., 186, note 10.  
Philosophically, Debussy and Stravinsky also evinced a genealogical connection to Wagner. In its 
“palpable melancholy,” Debussy’s music inherited Wagner’s “philosophical pessimism.” According to Adorno, 
French music in general, including that of Debussy, had “renounced all metaphysics, even its pessimistic forms.” 
Yet even in doing so, its physics nonetheless advocated Wagner’s “fundamental metaphysical category” of 
renunciation: in the objective musical structure of their compositions, Debussy and other French composers 
articulated a form of the Wagnerian “denial of the will to life,” and they did so “all the more strongly,” Adorno 
argued, the more their music exhibited signs of contentment with a form of “happiness” so severely impoverished 
that—reduced to a “simple being here,” to “absolute momentariness”—it was “no longer any happiness at all.” The 
“resignation” of Wagner and Debussy prepared the way for the “liquidation of the individual,” a cause which 
Stravinsky’s music celebrated. Ibid., 140. 
For Brelet, Debussy and Stravinsky renounced not metaphysics itself, but a certain form of metaphysics—
namely, that metaphysics which Brelet names “transcendental.” Each embraced instead an immanent metaphysics. 
Debussy derived his metaphysics from the immanent properties of musical sound, Stravinsky from those of musical 
time.  
657Brelet, Le Temps musical, 399: “La musique eût pu être langage, langage des idées ou des émotions: elle 
ne l’a point voulu; et pour bannir une fois pour toutes cette tentation, elle a créé le son, essence d’elle-même…” 
658Ibid., 400. 
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backwards was to regress, but not in a pejorative sense. It was, in Brelet’s view, to find in the 
“creation of sound” the “essential act of music,” the essence of music as activity.659  
Music, for Brelet, ideally expressed only itself: “Music embodies the pure act of 
expressing itself—the voice and the gesture.”660 Of bodily gestures, sonic form preserved only a 
generalized rhythm (the alternation of the body’s “tensions and relaxations”) and an “imaginary 
and symbolic curve in sonic space.”661 The “musical gesture par excellence” was, as mentioned 
above, the “vocal gesture.”662 “Immediately embodied in sounds,” the gesture of the voice 
represented a “spiritualized” movement of the body—a gesture expressed both “materially and 
spiritually” in music.663 
For Brelet, twentieth-century musical aesthetics registered not a breakdown of form, but a 
deliberate dismantling of expression. A progressive desublimation of musical expression 
culminated in the return to the “subtlest of gestures”—the voice.664 Rather than the “liquidation 
of the individual,” desublimation facilitated the rediscovery of the ground of individuation itself, 
the ground upon which the subject became conscious of itself as a subject.665 To return to the 
voice was to return not only to the origin of music (i.e., sound) but also to the origin of the 
reflecting self. For Brelet, to turn away from the contingency of any historical tradition of music 
making was to pinpoint the “first act of music and musical thought”—to “think sound as 
such.”666  
                                                 
659Ibid.  
660Brelet, Le Temps musical, 411. The second volume of Le Temps musical treats the topic of la forme 
musicale, its first chapter tackles the “problem of musical expression,” and its third chapter takes on the relationship 
between “form and expression.” 
661Ibid. 
662Ibid.  
663Ibid.  
664Ibid., 412.  
665Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 140.  
666Brelet, Le Temps musical, 402, 404.  
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Thinking sound from within resolved, for Brelet, the problem of musical expression; such 
thinking removed the ostensible conflict between “expression and musical thought.”667 Thus the 
antinomy that Adorno identified as the key to understanding and evaluating Western art music 
appeared necessary only from a specific vantage point. From a different point, at an “angle to the 
German stem,” the dispensability of this antinomy became apparent. It was no longer a necessity 
but a mere contingency.668 
Stravinsky’s music, from Brelet’s perspective, adopted such an angle. In choosing not to 
“convey sentiments in their contingent particularities,” but only to project a “universal and active 
schema,” Stravinsky expressed in music the understructure of subjectivity itself—he expressed 
“abstract subjectivity, i.e., the essential and fundamental acts through which the subject is 
posited.”669 In Stravinskyan form, “at once both pure and concrete,” subjectivity subdued itself 
from within; the subject, in Stravinsky’s music, consented to its own inner objectivity, its 
properly objective essence.670 The subject acceded to the “forgetting of itself—to the forsaking 
of its contents in order to be identified with its actions.”671 The subject, in other words, 
transformed itself into the “pure momentum of activity.”672 
For Adorno, Schoenberg’s “formal innovations” made music’s “emotional content” real 
for the first time. Through the mediation of form, Schoenberg transmuted that which is expressed 
in music from a semblance of emotions into their reality. For Brelet, Schoenberg simply 
heightened the effects of what was, to her thinking, an ultimately vain compositional project. 
                                                 
667Ibid., 403. 
668Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, Dialogues (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 30. “…I 
relate only from an angle to the German stem (Bach-Haydn-Mozart-Beethoven-Schubert-Brahms-Wagner-Mahler-
Schoenberg), which evaluates largely in terms of where a thing comes from and where it is going. But an angle may 
be an advantage.” 
669Ibid., 151.  
670Ibid., 144. 
671Ibid. 
672Ibid., 145.  
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Even if Schoenberg’s music had been capable of expressing actual human emotions, Brelet 
would have argued that such affects were not truly musical (i.e., that they misconstrued, even if 
sometimes productively, the expressive possibilities of music itself).673 It was a mistake to think 
that music could serve as a suitable medium for the sonic transliteration of human emotions or 
that music could somehow be the immediate expression of such emotions. Rather than the 
“deposition” of psychic states, musical expression should be the “decortication” of psychic 
contents and the propagation of purely musical forms. 
“Music in truth only knows one sentiment,” according to Brelet—“that of appeasement 
and joy.”674 This “appeasement,” this “joy,” was, moreover, the same sentiment that came as a 
result of “thought freely exercising itself” in aesthetic contemplation.675 Harmony and rhythm 
could not effectively translate the “sentiments and passions of everyday life.”676 If anything, 
Brelet maintained, the only things that musical sounds could express without mediation were the 
“pure forms of the mind”—not concepts or images, to which musical sounds always retained a 
dialectical relationship (i.e., a relationship that required constant mediation), but the formal 
categories of the intellect.677  
For Brelet, it was not Schoenberg but Stravinsky who revolutionized the function of 
musical expression. In her view, Stravinsky’s music operated as an objective expression of 
                                                 
673In a memorable depiction, Albright writes that “Adorno, an Apollonian in wolf’s clothes” argues that a 
“dissonant chord is not a representation of a spasm in the brain, but is a spasm in the brain.” Daniel Albright, 
Untwisting the Serpent: Modernism in Music, Literature, and Other Arts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000), 14–21. 
674Brelet, Le Temps musical, 408. “This is at least its fundamental emotional tone, as Hegel profoundly 
saw.” 
675Ibid. 
676Ibid., 409.  
677Ibid., 406. “Musical form, like the idea, is invisible, and, like the idea, it is the perfect form. And the 
mystery of musical thought is cleared up when it is discovered that in sounds, pure forms of the mind, like invisible 
sounds, are translated immediately without intermediaries and without display.” 
[“La forme musicale, comme l’idée, est invisible et, comme l’idée, elle est la forme parfaite. Et le mystère 
de la pensée musicale s’éclaircit lorsqu’on découvre que dans les sons, les formes pures de l’esprit, comme le son 
invisibles se traduisent immédiatement, sans intermédiaire et sans écran.”] 
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music’s fundamental laws. Therein the creative human subject expressed itself, seemingly 
paradoxically, by not expressing itself. In intentionally suppressing itself, in disciplining itself, in 
ascetically purifying itself of the personal and the particular, the human subject expressed, 
through the materials of music, only the essence of the musical object and its innermost laws. 
And, in doing so, it came to be, at least momentarily, no longer merely a human subject, but a 
musical subject as well. If, for Adorno, Schoenberg’s music was passion itself, Stravinsky’s 
music, for Brelet, was action itself. 
In Brelet’s philosophy, music carried the potential to shape a new humanity. It “awakens 
passions,” but does not express them.678 It “suscitates” them only “in order to sweep us away 
more completely toward the serene regions in which its forms move.”679 It “instills in us a 
musical being who thinks and feels according to the logic of the universe of sounds.”680 It takes 
us apart and then reconstructs us, fashioning anew our desires and sentiments. “When we listen 
to music,” Brelet says, “our desires and sentiments…become others”: 
We desire and feel music in accordance with the laws of musical thought; the joys 
and sorrows of the soul, all of its habitual dynamic comes to nourish sonic form, 
but it is the logic of musical discourse that regulates this dynamic and decides 
sovereignly. To think sounds is to live with them in their universe, is to make 
their appeals the law of our desires, chain ourselves to their forms, make our own 
their attractions and repulsions; and the desires that the musical work awakens in 
us, are they not filled so easily because they are founded on the fundamental 
desire that is itself accomplished according to musical laws? In order to taste the 
musical work, it is necessary that we be complicit in its designs, that its desires be 
our own. It is a new being who is suscitated by the work of art in which it is 
included, as it was necessary to create a new being, purified of the human and 
living according to aesthetic law.681 
                                                 
678Ibid., 409.  
679Ibid.  
680Ibid.  
681Ibid.: “Nous désirons et sentons en la musique selon les lois de la pensée musicale; les joies et les 
douleurs de l’âme, toute sa dynamique habituelle viennent nourrir la forme sonore, mais c’est la logique du discours 
musical qui règle cette dynamique et en décide souverainement. Penser les sons, c’est vivre avec eux en leur univers, 
c’est faire de leurs appels la loi de nos désirs, nous enchaîner â leurs formes, faire nôtres leurs attractions et 
répulsions; et les désirs que l’œuvre musicale éveille en nous, ne les comble-t-elle pas si aisément que parce qu’ils 
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The Stravinskyan being obeyed not the whims of psychological duration, but the immanent laws 
of musical time. It desublimated expression and decorticated the psyche. 
5.4.2 Aesthetic Dépouillement 
Already in 1932, Adorno had noted that the “virtuosity of Stravinsky and his followers” formed 
“an exact antithesis to the “mastery of Schoenberg and his school.”682 Where Schoenberg’s 
music expressed alienation, Stravinsky’s music, pretending to extinguish it, succeeded only in 
repressing it. Where Schoenberg’s music entered into a dialectical relationship with the social 
situation, Stravinsky’s music refused involvement in “any social dialectic.”683 Where 
Schoenberg’s music represented “social antinomies,” Stravinsky’s music offered only an 
imaginary representation of a “non-existent ‘objective’ society.”684  
For Brelet, Stravinsky’s music had more to do with presenting, with enacting the 
possibility for an aesthetic experience of the ontological reality of musical time. Brelet did not 
look to Stravinsky for sociological analysis. The antinomies that his music activated were 
nonetheless social, Brelet maintained, in the sense that they were universally shared by human 
                                                                                                                                                             
se fondent en le fondamental désir qu’elle-même s’accomplisse selon les lois musicales? Pour goûter l’œuvre 
musicale, il faut que nous soyons complices de ses desseins, que ses désirs soient les nôtres. C’est un être neuf que 
suscite l’œuvre d’art en qui la comprend, comme il fallut pour la créer un être neuf, purifié de l’humain et vivant 
selon la loi esthétique.” 
682Theodore W. Adorno, “On the Social Situation of Music,” in Essays on Music, trans. Susan H. Gillespie, 
ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 403.  
683Ibid., 396.  
684Ibid. Adorno charged composers with the impossible but necessary task of “developing a dialectical 
method” from the standpoint of a “self-reflective subject,” but in a context in which that subject’s “own attempt to 
liquidate everything outside of itself” had brought about its own liquidation as well. Shierry Weber Nicholson and 
Jeremy J. Shapiro, introduction to Hegel: Three Studies, by Theodore W. Adorno (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1993), xiv. In putting this method into practice, composers should not, Adorno argued, reinforce the “illusion of 
reconciliation” between subject and object, but maintain and sharpen the antagonism between them. Adorno, 
Philosophy of New Music, 25. They should likewise resist the inclination to simply “resurrect the liquidated 
subject,” but strive to attain that very “otherness” which a “subject-oriented dialectic” would categorically deny. 
Nicholson and Shapiro, introduction to Hegel: Three Studies, xiv. 
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beings—they were the same antinomies that comprised the dialectical framework of human 
consciousness. In the temporal organization of his music, Stravinsky manufactured a dialectical 
operation that corresponded to the “creative process” of “consciousness itself.”685  
For Brelet, a Lavellian dialectic of temporal experience thus governed Stravinsky’s 
musical aesthetic.686 Stravinsky constructed a specific dialectical movement of being and 
becoming in his music, wherein “obstinate repetitions of the same motives” demonstrated a 
commitment to the temporal presentation of atemporal themes.687 Rather than a stifling of 
becoming, Stravinskyan repetition maintained and renewed the music’s “creative momentum”; 
essentially active, such repetition avoided falling into a form of “stagnation in the past.” 688 As 
activity rather than “pure content,” as the “incessant return of the act to itself,” Stravinskyan 
repetition spontaneously generated the “eternity of musical time” from the “elementary 
becoming of life,” insofar as the temporal fabric of Stravinsky’s music merged completely “with 
its own becoming instead of being distinct from it.”689  
By means of the Stravinskyan temporal dialectic, consciousness conquered time, 
conquered “itself in time in order to finally regain control over time itself and attain the 
eternal.”690 To return to the eternal, to find once again the “essential purpose,” to recover the 
origin—the process of returning was one of aesthetic “stripping away” (dépouillement).691 In 
order to incarnate the essential categories of musical time, Brelet’s Stravinsky followed a 
creative path that traversed the Lavellian conceptions of duration and eternity.  
                                                 
685Brelet, Le Temps musical, 687–8. 
686Brelet never explicitly connects Stravinsky’s music with Lavelle’s dialectical method; the connection is 
an implicit one in her writing. 
687Ibid., 684. 
688Ibid. 
689Ibid., 684, 689, and 689, note 1.  
690Ibid.  
691Ibid.  
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For Lavelle, duration, in contrast to becoming, represented the means by which the 
subject legitimately conserved, takes possession of itself in time through a living act. It was itself 
a dialectical process of temporal participation: in Lavellian duration, as Colin Smith has 
observed, “the self builds itself up by a process of progressive enrichment; but there is also a 
parallel process of stripping away (dépouillement) and it is through this elimination of what is 
not required that the highest forms of being [i.e., the eternal forms] are attained.”692 
For Brelet, it was as a result of this decorticating procedure that the structures of 
Stravinsky’s music produced an “image of the eternal present”: 
Although the creative act, in Stravinsky, is experienced in the created object, it 
perpetually withdraws from that object, returning to itself and to its possibilities. 
And just as each work is a complete universe based on an original and irreducible 
thought, wherein it seems that music itself is called into question, so in each 
particular work the various instants, always original and irreducible—regardless 
of their kinship or likeness—each appear to be the expression of a new thought, of 
a thought that is not afraid of venturing beyond its previous manifestations, of 
rejecting its previous conquests, of being caught in and of losing its resources, but 
on the contrary is eager for a decortication that preserves its original freshness.693 
 
For Lavelle, time and eternity came to coincide in the instant, in that non-place where “liberty 
operates,” where the subject decides between becoming (i.e., “pure change”) and eternity.694 The 
instants of Stravinsky’s works effectuated, for Brelet, a further process of dépouillement, one in 
which eternity liberated “the self from its creations…and its identification with the creative 
                                                 
692Smith, 69.  
693Brelet, Le Temps musical, 685: “L’acte créateur, chez Strawinsky, bien qu’il s’éprouve dans l’objet créé, 
perpétuellement s’en retire, retourne à soi et à ses possibles. Et de même que chaque œuvre de Strawinsky est un 
univers complet, fondé sur une pensée originale et irréductible, où il semble que la musique même soit remise en 
question, de même en chaque œuvre particulière les différents instants, toujours originaux et irréductibles—quelle 
que soit leur parenté ou leur ressemblance—semblent chacun être l’expression d’une pensée neuve, d’une pensée 
qui ne craint pas, en s’aventurant hors de ses précédentes manifestations, en rejetant ses précédentes conquêtes, de 
se perdre et de perdre ses ressources, mais au contraire est avide d’un dépouillement qui préserve son originelle 
fraîcheur.” 
694Smith, 70. The concept of the instant, which has been discussed here in relation to Jankélévitch and 
Levinas, is an important one for Lavelle. It, the instant, is, as Smith notices, a “more complicated idea than that of a 
minute fraction of time, and is more related to qualitative judgement and quasi-Gestalt psychology than to any 
mathematical conception of time.” Ibid., 71. 
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act.”695 The Stravinskyan instant simulated eternity, yielding in music that “cutting edge of 
sense-giving activity, never at rest, always ahead of the forms which it engenders.”696 The 
Stravinskyan instant exposed the listener, Brelet said, to the eternal.  
In Adorno’s reading, the eternalizing gesture of Stravinsky’s music became a symptom of 
infantilism. Of those “works grouped around The Soldier’s Tale and the period of World War I,” 
the ballet burlesque Petrushka (1910–11; revised 1947) exemplified Stravinsky’s regressivity.697 
The absence of an “affirmative ideology” in these works constituted, for Adorno, the “truth 
content” of this early phase of Stravinsky’s oeuvre.698  
Adorno compared Stravinsky’s Petrushka to Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire. Like 
philosophy itself, “Pierrot and Petrushka...[survived] their own demise.”699 In treating the 
“clown whose tragedy registered the dawning powerlessness of subjectivity” but who still clung 
“ironically” to the “primacy” of his “condemned subjectivity,” the “historical trajectories of new 
music” set off in opposite directions.700 Schoenberg’s music emphasized “solitary subjectivity, 
withdrawn into itself,” recovering itself “on an imaginary plane” as the “quasi-transcendental 
subject, liberated from the ensnarements of the empirical.”701 Stravinsky’s music, by contrast, 
                                                 
695Ibid., 71.  
696Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 121. 
697Ibid. Adorno designated L’histoire du soldat (1918) as the fulcrum, the “pivotal work,” upon which 
Stravinsky turned from one type of objectivist music to another, from folklore to neo-classicism. It occupied the 
“center of his work” because it led to the “very threshold of consciousness” of the fact that his music played “temps 
espace against temps durée,” that his music prepared the “end of Bergsonianism in music.” By this, Adorno meant 
that Stravinsky’s musical setting of a text that concerned itself with the nature of time and memory simulated an 
artistic act of self-reflection.  
Charles Ramuz’s tale of a soldier who perished because he refused to “live only for the moment,” who died 
for the “coherence of experience in memory,” expressed, for Adorno, the fate of the subject in Stravinsky’s musical 
aesthetic. The renunciation of the particularity of the human, of all those things that characterized human 
consciousness and its relationship to past experience, infected all of Stravinsky’s works, both before and after 
L’histoire du soldat.  
698Ibid., 123. 
699Ibid., 109.  
700Ibid.  
701Ibid.  
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presented subjectivity not in the “image of hope for the hopeless” but in the guise of a sacrifice, 
identifying “not with the [individual] victim but with the annihilating authority” of the 
collective.702 
Brelet also stressed the significance of Petrushka: she located in its “astonishing” and 
“paradoxical” technique the quintessence of Stravinsky’s musical aesthetic.703 Brelet cited the 
French anthropologist and ethnomusicologist André Schaeffner’s 1931 monograph on 
Stravinsky, in which Schaeffner depicted a dialectical experience of Stravinsky’s music:  
Everything there [in Petrushka] conspired to bring about a general shortcut of 
expression. Never had music known concision so vehement nor celerity of 
language so evocative. A few notes of the work and here is the Russian 
exhibition, the Magician, Petrushka, and the Moor; just a few minutes later, 
everything has been said and another object already occupies our attention. 
Succession of unique moments...(of an) audacious brevity...with the quality of 
that which always seems to be sketched and yet is dense and engraved to 
perfection. Stravinsky has abridged, but by no means abolished, everything: a 
restless preciseness of terms suffices for his swift and strict thinking; the thread of 
the work has been beautifully severed, a pure sense of form always shows 
through. There is nothing more paradoxical in this music yielded in shreds than 
that of seizing in each of them equally a shred of symmetry (la carrure), perpetual 
gridlines whose sharpness resists fragmentation.”704 
 
Schaeffner described an experience in which a musical dialectic “unexpectedly proposes itself,” 
i.e., in which, “like a ship in the ice,” Stravinsky’s music immobilizes listeners, compelling them 
to reorient their attention to the very paradox, the “irresolvable binary opposition” that underlies 
experience itself.705 
From Brelet’s standpoint, Stravinsky did not annihilate the subject; he activated it, 
making it aware of itself as the dynamic source of musical dialectics. What appeared as cold and 
                                                 
702Ibid., 109–10.  
703Brelet, Le Temps musical, 686.  
704André Schaeffner, Stravinsky (Paris: Rieder, 1931), 32. Qtd. in Brelet, Le Temps musical, 686.  
705Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic, 51.  
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calculated to Adorno was, under Brelet’s gaze, the result of a “fervent sagacity,” a sagacity 
which was the “stimulation and intensification of the very spontaneity of life”: 
In Stravinskyan form, the theme is repeated or varied, or a multiplicity of themes 
succeed one another; but in any case the work progresses only through “total and 
continual renewal,” and, like a sage, the musician incessantly parts, without 
regret, from the most beautiful objects and their enjoyment in order to regain the 
purest and noblest enjoyment of the activity that generates them.706 
 
Stravinskyan subjectivity had not only the character of a sacrifice, but of a resurrection as 
well.707 
Stravinsky’s “music of the eternal present” did not, in Brelet’s view, disavow time: “not 
only did it endorse the unpredictability that it [i.e., time] provides, but it discovered in its very 
flux, which ceaselessly delivered it [i.e., Stravinsky’s music] from its past, the basis of its 
constant resurrection.”708 Stravinsky’s music bore witness to the dialectical action of the 
conscious subject: 
Stravinskyan time expresses consciousness in the purity of its fundamental act, 
not in the world of empirical content in which that act is more or less dissolved. 
And this is what explains both the formal rigor of this music and its living 
plenitude: human consciousness is presented therein, but, victorious over all its 
modes, it identifies itself with its act.709 
 
Stravinsky thus expressed the “pure act” of being; his music was the ontological act. In 
overcoming the “ontological deficiency” of time, the Stravinskyan act gave voice, in Brelet’s 
thought, to something like the Plotinian thauma, that mysterious entity, beloved by more than 
                                                 
706Brelet, Le Temps musical, 686: “Dans la forme strawinskyenne, le thème se répète ou se varie, ou bien 
une multiplicité de thèmes se succèdent; mais de toute façon, l’œuvre ne progresse que par ‘total et continuel 
renouvellement;’ et, comme un sage, le musicien sans cesse quitte sans regret les plus beaux objets et leur jouissance 
pour retrouver la jouissance plus pure et plus noble de l’activité qui les engendre.” 
707Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 109.  
708Brelet, Le Temps musical, 687.  
709Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 158: “Le temps strawinskien exprime la conscience, dans la 
pureté de son acte fondamental, et non pas le monde des contenus empiriques où cet acte plus ou moins se dissout. 
Et c’est ce qui explique, en même temps que la rigueur formelle de cette musique, sa plénitude vivante: la 
conscience humaine y est présente, mais, victorieuse de tous ses modes, elle s’identifie à son acte.” 
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one post-WWII French phenomenologist, which served as the “cause of itself and of all 
things.”710 
5.4.3 Stravinsky’s Music of Phenomenology 
Brelet argued that Stravinsky, having risen “above his individuality and his limitations,” 
navigated “upwards to the pure ‘I think,’” to the “pure categories” through which the 
construction of musical form became possible in the first place.711 In Stravinsky’s pure 
formalism, “musical time, constructed according to impersonal categories,” became “rigorously 
objective.”712 Upon arriving at the summit of an ascending dialectic, Stravinsky returned to the 
realm of sensibility once again via the gradations of a descending dialectic. A multilinear 
dialecticality characterized Stravinsky’s “concrete formalism,” which arose not merely from 
“intellectual combinations,” but from “profound acts” of the conscious self.713 
For Adorno, the neoclassical Stravinsky’s attempts to restore music’s authenticity—to 
“reinstill the binding quality in music”—verged toward the obliteration of the very possibility of 
grasping aesthetic necessities under the conditions of modernity.714 For Brelet, however, 
Stravinsky’s “archaism” could not be reduced to Hegel’s dictum regarding the futile resumption 
                                                 
710Louis Lavelle, De l’acte (Paris: Fernand Aubier, aux Éditions Montaigne, 1946), 200; Smith, 63. Smith 
remarks that “being,” for Lavelle, “is not an attribute, because as act it is the source of all attributes, and cannot 
become one of them,” and that “Jankélévitch’s quoddity is to all intents and purposes its equivalent.” 
711Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 143. also ibid., 678: In the “living rational time” of Stravinsky’s 
music, the “I think” of musical thought is no longer an “imaginary pole,” no longer an “empty form, as it appears in 
Kant,” but the “living me of Fichte, which has consciousness of uniting in itself supreme intelligibility and supreme 
reality.” 
712Ibid.  
713Ibid. 
714Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 105.  
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of past world-views in artistic creation.715 In her view, Stravinsky never adopted an archaic 
aesthetic perspective in order to employ it anachronistically as the foundation for modernist 
works of art. Contrariwise, he rediscovered in the musical past the “purity and universality of 
certain fundamental musical categories.”716 In other words, it was never anachronistic, Brelet 
might have said, to convey music’s “essential” and “eternally current” laws.717 The passage of 
time failed to diminish the sheen of their legitimacy.  
For Brelet, the creation of the new depended on an original response to the past. To 
“think the works of the past,” she wrote, was to “become conscious of the aesthetic imperative of 
the present era.”718 To locate in the works of the past a concrete “source of inspiration” was to 
discover in such works the “substantiation of a particular aesthetic.”719 To “recover in the present 
a certain style from the past” was to “reconstruct it from within a completely different sonic 
world” and to retain from it “only a universal and timeless element.”720  
Stravinsky’s study of Bach, for example, culminated in the discovery of a “style that, 
inspired by Bach, nonetheless transcended what Bach himself had made of it.”721 Rather than a 
regressive movement away from the aesthetic demands of the modern, Stravinsky’s return to 
Bach represented, for Brelet, a particularly felicitous response to those demands. A reinstitution 
and transformation of the past thus constituted a potentially viable project for new music. 
                                                 
715Ibid. in which Adorno quotes the following passage from Hegel’s Aesthetics: “It is therefore no help to 
him to adopt again, as that substance, so to say, past world-views, i.e., to propose to root himself firmly in one of 
these ways of looking at things, e.g., to turn Roman Catholic as in recent times many have done for art’s sake in 
order to give stability to their mind and to give the character of something absolute to the specifically limited 
character of their artistic product itself.” G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), 606. 
716Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 21. 
717Ibid., 22.  
718Ibid., 19.  
719Ibid.  
720Ibid.  
721Ibid.  
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5.4.4 Playing with Sound 
In Stravinsky’s music of restoration, Adorno perceived a “game” in which the “identical but 
empty” participants put on and took off a series of masks in a “seductively arbitrary” fashion.722 
In direct opposition to a “responsible dialectics” of music, Stravinsky’s “objectivism” attempted 
to “correct the alienation of music from within,” without regard for “social reality,” not through 
pursuit of the music’s “immanent dialectic,” but through “regression to older, totally pre-
bourgeois musical forms.”723 Stravinsky’s compositional aesthetic sought and failed to “affirm 
an original natural state of music.”724 
To Brelet’s ears, this distorted what Stravinsky’s music actually did. Music itself was the 
most serious of games for Brelet. Contra Adorno, Stravinsky’s music was not a masquerade, but 
a game without masks, a game that unmasked nature: 
Art is above all creation, new life in an autonomous universe, which the mind 
does not receive but gives freely. It is therefore liberation with respect to practical 
life, access to a disinterested life in which things only exist in view of themselves. 
In producing sound, the living being thwarts (déjoue) the calculations and 
artifices of nature: it plays (joue) in some way with the primitive work of nature 
in the constitution of meaning. Art is no doubt play, but we would gladly say that 
this play alone manifests the seriousness of life, its essence and its intimate and 
ultimate justification.725  
 
                                                 
722Adorno, “On the Social Situation of Music,” 403. 
723Ibid.  
724Ibid. Unsuccessfully, Stravinsky had, in Adorno’s view, attempted to restore in the present an 
“absolutely valid” image from the past, a timeless image that could be “realized here and now just as at any other 
time.” 
725Brelet, Le Temps musical, 401: “L’art est avant tout création, vie nouvelle dans un univers autonome, 
que l’esprit ne reçoit pas mais se donne librement. Il est donc libération à l’égard de la vie pratique, accès à une vie 
désintéressée où les choses n’existent qu’en vue d’elles-mêmes. En produisant le son, l’être vivant déjoue les calculs 
et les artifices de la nature: il joue en quelque sorte avec l’œuvre primitive de la nature dans la constitution du sens. 
L’art est jeu sans doute, mais nous dirions volontiers que ce jeu seul fait apparaître le sérieux de la vie, son essence 
même et sa justification intime et ultime.”  
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In Stravinsky, sound laid down “its signifying mask, its livery, abdicating its task and rejecting 
its message.”726 In Stravinsky, sound became itself, came to recognize itself as sound for the first 
time.  
For Brelet, Stravinsky not only freed sound from its “original natural state,” but also 
delivered it from its bondage to a second nature—the one that Adorno imposed on music from 
the outside, the one that the “German stem” overlaid on music, making artifice appear natural, 
inevitable, binding. Despite pretentions to authority, the historical tradition that evaluated 
“largely in terms of where a thing comes from and where it is going” did not have absolute 
jurisdiction over “pure sonic sensoriality.”727 Sound as such knew nothing of “progress.”  
Adorno’s disdain stemmed from the perception that Stravinsky treated music as a game. 
What should be serious became, in Stravinsky’s hands, a plaything. Stravinsky’s music 
constituted, for Adorno, a “game of masks,” and its characteristic movement was that of 
“hovering” continually between “game and seriousness”: within the oscillatory motion of 
Stravinsky’s music, a “game might become seriousness at any moment and change suddenly into 
satanic laughter, mocking society with the possibility of a non-alienated music.”728  
What Adorno described were the actions of someone who refused to play by the rules of 
the game. From inside the game itself, from inside the German tradition, what Stravinsky was 
doing sometimes appeared ludicrous, absurdly comical. To Adorno, for whom music was deadly 
                                                 
726Maurice Pradines, Traité de Psychologie, II, Le Génie humain, ses oeuvres (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1946), 222. Qtd. in Brelet, Le Temps musical, 401.  
727Stravinsky and Craft, Dialogues, 30; Brelet, Le Temps musical, 403.  
728Ibid., 406. Yet sometimes this undialectical hovering became “socially dialectical.” In Adorno’s 1932 
essay “On the Social Situation of Music,” Stravinsky’s “best and most exposed works” redeemed themselves 
through the provocation of “contradiction.” Works like L’histoire du soldat (1918) “absorbed social contradictions 
into artistic antinomy and gave them form.” They articulated “Stravinsky’s despair,” expressing a “subjectivity 
achieved only through fragments and ghosts of past objective musical language.” According to Adorno, Stravinsky 
drove his “totally historical despair” to the “boundary of schizophrenia in L’histoire du soldat.” By the time of 
Philosophie der neuen Musik, Adorno’s view of L’histoire du soldat had changed. Ibid., 407. 
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serious, Stravinsky’s irreverence quickly passed over into irresponsibility and moral depravity. 
To Brelet, for whom music was also serious, but serious in its very playfulness, Stravinsky’s 
bounce looks not at all sacrilegious.729 From Brelet’s perspective, Stravinsky’s music plays a 
game that has little to do with the one envisioned by Adorno.  
This game derived its rules, Brelet said, from a deeper understanding of musical time. 
Time revealed, in Stravinsky’s music, “its ability to create musical form of its own accord.”730 
Time became, in Stravinsky, both the form and the content of music, Brelet claimed. Rather than 
primarily melodic or harmonic, Stravinskyan development was “rhythmical in nature,” i.e., 
“purely temporal.”731 Brelet discovered in Stravinsky’s “formalism” a musical language based 
on the “primary and constructive power of rhythm.”732 Adorno made a similar observation, but, 
for him, the supremacy of rhythm in Stravinsky led to the destruction rather than the renewal of 
musical time. In Stravinsky’s “archaic” modernism, the confluence of “taste,” “stylization,” and 
rhythmic dominance resulted, in Adorno’s account, in the “impoverishment of the compositional 
procedures” themselves and the “deterioration of technique.”733 
Where Adorno denied the structural role of Stravinsky’s elevation of rhythm, Brelet 
insisted that the rhythmic dimension guided development and that it did so insofar as the “formal 
                                                 
729Brelet, Le Temps musical, 277: “The essence of musical rhythm is to reside, as Johannes Volkelt says, in 
a ‘play delivered from the real and from the object,’ of being free from all extrinsic significance. And once could say 
that in it the properly rhythmic is illuminated, this essential and stripped down rhythm that signifies itself.” 
[“L’essence du rythme musical, c’est de résider, comme le dit Johannes Volkelt, dans un ‘jeu délivré du 
réel et de l’objet,’ d’être libre de toute signification extrinsèque. Et l’on peut dire qu’en lui s’illumine le proprement 
rythmique, ce rythme essentiel et dépouillé qui se signifie lui-même.”] 
730Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 159.  
731Ibid. In this regard, Brelet cites Schaeffner on the Rite of Spring: “The sole form of development in the 
Sacre thus appears to be entirely rhythmic and is implemented by elimination or metric amplification. On rare 
occasions, Beethoven made use of such a mode of rhythmic development, but he never converted it as Stravinsky 
has done into the immediate, atomic material of musical language.” Schaeffner, 52. 
732Ibid. 
733Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 116. According to Adorno, “Stravinsky’s stalwarts carefully 
accommodate themselves to the discomfort with this [deterioration of technique] by proclaiming him most of all a 
rhythmist and attesting that he has restored to honor the rhythmical dimension of music, which had become 
overshadowed by the melodic-harmonic dimension, and has thus unearthed the stifled origins of music.” 
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and active powers of time are manifested in it in their purity.”734 Ordinarily, Brelet maintained, 
“temporal form is only thought mediately, i.e., through the intermediary of sonic material.”735 
Stravinsky’s “rhythmic development,” however, nearly dissolved the “sonic material within its 
temporal form,” making the latter into the “immediate material” of musical thought.736 
Adorno alleged that there was no rhythmic development in Stravinsky, only a sort of 
random, senseless series of rhythmic “displacements” of what was “always the same and entirely 
static,” a “marching in place in which the haphazard recurrence” replaced the “new”: 
Not only does the invariably, rigidly maintained meter, in Stravinsky’s music, 
beginning with The Rite of Spring, lack all subjective, expressive flexibility, but it 
also lacks any coherently successive rhythmical relation to the structure, to the 
inner compositional makeup of the work, to the “whole rhythm” of the form. The 
rhythm is emphasized but detached from the musical content.737 
 
Brelet held that precisely the opposite was true of Stravinskyan rhythm. To Adorno’s statement 
above, she would have replied that, in fact, it was the musical content, that Stravinsky reoriented 
the rhythmic aspect such that, turning its gaze upon itself, it largely ignored what for Adorno was 
the “musical content” (i.e., pitch) and made of itself its own material. Rhythm worked upon 
itself; form became content. When rhythm and meter came to dominate the aesthetic design of 
Stravinsky’s music, Brelet claimed, the “most impoverished sonic material, animated by a 
temporal form, generated a musical depth.”738 
Rhythm consisted, for Brelet, in an essential “dialectic of freedom and form,” and this 
“antinomy of rhythm” embodied the “antinomy of musical time” itself, an antinomy composed 
of “form and duration”—an antinomy in which form attempted to take possession of duration 
                                                 
734Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 159.  
735Ibid., 160.  
736Ibid., 159–60.  
737Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 116–7.  
738Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 153.  
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“without ever managing to capture it completely.”739 For Brelet, respecting both rhythm and 
meter through accepting the irreducibility of their conflict served as an essential precondition for 
all aesthetically valuable music. Rhythm was inherently metrical, and meter inherently 
rhythmic—rather than discrete entities, they formed inseparable and antithetical components of 
an indissoluble dialectical configuration. Their conflict was both necessary and productive: “the 
conflict of rhythm and meter,” Brelet wrote, can never be “resolved entirely,” since “this conflict 
is inscribed at the very heart of living music.”740 
5.4.5 La Carrure and the Mystery of the Eternal Present 
According to Brelet, Stravinsky derived his conception of musical time from the “eternal,” i.e., 
from the “actuality of an act always sufficient and equal to itself.”741 The “intensely living 
musical time” of Stravinsky’s works bestowed, for Brelet, a lasting “image of the eternal 
present” in which the unity of music and the human attained its fullest realization. Embodying 
the consummation of human consciousness, Stravinsky’s synthetic music fashioned from 
“eternal duration” an “expression of intense and superabundant life.”742 
Brelet’s understanding of Stravinsky’s music as embodying the plenitude of an “eternal 
present” can be seen as an elaboration of Lavelle’s reflections on the dialectical nature of 
perception and time, and in particular his notion of an atemporal present.  
                                                 
739Brelet, Le Temps musical, 302. 
740Ibid.  
741Brelet, Le Temps musical, 687.  
742Ibid., 689.  
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“Where perception occurs, there is no longer any time,” Lavell wrote.743 Inextricable 
from the act of participation, time emerged, in Lavelle’s thought, from a “non-coincidence of the 
self with the present of the object.”744 The experience of time was the experience of this non-
coincidence, this gap, this interval between self and object. To overcome time, then, was to 
perceive actively, to negate time by filling it “with our activity,” to “live in an eternal 
present.”745 The decision to overcome time took place in the instant—the “place of 
participation.”746 In turning within the instant away from the present of time, the subject 
exercised its freedom and entered the présence of eternity. 
Brelet made Lavelle’s philosophy of time more concrete. She read in Stravinsky’s music 
the signs of eternity. In Stravinsky, temporal continuity paradoxically arose from the 
“discontinuous itself,” from the “perpetual resumption” of a “living power of renewal.”747 
Stravinsky’s music effected, for Brelet, an experience of Lavellian eternity, of a “perpetual 
beyond which prevented time from ever coming to a stop.”748 Engendering an aural experience 
of the eternal, the “concrete rational time” of Stravinsky’s compositions conciliated the antinomy 
of mind and body, conjoining “what was believed to be contrary”—the biological and the 
spiritual.749 
                                                 
743Lavelle, Du temps, 22.  
744Ibid.  
745Smith, 66.  
746Lavelle, Du temps, 247.  
747Brelet, Le Temps musical, 684. “And this is the sign that it is installed in the absolute, that it is the 
expression of a concrete intelligence creating temporal continuity through an act of indefinitely renewed 
distinction.” 
748Lavelle, Du temps, 419. 
749Brelet, Le Temps musical, 684, 689. The “overflowing life” that “animates” in Stravinsky’s music the 
“purest and most stripped down forms” expresses the “total victory of musical time over psychological duration” 
and “consummates and ratifies” the “reconciliation, in a common eternity, of two antagonistic powers, of two 
contrary durations of being: the biological and spiritual.”  
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For Brelet, it was specifically Stravinsky’s spiritualized rhythms that reintegrated the 
fragmented durations of the modern human. Stravinsky’s music actualized rhythm, making it 
into a self-conscious and self-contemplating temporal dimension—a rhythm both conscious of 
itself and reflecting on itself, or a thinking of time. Stravinsky respected the inescapable conflict 
between measure and rhythm, but evinced a predilection for “the carrure, rhythm of the 
measure,” which attested to the merging of the “intelligibility and reality” of rhythm.750 
The notion of la carrure has its origins in choreography, in the coordinated movements 
of the body—in marching and in dance, specifically. All of “the old French marches, almost all 
the former provincial dances of our country,” Brelet wrote, are “square.”751 The carrure arises 
from a grouping of the body’s natural rhythmic movements, from an ordering into regular, 
recurring measures. The carrure is fundamentally social: “measure,” Brelet writes, is “social 
requirement, tames individual durations, but also brings them into agreement.”752 
Concrete in dance, carrure becomes abstract in music. It does not thereby lose its living 
quality, becoming a husk, an empty shell, a strictly mechanical procedure for the organization of 
musical temporality. Nor does its continued survival, in music that no longer accompanies the 
                                                 
750Ibid. The French word carrure typically denotes either the “square, regular form of a monument” or the 
“width of the back from one shoulder to the other.” Figuratively, it may mean “size, scope, strength” or “exactitude, 
certitude, directness.” See http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/carrure, accessed 28 September 2016. 
In Le Temps musical, Brelet qualifies the notion of carrure in several ways, calling it a “rhythm of accents” 
and, more generally, the “symmetry” and “cyclism” of either “harmony” or “rhythm.” But not of melody, upon 
which carrure always seems rather to be imposed. Classical composers, for example, subject melody completely to 
carrure, to symmetrical phrasing, which fragments its natural curve and fashions a melodic “image” of “rational 
time.” That carrure is at odds with melody is, Brelet contended, as it should be. This conflict powers the dialectical 
engine of musical time itself. The “free rhythm of melody” constitutes, for Brelet, the “true musical rhythm,” the 
“momentum of which surmounts all the segments and incisions of metric form”; however, the “abandon and the 
nonchalance of melodic rhythm” requires the “rigor of the meter.” Without meter, rhythm ceased to exist. And 
without the conflict between the two, music ceased to exist. Ibid., 293, 635. 
751Ibid. In music, the term phrase carrée (literally, “square phrase”) designates a phrase consisting of four 
equal measures (or a number of measures in multiples of four), and, by extension, rythme carré and mélodie carrée 
specify “square” rhythms and melodies (i.e., rhythms and melodies that obey a principle of symmetry). 
752Ibid., 306. “And it could be said,” she continues, “that the social time of the collectivity that imposed the 
measure, is mediator, from the point of the perception of time, between subjective duration and universal time.”  
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dance, indicate signs of regression. For Brelet, its presence was both ineradicable and ultimately 
favorable. Brelet argued that Stravinsky’s great accomplishment was to have recaptured the 
essence of musical time through recuperating the carrure. 
When applied to the history of Western art music, this peculiarly abstract concretion 
emerged in Brelet’s text on musical time as at first a hindrance to the fulfillment of music’s 
rhythmic possibilities. In its earliest appearances in Le Temps musical, carrure served as the 
adversary of sonority itself, enchaining musical sound with an external temporal schemata. In the 
“Beethovenian symphony,” for example, the presence of carrure disrupted the music’s 
continuity to the detriment of its concrete development.753 Debussy, having aimed “above all to 
respect the concrete being of sounds,” conversely cast off “thematicism and the carrure” and 
sought a “law of musical development” in the “harmonies themselves.”754  
Gradually, however, carrure evolved from a destructive and undesirable force to that of 
equal partner in a mutually beneficial antagonism. Brelet’s Stravinsky rediscovered this eternal 
value and necessity of carrure, which inhabited rhythm itself as one side of its intrinsically 
double nature, as one half of its “interior antinomy.”755 The other half, which had come to 
dominate the texture of romantic music, was the purely musical rhythm of the vocal gesture. The 
antinomy of physical carrure and spiritual phrasing thus expressed that essential rhythmic 
dialectic of form and freedom. 
For Adorno, articulating time through “its division into equal quantities” virtually 
abrogated it and spatialized it. Brelet, however, now looking back from the perspective of 
                                                 
753Ibid., 272. The “dialectic theme-development” in Beethoven’s symphonic works came “under the grip of 
rhythmic carrure,” the schematic rigidity of which constantly fractured the “momentum of the melody” (itself the 
restitution and reiteration of the “momentum of sound”).  
754Ibid.  
755Ibid., 302. 
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history, whose pinnacle, for her, was Stravinsky, would have said that meter can and has 
served—in Mozart and Beethoven, for instance—as a regulation of movement in time that 
provides formal unity without destroying temporality completely. “In its secret being,” Brelet 
claimed, music escaped from the rigid symmetry of dance rhythms. In dance, meter was a spatial 
concept; in music, it became a dynamic, temporal experience. She directed attention to the music 
of the classics: 
Listen to Mozart or even Beethoven: is not the carrure in each idealized, 
symmetry, torn from space, in order to compose a purely temporal structure? In 
classical music, as we have shown, the carrure takes on a wholly other meaning 
than in dance: far from expressing the fatality of the spatial, it expresses a 
deliberated conception of time, a rationalist philosophy, which has preferred the 
homogeneous time of the understanding to heterogeneous duration, the principle 
of identity, creator of intelligibility, to anarchic diversity, and the eternal to the 
temporal. And who does not sense that spiritualization of the carrure in Mozart, 
which is no longer spatial heaviness but transparent and rational legerity?756 
 
Musical carrure was the temporalization of spatiality, not the spatialization of temporality.  
Brelet argued that when Stravinsky revived la carrure to “found his audacious rhythms,” 
he recovered and actualized the “very law of perception of rhythm—the presence, whether real 
or virtual, in it of a metric and homogeneous time in relation to which the diversity of rhythmic 
groups are organized.”757 Stravinsky recognized and made into reality the fact that “measure is 
interior to rhythm itself.”758 By pursuing the mystery of metricity, he revealed with “particular 
                                                 
756Brelet, Le Temps musical, 269–70: “Écoutez Mozart ou même Beethoven: est-ce que la carrure chez eux 
n’est pas idéalisée, la symétrie, arrachée à l’espace, afin de composer une structure purement temporelle? Dans la 
musique classique, comme nous verrons, la carrure revêt un tout autre sens que dans la danse: loin d’exprimer la 
fatalité du spatial, elle exprime une conception délibérée du temps, une philosophie rationaliste, qui a préféré le 
temps homogène de l’entendement à la durée hétérogène, le principe d’identité, créateur d’intelligibilité, au divers 
anarchique et l’éternel au temporel. Et qui ne sent cette spiritualisation de la carrure chez Mozart, laquelle n’est plus 
lourdeur spatiale mais légèreté transparente du rationnel?” 
757Brelet, Esthétique et création musicale, 22. also section 4.3.3.2 above. 
758Brelet, Le Temps musical, 293. 
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acuity” the “condition of the reality and intelligibility of rhythm,” the living antinomy upon 
which it was based.759 
The music of Stravinsky aimed, in Brelet’s words, to insert the self “into the musical 
present and the present into the self.”760 It aimed “to deliver us from the torments of 
subjectivity,” and it did so through its tendency to transform the measure into a “dynamic and 
living reality.”761 The measure possessed, in Stravinsky’s music, an “astonishing force of 
impulsion and propulsion.”762 The Stravinskyan measure incarnated the “elementary power of 
homogeneous time,” the time of human collectivity.763 It also consummated the voluntary 
“sacrifice” that took the individual from a personal, subjective, and heterogeneous duration to 
universal homogeneous time.764 
This sacrifice did not entail an identification of the music with the “annihilating 
authority” of the collective; it neither treated the subject as a “victim” of society nor led to the 
liquidation of this subject.765 Rather than mocking the “tradition of humanistic art,” Stravinsky’s 
music offered a renewal of the human, one which favored objectivity but still respected the 
subjectivity immanent in music’s dialecticality.766 The sacrifice of the subject was far from 
complete, in other words.  
From Brelet’s perspective, Stravinsky made objectivity and collectivity more palatable. 
Stravinsky’s musical aesthetic, as Brelet portrayed it, avoided the “pathos” of “solitary 
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762Ibid. 
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764Ibid. 
765Adorno, Philosophy of New Music, 110.  
766Ibid. 
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subjectivity, withdrawn into itself.”767 It did not impose its authority unilaterally; rather, it spoke 
to the objective qualities of subjectivity itself, presenting the subject not as it was but as it could 
be, perhaps even as it ought to be. It did not liquidate the subject, but purified it. In Stravinsky’s 
musical objectivism, the human subject discovered the “lived measure that is ontological time,” 
experienced an “unknown joy, metaphysical joy of a reconciliation with self, and of a coinciding, 
far from the unreality of the future and of desire, with that eternal present in which the time of 
the self and the time of the world come together.”768 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
Jankélévitch’s Debussy and Brelet’s Stravinsky have this in common: they perform, in music, a 
kind of phenomenological reduction.769 Within the aesthetic object itself, the philosophers’ 
composers display a form of temporary reconciliation between subject and object, constituting a 
temporal space in which self and world interact. Their musical works, to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
language, “express” a singular “mode of existing.”770 Jankélévitch and Brelet probe the 
existential “dimensions” of Debussy and Stravinsky’s music, discerning therein a “unique 
manner of behavior towards others, towards Nature, time, and death: a certain way of patterning 
the world…”771  
In participating in the re-creation of this music, performers and audiences, from the 
perspectives of Brelet and Jankélévitch, not only take part in the re-construction of a “relational, 
lived space” within a musico-phenomenological world, they also experience the “very conditions 
of our embodied access to the world” and spontaneously perform a “Husserlian ἐποχή.”772 
Though, in their descriptions of music and aesthetics, neither Brelet nor Jankélévitch ever made 
explicit reference to phenomenology or its methods, they nonetheless rendered aesthetic 
                                                 
769It is the eidetic reduction that makes possible phenomenology’s “broadened notion of intentionality.” 
Merleau-Ponty, Basic Writings, 74. See note 69, above. 
770Ibid., 75.  
771Ibid. 
772Jerome Veith, translator’s forward to Aesthetics as Phenomenology: The Appearance of Things, by 
Günter Figal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), xi. Epoché (ἐποχή), or “suspension,” refers to 
Husserl’s notion of bracketing the “natural attitude” of scientific thinking in order “to return to that world which 
precedes knowledge.” It is, in other words, part and parcel of the phenomenological reduction. Ibid., 65. 
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experience as an experience of that which makes experience possible in the first place—as an 
experience of the mysterious conditions of existence per se. 
As we have seen, they approached the study of these conditions from different directions. 
Jankélévitch maintained a performative stance, Brelet a cognitive stance. Jankélévitch was 
seeking to re-create the mysterious effects of what was for him ultimately ineffable, unknowable. 
Brelet was trying to pin down and articulate the essence of music’s mysteriousness. Jankélévitch 
was trying to perform mystery; Brelet was trying to explain it.  
In this, they formed a complementary pair, having expressed between them the full range 
of mysteriological explorations in post-WWII France. They did so, moreover, between two areas 
of study, between two disciplines, charting the interstices of music and philosophy, musicology 
and phenomenology. By and large an intellectual history of this interdisciplinarity, my 
dissertation maps the liminal spaces in which Jankélévitch and Brelet carried out their work.  
In a nutshell, so to speak, my dissertation claims that the philosopher-musicologists 
Gisèle Brelet and Vladimir Jankélévitch constructed phenomenologies of musical mystery in 
postwar France, binding the aesthetic experience of music to an act of participation, an act in 
which otherness is constituted in and through the creation of musical time.  
 
219 
APPENDIX A 
TYPES OF MYSTERY IN JANKÉLÉVITCH’S DEBUSSY ET LE MYSTÈRE 
Table 6. Types of Mystery in Jankélévitch’s Debussy et le mystère 
 
Types of Mystery Page Number(s) 
death 10, 19, 22, 133, 146 
love 10 
the constitutional and nuclear mystery of existence 10 
the limpid mystery (or the destinal mystery of existence) 11, 13 
fate 13, 22 
the occult mystery (or the arcane Punchinello) 12 
anguish 14, 15, 80, 95 
voluptuosity 17, 149, 150 
femininity 18, 139 
the body 18 
the soul 18 
the great mystery of Punchinello 18 
the domestic mystery of the death of love 20 
the mortal mystery (the ultimate mystery, mystery of mysteries) 20 
midday (a mystery of ecstasy and desperate voluptuosity)  149 
the ambient mystery 31 
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the mystery of Psyche 31 
the mystery of Physis 31 
the ontological mystery (a mystery of gratuitousness—co-presence, multi-presence, and omni-
presence) 32 
a mystery of decadence and decomposition 51 
aquatic mysteries 54 
a mystery of multi-presence 32, 65 
the mystery of the horizon 75 
the mystery of pure presence (a mystery of irreality) 75 
the meridian mystery of existence 76 
the nocturnal mystery of nothingness 76 
the Debussyan mystery (a mystery of light) 76 
mysteries of midnight (mysteries of darkness) 77 
the mystery of dissonances 77 
the inexplicable mystery of F-sharp major 77 
this mystery of the afternoon (the mystery of the sun at its zenith, mystery of the panic summer and the 
blinding silence) 82–3 
these mysterious terrors (the panics) 83 
the lethal mystery 87 
sheer co-presence and of the pure fact of being there (which produces Debussyan harmony, the 
harmony of mystery) 104 
an ironic mystery (a caprice of fate) 104 
a completely esoteric mystery 112 
the mystery of disquieted delectation 115 
this “major” mystery (a form of the canicular and meridian mystery) 124 
a mystery of consonance 124 
the beautiful mystery of Spanishness [le beau mystère d’hispanité] 131 
two symmetrical mysteries of liminality 133 
the mysteries of creation 133 
a mystery of innocence 139 
the mystery of Mélisande the happy-but-sad  141 
the mystery of Mélisande with the golden hair 141 
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the mystery of Nuit de Noël, of Kachtchéï l’immortel, and of Nuit de mai (the mystery of “the winter 
which is in Debussy the omega and the culminating and incomprehensible raison d'être of all life”) 146 
the eternal mystery of man 149 
mystery sharpened, mystery of midday, mystery of nothingness and the immobile 149 
mystery flattened, mystery of midnight, of hope and living water 149 
the profoundest mystery of the darkest night 150 
the mystery of a beauty that is indifferent and already supernatural simply by its presence 150 
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APPENDIX B 
COMPOSITIONS CITED IN DEBUSSY ET LE MYSTÈRE 
Table 7. Compositions Cited in Jankélévitch’s Debussy et le mystère 
 
Compositions by Debussy Number of References 
the Étude Pour les cinq doigts 5 
Les Tierces alternées (Préludes II, no. 11) 2 
Docteur Gradus ad Parnassum (Children's Corner, no. 1) 2 
La Damoiselle élue 6 
Khamma 16 
Le Martyre de saint Sébastien 23 
Pagodes (Estampes, no. 1) 6 
Placet futile (Trois poèmes de Stéphane Mallarmé, no. 2) 2 
Boîte à joujoux 33 
Berceuse héroïque 3 
Pièce pour clarinette in G major 1 
Ballade (1890) 1 
Hommage à Joseph Haydn for solo piano 5 
Suite bergamasque 7 
Lindaraja 8 
Pelléas et Mélisande more than 100 
Des pas sur la neige (Préludes I, no. 6) 11 
the Étude Pour les accords 4 
Rhapsodie for clarinet 4 
the Étude Pour les tierces 3 
Noël des enfants qui n'ont plus de maison 3 
La Chevelure (Chansons de Bilitis, no. 2) 2 
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Les Angélus: Cloches chrétiennes pour les matines  1 
De fleurs (Proses lyriques, no. 3) 6 
Sonate de violoncelle 5 
Sonate pour flûte, alto et harpe 6 
Sonate pour piano et violon 9 
En blanc et noir  12 
Recueillement (Cinq poèmes de Baudelaire, no. 4) 5 
Ballade de Villon á s’amye (Trois ballades de François Villon, no. 1)  1 
La Neige danse (Children's Corner, no. 4) 8 
Colloque sentimental (Fêtes galantes II, no. 3) 9 
Pour un tombeau sans nom (2d Épigraphe antique) 6 
Clair de lune (Suite Bergamasque, no. 3) 1 
Nuages (Nocturnes for orchestra, no. 1) 9 
Fêtes (Nocturnes for orchestra, no. 2) 9 
Sirènes (Nocturnes for orchestra, no. 3) 10 
Brouillards (Préludes II, no. 1) 10 
Feuilles mortes (Préludes II, no. 2) 7 
La Mer 26 
Parfums de la nuit (Ibéria, no. 2) (Images III for orchestra, no. 2) 18 
Le Son du cor s’afflige vers les bois (Mélodies, no. 2) 5 
La Grotte (Chansons de France, no. 2) 5 
En sourdine (Fêtes galantes I, no. 1) 9 
Prélude à l’après-midi d’un faune 5 
La Puerta del Vino (Préludes II, no. 3) 2 
La Soirée dans Grenade (Estampes, no. 2) 7 
Le Vent dans la plaine (Préludes I, no. 3) 9 
Pour remercier la pluie au matin (6th Épigraphe antique) 4 
Voiles (Préludes I, no. 2) 4 
Isle joyeuse for solo piano 5 
Mouvement (Images I for piano, no. 3) 7 
Jardins sous la pluie (Estampes, no. 3) 13 
Masques for solo piano 11 
Pour le piano 15 
the Étude Pour les degrés chromatiques 8 
"Les Fées sont d’exquises danseuses" (Préludes II, no. 4) 16 
Ballade des femmes de Paris (Trois ballades de François Villon, no. 3) 2 
De soir (Proses lyriques, no. 4) 13 
Rondes de printemps (Images III for orchestra, no. 3) 9 
Feux d’artifice (Préludes II, no. 12) 10 
the Étude Pour les huit doigts  3 
De grève (Proses lyriques, no. 2) 6 
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Échelonnement des haies moutonne à l'infini (Mélodies, no. 3)  6 
Chevaux de bois (Ariettes oubliées, no. 4) 8 
Marche écossaise for piano, four hands 1 
Petite suite for piano, four hands 1 
Par les rues et par les chemins (Ibéria, no. 1) (Images III for orchestra, no. 2) 1 
Reflets dans l’eau (Images I for piano, no. 1) 11 
La Sérénade interrompue (Préludes I, no. 9) 11 
Le Matin d’un jour de fête (Ibéria, no. 3) (Images III for orchestra, no. 2) 5 
Les Collines d’Anacapri (Préludes I, no. 5) 7 
La Danse de Puck (Préludes I, no. 11) 5 
Minstrels (Préludes I, no. 12) 2 
Général Lavine (Préludes II, no. 6) 1 
Le Promenoir des deux amants for voice and piano 4 
La Mer est plus belle que les cathédrales (Mélodies, no. 3) 1 
Ce qu’a vu le vent d’ouest (Préludes I, no. 7) 2 
Jeux de vagues (La Mer, no. 2) 9 
Jet d’eau (Cinq poèmes de Baudelaire, no. 3) 2 
Dialogue du vent et de la mer 4 
Poissons d’or (Images II for piano, no. 3) 6 
the Étude Pour les sonorités opposées 11 
La Terrasse des audiences du clair de lune (Préludes II, no. 7)   11 
Cloches à travers les feuilles (Images II for piano, no. 1) 9 
the Étude Pour les agréments  5 
Canope (Préludes II, no. 10) 5 
the Étude Pour les arpèges composés 3 
Éventail (Trois poèmes de Stéphane Mallarmé, no. 3) 2 
the Étude Pour les sixtes  1 
the Étude Pour les octaves 2 
De l’aube á midi sur la mer (from La Mer) 1 
Rhapsodie pour saxophone  10 
Pour invoquer Pan (1st Épigraphe antique) 3 
Apparition (for voice and piano) 3 
Syrinx for flute 7 
De rêve (Proses lyriques, no. 1) 9 
Ondine (Préludes II, no. 8) 9 
Gigues (Images III for orchestra, no. 1) 14 
2d Ballade de François Villon 3 
Danseuses de Delphes (Préludes I, no. 1) 1 
Danse sacrée (Danses for cross-strung harp and string quintet, no. 1) 1 
Hommage à Rameau (Images I for piano, no. 2) 8 
Et la lune descend sur le temple qui fut (Images II for piano, no. 2) 6 
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La Cathédrale engloutie (Préludes I, no. 10) 4 
Fantoches (Fêtes galantes I, no. 2) 1 
Les tombeau des Naïades (Chansons de Bilitis, no. 3) 6 
the Étude Pour les notes répétées 5 
"Les Sons et les parfums tournent dans l’air du soir" (Préludes I, no. 4) 3 
Pour l'Égyptienne (5th Épigraphe antique) 4 
Chambre magique (from Le Martyre de saint Sébastien)  5 
Bruyères (Préludes II, no. 5) 4 
Fille aux cheveux de lin (Préludes I, no. 8)  9 
Harmonie du soir (Poèmes de Baudelaire, no. 2)  2 
Rondel (Chansons de France, no. 1) 3 
“Aquarelles I. Green” (Ariettes oubliées, no. 5) 1 
La Flûte de Pan (Chansons de Bilitis, no. 1) 4 
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APPENDIX C 
MUSIC EXAMPLES IN DEBUSSY ET LE MYSTÈRE 
Table 8. Music Examples in Jankélévitch’s Debussy et le mystère 
 
Piece(s) Chapter 
Pelléas et Mélisande 1 
La Sérénade interrompue (Préludes I, no. 9);  
Le Matin d'un jour de fete (Iberia II) 
2 
Sirènes (Nocturnes for orchestra, no. 3); La Mer (II. Jeux de vagues) 
Dialogue du vent et de la mer 
De soir (Proses lyriques, no. 4); Chevaux de bois;  
Reflets dans l'eau (Images I for piano, no. 1);  
Albeniz: Fête-Dieu à Seville (Iberia I.iii) 
Pour les sonorités opposées (5th étude, p. 18–9);  
De rêve (Proses lyriques, no. 1) 
Albeniz: Evocation, Triana, and Asturias 
Albeniz: Fête-Dieu à Seville (Iberia I.iii) 
De soir (Proses lyriques, no. 4);  
La Flûte de Pan (Chansons de Bilitis, no. 1);  
Lindaraja 
Pour les agréments (Études II, p. 6);  
Jeux (p. 4, 14) 
Les Parfums de la nuit (Iberia II, markers 39, 41, 50);  
La Soirée dans Grenade 
Syrinx (1913); Le Faune (Fêtes galantes II, 1904) 
3 
“Je tremble volant ton visage” (Promenoir des deux amants, no. 3) 
En Sourdine (Fêtes galantes I, 1892);  
Colloque sentimental (Fêtes galantes II, 1904) 
Par les rues et par les chemins (Iberia) 
Jeux; Gigues (8);  
Khamma;  
2d Épigraphe antique [Pour un tombeau sans nom] 
227 
La Chevelure (Chansons de Bilitis II); Pelléas et Mélisande, I.i 
Les Parfums de la nuit (Iberia II) 
Khamma; Sonate de violoncelle (finale, p. 10) 
Pour un tombeau sans nom (2d Épigraphe antique, 1914);  
Sonate pour flûte, alto et harpe (interlude) (1916);  
2d Ballade de Francois Villon (1910) 
Sonate pour flûte, alto et harpe 
En blanc et noir (II, p. 16–7) 
Pelléas et Mélisande II.i, II.ii, IV.ii; Pour le piano (II. Sarabande); Gigues (3) 
Boîte à joujoux II (p. 32–33); Pour les notes répétées (Études II, 9) 
Échelonnement des haies 
Masques (p. 6–7); Tombeau des Naïades (Chansons de Bilitis II, p. 12) 
Rhapsodie pour orchestre et saxophone (6) 
Gigues (3) 
Moussorgski: Chants et danses de la mort, II Epilogue 
 Gigues (9) 
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